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PREFACE
This dissertation is interested in a plane of reality which is such 
that it can only be known with the criteria of knowledge given in the disser­
tation, namely: (i) that it is unchangeable; (ii) that it cannot be mis­
taken; (iii) that it is identical with its object. The question of the 
dissertation is what can exist and what cannot exist in solely this sense, 
and whether anything can exist in this sense.
But prima facie, at least, there appears to be another level of 
existence, the level of subjects and objects. While, given the above cri­
teria, it may be true that we cannot know this level to exist, we certainly 
believe that it does. The world of subjects and objects exists on the level 
of belief.
The question of levels is crucial to an understanding of the disser­
tation. There is the level of reality, which is the level at which there is 
knowledge; and, there is the level of the appearance of subjects and objects 
which is the level at which there is belief. These levels must be kept clear­
ly distinct from each other or else one will be led to absurd conclusions.
For example, on the level of reality, all that there is is knowledge. A 
confusion of the two levels can prompt a question such as this one: "If all
that there is is knowledge, why is it that we cannot walk through walls?"
The question is asked from one level, the level of the appearance of a subject 
and an object, and an answer is sought from the other level, the level where 
there is neither subject nor object. The level of the question is preferen­
tially disposed to the subject. The questioner thinks that the object can be
shown to be an illusion and that the subject can continue to exist in a world 
without objects. But the level of reality is one which takes us beyond both 
subjects and objects. So long as there is a belief in the subject there must 
be a belief in the object as well. So long as there is a subject there must 
be an object. On the level of subjects and objects, everything remains as 
before. This world, with all of its rules, must remain Intact for the sub­
ject. For all practical purposes the subject must obey all the rules of the 
object world. But the entire world of the appearance of subject and object 
exists on the level of belief.
The distinction of levels bears on another issue: the evolutionary
nature of the dialogues. The questions one asks and the answers that he is 
given are always reflective of the level he occupies. Answers given by the 
teacher at the beginning of the dialogues are not necessarily identical with 
the answers he will give at the end of the dialogues. Propositions stated 
as truths in the early dialogues are stated so but provisionally. These 
propositions must themselves be abandoned once the standpoint of reality has 
been achieved. They are but the rungs on a ladder. Once the ascent has been 
made the ladder may then be discarded.
But now even this description must be abandoned. For the distinction 
of levels exists only on the level of appearance. On the level of reality 
there are not two levels. Reality is non-dual. On the level of appearance 
there are two levels. But the level of appearance is but a provisional 
standpoint. It exists as a ladder on which we may ascend to reality. From 
the standpoint of reality there are not two levelB. But one cannot occupy 
this level until one has made the ascent.
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In the summer of 1970, the author travelled to India to see the great 
sage, Sri Padmanabha Menon, to whom he shall always be deeply Indebted.
This dissertation was submitted to the Committee in January of 1972.
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subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge which Is the source of 
the unexplained and inexplicable residues in the solutions to epistemological 
problems which have been propounded by Western philosophers. These residues 
have been a breeding ground for skepticism, a skepticism which casts doubt 
on the validity of the philosophic enterprise. It is hoped that this thesis 
might play some role In indicating a pathway through which faith in the 
philosophic enterprise may be restored.
The approach taken is a multi-leveled one which is at once transcen­
dental, metaphysical, phenomenological and empirical. It is transcendental 
in that the question is always how is knowledge possible? It is metaphysical 
in that the focal point of the inquiry is always that which is, as opposed 
to that which seems to be. It is phenomenological in that the inquiry is 
confined to the data of consciousness and makes no attempt to go beyond
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subject knower. That there can be an appearance of plurality is demonstrated 
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purely ideal.
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they have been dirempted provides an explanation of the possibility of know­
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Teacher: Since you have come to me as a student what is It that you wish
to know?
Student: I want to know something that is certain and yet is not at the
same time a mere tautology, as A *= A. I want to know something that is 
certain and is not simply true because of the way words are defined. I want 
to know something that is certain about what really exists.
Teacher: Indeed, this is a most worthy desire. What has kept you from dis­
covering what it is you desire to know?
Student: One day I talk with one man and I become enamoured with his beliefs.
The next day I speak with another man and I find myself brought to exactly the 
opposite opinion. I am beginning to despair that knowledge does not exist.
It seems that everything is in a constant flux and there is nothing that is 
unchangeable.
Teacher: If everything were in constant flux you would never be aware of it.
It is only because there is something which is constant that you can be aware 
of change at all. Change can be detected only against a background which is 
unchangeable.
Student: You are saying that there is such a thing as knowledge.
Teacher: Let us not take for granted what I am saying. Let us set out
together and prove whatever we may say both to your satisfaction and to mine. 
Student: Excellent. I am ready for that.
Teacher: Now, tell me something that you believe.
Student: I believe that you are sitting here in front of me.
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Teacher: It could be possible, however, that I am an elaborately construct­
ed marionette whose voice is being operated by remote control.
Student: Yes, that is possible.
Teacher: The belief that you have that I am really here could be proven
wrong.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: You would then change your belief that I am really here.
Student: Of course.
Teacher: Belief we may say is changeable. A belief is something about
which you may be mistaken.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Now, do you believe that I am really here.
Student: Why, of course.
Teacher: Do you believe that you believe that I am here?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: What, do you mean that you might be mistaken about believing that
I am here? Is it possible that you never thought that I was here?
Student: No, that is not possible. I could not be wrong about thinking that
you were here. Surely, I thought that you were here whether or not you were 
actually here.
Teacher: Do you still want to say that you believed that you believed that I
was here?
Student: No, I see now that I was mistaken to have said that. For, if I
merely believed that I believed that you were here you could convince me that 
I may never have believed that you were here.
Teacher: Could anything occur to change your mind so that you would say that
you did not believe that I was here?
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Student: No.
Teacher: You cannot be mistaken, then, that you thought or believed that X
was here.
Student: No.
Teacher: A belief is something about which you may be mistaken and which you
may change. Here, we have an instance of something in which you cannot be
mistaken and which is not subject to change. Would you be willing to name
what we have here "knowledge" instead of belief?
Student: Very well.
Teacher: We have discovered two characteristics that distinguish knowledge
from belief.^ Knowledge is that in which you cannot be mistaken and knowledge 
is unchangeable.^ The reason that you have found yourself with changing views 
up until now is that you have been moving on the level of belief and have not 
yet come to knowledge.
Student: How do we know that there is such a thing as knowledge?
Teacher: What, have you not proven it yourself? Did you not just tell me you
could not be mistaken about thinking that I was here? Did we not agree that
although you could be mistaken about what you were thinking, you could not be
mistaken about the fact that you were thinking.
Student: I am still not perfectly clear about what you mean.
Teacher: What 1 mean is that you cannot be mistaken about your consciousness
although you may be mistaken in what your consciousness is about.
Student: Are you saying that knowledge and consciousness are the same thing?
■̂For the distinction between knowledge and belief cf., Augustine, Of 
True Religion, XLIX, 96.
•‘Plato arrives at similar conclusions, cf., Theatetus, C, 152; 
Republic, V, 477.
Teacher: Yes, the terms 'awareness1, 'consciousness1, and 'knowledge* may
be used interchangeably. We use the expressions this way in our everyday
language so why should we not use them in this way in our discussion here?
Have you not heard someone say: "I am conscious of a flaw in your argument",
or, "I am aware of what you are saying", to mean that, "I am aware that there
is a flaw in your argument", or, "I know what you are saying".
Student: Very well, I accept the equivalence of meaning among the terms
'awareness', 'consciousness', and 'knowledge'.
Teacher: And we know that there is knowledge.
Student: I do not know if there is knowledge or not.
Teacher: Do you believe that you do not know if knowledge does or does not
exist?
Student: No, you will not catch me up there. I know that I do not know
3whether or not there is knowledge.
Teacher: Then you have yourself proved that there is knowledge in virtue of
your own possession of it.
Student: Could It not be possible that I am deceived?
Teacher: Would you not have to be conscious in order to be deceived? We do
not think of stones as being able to be deceived because we do not attribute
consciousness to them.
Student: Yes, you are right, I would have to be conscious in order to be
4deceived.
3Similar arguments may be found in Augustine, cf., On the Trinity,
X, 1, 14; Of True Religion, XXIX, 73.
^Augustine says, "...it is certain, that he who Is deceived, yet lives." 
On the Trinity XV, 12. And, Descartes, referring to the possibility of his 
being deceived by a cunning deceiver: "There is therefore no doubt that I exist,
if he deceives me." Meditations, II.
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Teacher: And did we not say that consciousness and knowledge are one and the
same?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Then have we not shown that it is impossible to be deceived about
the fact that there is knowledge.
Student: Very well. You have convinced me that there is knowledge. But if
what you mean by knowledge is only our immediate awareness then knowledge 
would not have any content to it. We might very well know that knowledge 
existed but of the existence of the vast array of phenomena in the world we 
would remain ignorant. To know only of the existence of knowledge would be 
to know only a small portion of what exists.
Teacher: What if we were to show that all that there is is knowledge. Then,
to know of the existence of knowledge would not be to know of only a small
portion of what exists but would be to know all reality. If we could know the 
existence of knowledge we would have knowledge of all existence.
Student: But it is obvious that knowledge or consciousness is not all that
there is. Consciousness cannot exist by itself. All consciousness is the 
consciousness of something. There are things all around us which are other 
than our consciousness.
Teacher: Do you know these things as they exist in themselves?
Student: I am not sure of what you mean.
Teacher: Do we ever have knowledge of something as it exists independently
of our consciousness, that is to say, do we ever know something as it would 
exist by itself were we not knowing it?
Student: Since we must always know whatever it is to be known, our only
acquaintance with the object is as something known. We do not know what the
object may be in itself since we have no access to the object as it is in 
itself.
Teacher: Very good. We can never say then that we know what objects are
like in themselves but only what they are like for us. We are not conscious 
of any object existing in itself but only as existing for us.
Student: True.
Teacher: If we cannot know something as it exists independently of our
knowing it, how can we say that there are things all around us which are 
other than our consciousness? All we know Is our knowledge of things, not 
that things exist which are other than our consciousness. If our only access 
to things is through our knowledge, then that things exist other than our 
knowledge will forever remain purely an hypothesis to us.
Student: Are we not conscious of things which are other than our conscious­
ness?
Teacher: If we are conscious of things then they are within the field of our
consciousness, are they not?
Student: To be sure.
Teacher: If knowledge and consciousness are the same, then how can we say that
that which we know exists outside of our consciousness? To say that that which 
we know exists outside of our consciousness would be to say that that which we 
know exists outside of our knowledge or that which we know is that which we 
do not know. Surely, that which is outside of our knowledge cannot be that 
which we know.
Student: I see what you mean. I was wrong to say that we know things which
exist outside of our consciousness. But we may infer that there are things 
which exist outside of our conscious states.
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Teacher: How do we have knowledge of things?
Student: Why, we receive our knowledge of things through our senses.
Teacher: Instead of things as they would exist In themselves were we not to
know them we know only our sense Impressions of things.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: And all knowledge of things must come through our senses?
Student: Of course.
Teacher: And we can only know our sense impressions of things.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Then how do we know that things exist which correspond to our sense
Impressions?
Student: I do not know my way out of this dilemma. Since we must always go
through our senses we have no way of certifying the existence of things in 
themselves.
Teacher: How then can you say that you know a thing which is other than your
knowledge? The existence of a something which corresponds to your sense im­
pressions can at best be a theoretical existence which lacks any possibility 
of verification.
Student: But surely there must be something which causes my sense impressions. 
Teacher: That there is a something which causes your sense impressions is 
again purely an hypothesis on your part. Or, do you ever have any direct 
experience of this causal process?
Student: The best that I can make out of the matter is that the thing as it
exists in its own right produces a physical Impulse which is transmitted 
through the air and which upon reception we transform into a mental image.
This, of course, is but a bare outline of a very complicated physiological
5process.
Teacher: I can understand this description as a summary of a theory of how
perception takes place. But now do you have a direct experience of the thing 
which produces the physical impulse?
Student: No, I have only the resultant mental image.
Teacher: Do you have a direct experience of the physical impulse?
Student: No, I am conscious only of my mental Images. But there have been
tests made which show that perception takes place as I have described.
Teacher: Are the scientists who have made these tests conscious of the thing
which produces the physical stimulus, or of the physical stimulus, or of its 
reception prior to its transformation into a mental image or a conscious 
state?
Student: No, the scientists, like everyone else, perceive only the end result
of the process which I have described.
Teacher: When scientists look into their instruments and see what they call
an electrical impulse they are seeing not an impulse as it would exist in it­
self but only their mental image which as with any perception must already have
been produced, transmitted, and received and transformed.
Student: True.
Teacher: No one then in the history of humanity has ever experienced a thing
or an object if we mean by a thing a something which exists outside of our 
consciousness or whose properties which are other than our consciousness, can 
be ascertained.
^For a full theory of the physical and the physiological basis of
perception, see W. Russell Brain, Mind, Perception and Science.
Student: I cannot refute what you say. But there must be something which
causes what we do perceive.
Teacher: This is a belief that you possess, but it is nothing for which you
can supply any proof.
Student: What of this. Suppose I am eating and I feel the surge of energy
that the food gives me. Am I then not experiencing a cause directly?
Teacher: You are only experiencing one thing happening after another which
is no proof that the first is the cause of the second. But even on your own 
theory there can be no direct experience of a cause. For all that you can 
know is that which you have already transformed. You cannot say that a thing 
which exists in itself is the cause of your experience for that thing and its 
causal efficacy cannot be experienced directly. All you can experience is 
what comes at the end point of the process. You can say nothing about its
origins. The theory of perception that you have put forth is, at best, a
hypothetical account of how knowledge comes to be.
Student: Very well.
Teacher: What is more, this account is not merely a hypothetical account of
perception but an impossible one.
Student: How is that?
Teacher: If we take this theory you have expounded and examine it closely,
we will discover that on this theory we could never come to have knowledge 
of a thing in the first place.
Student: This would be a most amazing consequence of a theory which is
designed to explain the possibility of the perception of objects if it were 
to make the perception of objects impossible.
Teacher: You agree then to draw out the logical consequences of this theory.
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Student : Yes.
Teacher: I must issue you fair warning that if we follow our logic rigorous­
ly we may come upon a conclusion that you may find difficult to accept. It 
will require philosophical courage.
Student: I am prepared. Please proceed.
Teacher: According to your theory all consciousness is the consciousness of
something. Consciousness cannot be something which exists in itself or by 
itself.
Student: True. All consciousness is the consciousness of an object. We
cannot have a consciousness which is conscious of nothing at all.
Teacher: Now* according to your theory there is no consciousness until there
is the production of a physical impulse, the transmission of it through the 
air, and a transformation of it into an image.
Student: That is quite right. Consciousness of a thing can take place in no
other way but this.
Teacher: And it takes time, I presume, for all of this to happen.**
Student: Yes, it takes time for all of this to take place for all processes
take time. The time span, however, is a very small one. It is so small, in 
fact, that we are never conscious of any time lapse in perception.
Teacher: I am afraid if it takes any time at all that we should never be
conscious in the first place, much less be aware of any object.
Student: What do you mean?
Teacher: If in order to become conscious the mind must receive a stimulus
^For the argument that a span of time must elapse for perception to 
take place, see W. Russel Brain, Mind, Perception and Science, 4ff. This 
admirable book employs arguments from a scientific point of view to establish 
the conclusion that we do not have direct experience of an external object.
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which It then transforms, what Is there to receive the stimulus? If con­
sciousness does not come into being until the end point of the process, how 
can it detect the presence of the stimulus at the beginning? If we are un­
aware before receiving a stimulus, we must always be unaware for there can be 
no reception if there is no one on the end of the receiving line. If we can­
not become conscious until we receive an Impulse how would we ever know when 
we received one? How would we know to refashion this impulse so as to make it 
into a conscious state? According to your theory, perception is a re-product- 
ion. But we cannot say perception is re-production for we have no access to 
the supposed originals of which our conscious states are supposed to be the 
re-productions. If knowledge must wait upon a stimulus before it comes into 
existence we would never have an experience in the first place for nothing 
would exist to be stimulated. If there were no experience in the first place 
there would be nothing to reproduce and we would never come to consciousness. 
Student: But how can this be? Surely we are conscious. Have we not our­
selves established this earlier on?
Teacher: Precisely. It must follow then that consciousness is not a con­
sciousness of objects.
Student: The logic of your arguments is unassailable. But I cannot give up
my belief in the existence of objects. There seem to be objects all around
us: trees, clouds, flowers. How can you say that these things do not exist?
Teacher: Have you ever dreamed of being in a garden and seeing trees, clouds,
and flowers and later awakened to discover that the objects you thought
7existed did not exist at all?
7In a dream it appears as if there are external objects and a perceiver 
(the subject in the dream) but the perceiver and perceived are only mental 
creations. Vide, The Mandukyopanisad With Gaudapada*s Karika and Sankara’s 
Commentary, Ch. II, 1.
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Student : Yes, but I am not dreaming now.
Teacher: How do you know that?
Student: Because this morning I arose and I am not now in my bed.
Teacher: Have you not ever dreamed that you had arisen and later awakened to
discover that you had only been dreaming that you had been awake?
Student: Yes, but in those cases I did awaken to make the discovery.
Teacher: And how do you know that you have not yet awakened?
Student: For one thing my dreams are much shorter than my waking experiences.
For instance, 1 have lived eighteen years and can remember when I was a little 
child while my dreams are of a very short duration. Thus, I know that I am 
not dreaming now because I would not have a dream that lasted so long.
Teacher: Have you ever had a dream in which the events which took place took
Qup a greater number of hours than the hours which you actually slept?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: You can see how, in principle, it would be possible to have a dream
in which the many years have passed.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: And in such a dream it may appear that one is living through an
entire lifetime.
Student: Yes.
9Teacher: And so you may be dreaming now.
8Ibld., II, 15. 
gThe dilemma is stated as Insoluble in the writings of Plato:
Socrates, "...what evidence could be appealed to, supposing we were asked at 
this very moment whether we are asleep or awake— dreaming all that passes 
through our minds or talking to one another in the waking state." Theatetus. 
"Indeed, Socrates, I do not see by what evidence it is to be proved; for the 
two conditions correspond in every circumstance like exact counterparts. The 
conversation we have just had might equally well be one that we are merely 
thinking we are carrying on in our sleep..." Theatetus. 158 B, C.
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Student: Wait a moment. If I am aware of the two states, waking and dreaming,
then must there not be two such states? How could I have a distinction be­
tween one experience which was illusory and one which was real unless one of 
these experiences was, in fact, real and the other illusory? If, as you seem
to imply, all life may be but a dream, how would we ever become conscious of
this? Does not the idea of dream demand an experience other than dream? 
Teacher: Very well thought out. Of course you say this while you are awake.
In the waking state there is the idea that the dream state is not real. But 
this idea does not occur to you when you are dreaming.^® We have not yet de­
cided if reality is to be found in what we call the waking state.
Student: But I have had dreams where I could fly. Was this not an illusion?
Teacher: While you were dreaming did you find this to be an illusion or could
you actually fly in your dream?
Student: In the dream I could fly.
Teacher: How can you say that that was not the reality and now it is an
illusion that you cannot fly?^
Student: But 1 was not really flying then. If someone had been watching at
my bedside he would testify that all the while my body had remained horizontal 
on my bed.
Teacher: Have we established the existence of this someone?
Student: No.
^®Sankara argues that within dreams we make a distinction between the 
real and the unreal. The subject in the dream can distinguish between what he
imagines and what is really happening in the dream. Thus, the distinction be­
tween the real and the unreal cannot be used to differentiate the dream state
from the waking state. Vide, Op. cit., II, 10.
^Chuang Tze, the Chinese philosopher, once dreamed he was a butterfly. 
When he awakened he wondered if he were Chuang Tze, who had dreamed he was a 
butterfly, or if he were a butterfly, who was now dreaming he was Chuang Tze, 
a Chinese philosopher.
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Teacher: And if we did he would see your body in his waking state, would
he not?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: And we have not yet established that the experiences we have in the
waking state are the real ones. If we are not yet certain which experiences 
are real and which are illusory, it may be that his interpretation is the 
dream and your experience of the dream the reality.
Student: Let me try one final point. My waking experiences seem to link up
more with each other. There is a continuity to them while in a dream, there
is rarely, if ever, a remembrance of past dreams or any connection between 
12them.
Teacher: You make this distinction in the waking state, but while you are
dreaming you do not think of your dreams as discontinuous. What is more, you
beg the question. For the notion that you can distinguish between the waking
state and the dream state presupposes that you are awake now. But the distinct-
1 1ion between the waking state and the dream state may also be part of the dream.
If you are dreaming now, then the idea that coherence can serve to distinguish 
the waking state from the dream state will only be a dream illusion.
Student: But it seems to me that you admit the distinction between the waking 
state and the dream state by using the waking state to say that we have certain 
notions only in the waking state. Therefore, you contradict yourself because 
you seem to know that there are two states and which one of them you are in. 
Teacher: But it does not follow from my awareness of two states that the
12Descartes makes a similar case for the criterion of demarcation be­
tween dream and waking being coherence. Vide, Meditations, VI.
It is possible, for example, to dream that you have awakened and 
later on to awaken and discover that this was part of the dream.
-15-
waking state is the reality and the dream state is the illusion.^ Nor does 
it follow from the fact that there are two states that I can know which one 
of them I am in. Besides, what if there were a third state, neither a waking 
state nor a dream state, which was the reality. If there were such a state
then there would be no harm in finding that both the waking state and the
dream state contained contradictions.
Student: Yes, that is true. But what would such a state be?
Teacher: Have you not ever experienced a state of sleep in which you have
had no dreams?^"*
Student: Yes.
Teacher: In dreamless sleep you are not aware of any objects at all whether
dream objects or real ones.
Student: True.
Teacher: Can the sleeper be aroused from his dreamless or deep sleep?
Student: Of course.
Teacher: Then we must say that in deep sleep there is consciousness even
though we are not conscious of any objects. This deep sleep state proves 
that there can be consciousness which is not a consciousness of something. 
Student: How do we know that this idea is only an idea which we are having
«  i
x^Plato finds that he is unable to prove that the waking state is the 
real and the dream state the illusion: "...and in fact, our time being
equally divided between waking and sleeping, in each condition our mind 
strenuously contends that the convictions of the moment are certainly true; 
so that for equal times we affirm the reality of the one world and of the 
other and are just as confident of both." Theatetus, 158 D.
^The dreamless sleep which is being discussed here and below is the 
state of sleep wherein the waking ego is latent. As Sankara says: "As in
the dream the elephant as well as the mind that perceives the elephant, are 
not really existent, so also is the case with the mind and its objects of the 
waking condition." Vide, The Mandukyopanisad With Gaudapada's Karika and 
Sankara's Commentary, IV, 67.
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in the waking state?
1 fiTeacher: What you call the waking state may he a dream state.
Student: Then we do not know if this idea of a dreamless sleep is real or
not.
Teacher: Let us say that we have two states, one which we shall call deep
sleep and one which we shall call indifferently either waking or dream. Now, 
of these two, we can tell which one we are in since we are now aware of there 
being two states, while in the deep sleep state we would be aware of nothing 
at all. We must be awake or dreaming. It does not matter which.
Student: I am still troubled over how we can know there is a distinction
between the dream and the waking state if we cannot tell when we are awake
and when we are dreaming.
Teacher: The distinction between the two states may itself be an illusion.
Let us not try to figure this out at this moment. Let us say that there is a 
distinction between deep sleep or a consciousness in which there is no con­
sciousness of objects and a state which we may call indifferently waking or 
dream since in both of these states it seems to us that we are conscious of 
objects. If we understand dreams as a species of thought (we could just as 
well have done this the other way around) we may refer to these states as deep
sleep and waking, understanding dreams to be part of the waking state. Remem­
ber, the key distinction is between deep sleep and one other state. The name 
of this other state we have arbitrarily decided to be the waking state although 
we could have, with just as much justification, called it the dream state.
^Just as you can awaken from the dream and find the dream to be un­
real then may it not be possible that we can awaken from the waking state and 
find the waking state to be unreal.
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Student: Very well. But where do we go from here? To be quite frank
I must express my dissatisfaction with this whole discussion before we 
proceed any farther. For, if we do not know if we are dreaming or awake, 
anything we may conclude may be an illusion. I do not even know why we 
should say there is a deep sleep state since this is only an idea which, 
for all we know, may turn out to be a dream image and correspond to no 
reality.
Teacher: Your point is very well taken. However, if this is all but a
dream we will not come to any harm will we?
Student: No, but we might be wasting our time.
Teacher: But if we are dreaming we will not worry about the time we are
taking up.
Student: True.
Teacher: Now, we are certain of the existence of consciousness, are we not?
Student: Yes, we have established that much for certain.
Teacher: Shall we say that all we can be certain of is the existence of 
consciousness?
Student: I cannot go that far. What about objects? I cannot give up their
existence so readily.
Teacher: Do you know objects as they exist in themselves or do you know of
your consciousness of objects?
Student: I know of my consciousness of objects.
Teacher: Can you say that your consciousness is a consciousness of objects?
Student: Why not?
Teacher: To say that you are conscious of objects implies that you can dis­




Teacher: Can you show me how and where we can draw the line between yourself
and the object? Can you show me where you stop and the object begins?"^
Student: I am here and the object is over there.
Teacher: Is this "over there" something which exists outside of your con­
sciousness?
Student: No, for we have already seen that we have no knowledge of the
existence of anything which exists outside of our consciousness.
Teacher: Then what do you mean by saying that the object is over there?
Student: My body is here and the object is outside of my body.
Teacher: Do you know with your body or with your mind?
Student: With my mind.
Teacher: Is the object outside of your mind?
Student: As the mind is not a physical thing we cannot speak properly of
anything being outside of it. The mind has no location. If the mind has no 
location, then things can have no location with respect to it, whether outside 
or Inside.
Teacher: And you know the object with your mind.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Can you distinguish where the object leaves off and the mind begins?
Student: No.
Teacher: How can you say that you know objects when we can never discover the
demarcation line between your mind and the object which your mind supposedly
17When we hold a cold stone in our hands, can we distinguish between 
the coldness as belonging to the stone or to the hand? Can we tell if it is 




Student: I cannot deny the logic of your arguments. But It still seems to
me that 1 see objects. Experientially, there are objects even if logically 
it makes no sense to speak of objects.
Teacher: I do not think you have been making a close enough examination of
your own experience.
Student: What do you mean?
Teacher: You think that you, as a subject, by some act you perform, see an
obj ect.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: An act of seeing then requires the seer, the act of seeing, and the
seen.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Now, if we cannot know the existence of something which is not you
(the object), how can we ever be aware of the existence which is you (the 
subject)?
Student: It would seem that without an object, there would be no concept of
the subject.
Teacher: If there is no subject who would perform the act upon the object?
Student: Without a subject the notion of an act is unintelligible. But it
seems as if there is an act.
Teacher: Give me an example of such a knowledge act.
Student: There is, for example, the act of hearing.
Teacher: Can hearing exist without sound?
Student: What do you mean?
Teacher: Would we ever be conscious of something we call hearing unless
there were something heard. Can there ever be an example of hearing where 
no sound is heard?
Student: We can listen and yet not hear anything.
Teacher: Listening and hearing are not the same. Can we actually hear
anything if there is no sound at all?
Student: No.
Teacher: Could sound exist without hearing? In other words, could a thing
such as sound which is never heard exist?
Student: Perhaps, how could I know? Perhaps when a tree falls in a forest
there is a sound although no one may be there to hear It.
Teacher: You do not quite understand what I mean. What I mean is can there
be the experience of sound without hearing?
Student: No.
Teacher: If sound cannot exist without hearing and hearing cannot exist with­
out sound, how can we say that there is an act of hearing which hears sound 
or a sound which is heard by an act of hearing. If neither of these exists 
without the other, how can we say that a sound exists to be heard or that
hearing exists to hear sound? How can we say that there is an act which is
performed upon something if that something does not exist outside of the act
18and that act does not exist unless there is the something?
18Sankara argues that the mind exists only if objects exist and ob­
jects exist only if the mind exists. Thus, each is dependent on the other. 
Neither the mind nor the object has an independent existence. But if this Is 
so how can one exist to act on the other, or the other exist to be acted on by 
the one? The Mandukyopanisad..., IV, 67. Plato also sees the interdependence 
of sense and object: "...What you call white color has no being as a distinct
thing outside your eyes...there is no single thing that is in and by itself." 
Theatetus, 153 D, E. And a little later on, "One of each pair is something 
perceived, the other a perception, whose birth always coincides with that of 
the thing perceived." Ibid., 156 B, C. This is essentially the same point 
as that of Sankara.
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Student: What sense can we make out of the matter then?
Teacher: It Is not obvious that there is not a duality in perception whereby
one thing senses another, but that all knowledge is free of duality. All we 
can say that exists is hearingness or soundness; it does not matter which name 
we choose. We never experience a duality. We never experience a subject act­
ing upon an object or an object which is then acted upon by a subject. This 
Is a purely theoretical model. We never experience a subject, an act, or an 
object. These are later categories which we employ to explain the possibility 
of an experience which is not experienced as tripartite. When you say that 
you as a subject experience an object you are not being attentive enough to 
that in which your experience really consists.
Student: Why does it appear to me that I am seeing a tree?
Teacher: At the moment of seeing can you distinguish between the seeing, the
you, and what is seen?
Student: I am the seer; the seeing is what I do; the seen is what I see.
Teacher: Please concentrate on your experience. At the precise moment that
the tree appears are you conscious of yourself? Let us make a test. Close 
your eyes.
Student: Very well.
Teacher: Now open them. At the moment of your seeing the tree are you aware
of yourself.
Student: I can distinguish between my physical eye and what I see as the tree.
Teacher: Now you are taking another act of awareness. You have shifted to
another awareness. If we take the awareness of the eye, could you make the 
distinction in your experience of the eye between your seeing and the eye 
that you see?
Student: But I can experience nyself as different from what I see.
Teacher: That is another awareness. In your awareness of yourself can you
distinguish in that awareness between yourself as subject knower and as
subject known?
Student: If I could distinguish myself as subject knower and myself as sub­
ject known, I could not know myself for the me who knows (the subject knower) 
would not be the same as the me who is known.
Teacher: Excellent. Now let us return to the example of your awareness of
the tree. In the moment of vision where there is a tree, can you experience 
the subject knower as different from the object known?
Student: No. I do not experience this distinction. But it does not follow
that this distinction does not exist in reality.
Teacher: Do we know any reality outside of consciousness?
Student: No.
Teacher: What do you experience when you experience the tree?
Student: Does it matter if I say treeness or myselfness, for I cannot dis­
tinguish one from the other?
Teacher: It does not matter, does it? We can as easily say that there is
treeness, or seeingness, or seemess. These are but different ways of saying 
the same thing and they are all equally true. All that exists is knowledge, 
or awareness, or consciousness. We are aware of the existence of no objects or 
subjects.
Student: You have proven this to me both from the side of logic and from the
side of experience.
Teacher: We are certain that there is knowledge.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Then to know that there is knowledge is no mere tautology since it
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tells us something about our experience.
Student: Quite so.
Teacher: And we know of the existence of nothing else but knowledge.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Then when we know that there is knowledge, we know all existence.
Student: That is so.
Teacher: Have I satisfied you by coming upon something that is certain and
is, at the same time, about what exists?
Student: Indeed you have. I am deeply grateful to you.
SECOND DIALOGUE
Student: I should like to talk with you again.
Teacher: What, are you not satisfied with certain knowledge of all that
exists, in fact, all existence?
Student: I am not sure that what we said had any substance to it. It seems
to me now that everything we concluded could merely have been a mental game 
and have had nothing to do with reality, with what is.
Teacher: You are once again in a state of doubt, of skepticism.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Would you say that you are doubting?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Can you doubt that you are doubting?
Student: Why not?
Teacher: If it were true that you could doubt that you were doubting then
your doubting would be dubitable. If your doubting were dubitable then it 
would be logically possible that you would not be doubting. You might not be 
doubting after all. But this is contrary to fact because we began with your 
admission that you were doubting. Doubting is indubitable because the ques­
tion of its existence can never arise without its actuality. Or, to put the 
matter even more strongly, the question of its modal existence can never arise 
without its necessary existence.
Student: But I can say in worde-^hat I doubt that I am doubting.
Teacher: Here is an instance where the boundaries of language extend beyond
the boundaries of factual reality. It is not the case that you can, in actual
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fact, doubt that you are doubting. You can verbally formulate the sentence,
"I doubt that I am doubting", but in fact this is an impossibility.
19Student: Very well. To follow your lead, "I think, therefore I am".
anTeacher: Does the knowledge of your existence arise from your thought?
Student: Why not?
Teacher: If you think something you can be mistaken about what you are
thinking. If you think that it is Friday you may be mistaken. It may actual­
ly be Saturday. If you have knowledge of something, you cannot be mistaken.
If you know it is Friday, then it cannot turn out to be Saturday. If it turns 
out that it is Saturday, we cannot say that you knew that it was Friday. We 
would have to say that you thought that it was Friday, but that you were 
mistaken.
19"I existed without doubt, by...the mere fact that I thought at all." 
Descartes, Meditation, II. For Descartes, the existence of thinking proves 
the existence of a one who thinks. Descartes has discovered something but it 
is not what he thinks he has discovered. He has discovered the Irreducible 
fact of consciousness. But he has by no means discovered a subject of that 
consciousness. Indeed, for Nietzsche, rather than the existence of a subject 
being established only the existence of the thought of a subject is estab­
lished: "We used to believe in the "soul" as we believed in grammar and
the grammatical subject; we used to say that "I" was the condition, "think" 
the predicate that conditioned, and thinking an activity for which a subject 
had to be thought of as its cause. But then we tried, with admirable per­
sistence and guile, to see whether the reverse might not perhaps be true.
"Think" was now the condition, "I" the thing conditioned, hence "I" only a 
synthesis which was created by thinking. Kant basically wanted to prove that 
the subject could not be proved by the subject— nor the object either. The 
possibility of an illusory existence of the individual subject (the "soul") 
may not have been a thought foreign to him. It is the same thought which 
has already existed as an immense power on earth, in the form of Vedanta-phil- 
osophy." Beyond Good and Evil, III, 54. (emphasis Nietzsche’s).
20DescarteB, of course, gives epistemological, not ontological primacy 
to thought. It is not that he thought that he had thought himself into exis­
tence. In fact, he requires the existence of God for his original and continued 
existence at any moment. (Meditation, III). But he does think that the certain 
knowledge of his existence is proved by his thought. It is this contention of 
his that is under dispute.
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Student: How does this discussion of different days apply to our thought
of existence?
Teacher: Can the proof of our existence be established by thought?
Student: Why not?
Teacher: May I ask you a question?
Student: To be sure.
Teacher: Do you think that you are thinking?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If you only think that you are thinking, then as we concluded from
our previous discussion, you can be mistaken. The object of thought Is always 
something about which you may be mistaken. In this case the object of your 
thought (what you thought) was that you were thinking. If you can be mistaken 
in what you thought, then you might not have been thinking after all.
Student: No, that is impossible. I must be thinking. If I think that I am 
thinking I must be thinking. I have to think in order to think that I am 
thinking.
Teacher: Excellent. You cannot be mistaken about the fact that you are
thinking. You have to be thinking In order for the question even to arise
whether or not you are thinking.
Student: True.
Teacher: Then, you cannot think you are thinking. You know that you are
thinking.
Student: Very well.
Teacher: If you know that you are thinking then your (own) existence is not
dependent upon thought (which can be mistaken), but is based upon certain know­
ledge .
Student: I am not certain that I understand.
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Teacher : Do you think that you are conscious or do you know that you are
conscious?
Student: If I say that I think that I am conscious you will ask me if I can 
be mistaken. If I could be mistaken about being conscious it could be true 
that I was not conscious at all. But if I were not conscious at all how could 
I be mistaken? If I can be mistaken, I must be conscious for I would have to 
be conscious in order to be mistaken.
Teacher: Very good. You have proven that your existence cannot follow from
your thought but must rest upon knowledge.
21Student: But I only know this when I am thinking. When I am not thinking
how can I know that I exist?
Teacher: Do you exist when you are asleep?
Student: You can be dreaming when you are asleep and dreams are a kind of
thinking.
Teacher: Yes, but is there not also a state of dreamless sleep?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: And do you not exist during this state?
Student: I do not know.
Teacher: What would it be like not to exist during dreamless sleep? Think
about what this would mean. This would mean that you would have a new 
existence at the time that you awakened. Of course, since you do not exist 
during dreamless sleep (as you do not exist when you are not thinking), it is 
impossible to say that you have awakened. The you who would just come into
21"Thinking" is used as a generic term as in the writings of Descar­
tes: "What is a thing that thinks? That is to say, a thing that doubts,
perceives, affirms, denies, wills, does not will, that imagines also, and 
which feels." Meditation, II.
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birth at the time of awakening would not have a language or even a name, 
for it would carry nothing with it that the you who had gone to sleep had 
learned during the course of its lifetime.
Student: But this is all in the mind, is it not? I mean all these ideas
of waking, of sleeping, of consciousness, are these not all thought creations? 
How do we know they have any reality?
Teacher: What is the mind?
Student: It is that which thinks.
Teacher: Is this ’’that which thinks" a thing which is known as existing in
itself, that is, something which has an independent existence, or is this 
"that which thinks" a consciousness of ours?
Student: It is the latter.
Teacher: Now, all that we have established for certain is that there is con­
sciousness. What then is this thing which you choose to call the mind?
Student: We have a mind, as distinct from other animals, in that our mind is
a consciousness which is conscious of itself.
Teacher: The mind you say is a consciousness which is conscious of itself.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Is the mind and consciousness one and the same thing?
Student: Yes, for if the mind is what is conscious, and what it is conscious
of is itself, it follows that consciousness and the mind must be one and the 
same thing. If the mind and consciousness were different things we could 
not say that the mind could be conscious of itself.
Teacher: If we proved that consciousness could not be conscious of itself,
then what you call the mind would not exist.
Student: Yes, that is so.
Teacher: Very well then. We are certain that there is consciousness. Let
us calX this consciousness, consciousness^.
Student: As you like.
Teacher: We cannot say that this consciousness (consciousness^) is conscious
of itself as "its being conscious of itself" would be another consciousness, 
consciousness^. Consciousness^ is not that existence of which alone we 
proved we could be certain, namely, consciousness^.
Student: This seems to be word jugglery to me.
Teacher: Look, all we showed was that we could be certain of consciousness,
but we did not show that we could be certain of that of which consciousness 
were conscious. Therefore, although we can say that there is consciousness we 
cannot say that this consciousness is conscious of itself.
Student: What do you mean by the 'is' in your last statement?
Teacher: The 'is' is the 'is1 of identity. We cannot say that consciousness^
is identical to that of which it is aware since we can only be certain of 
consciousness, not of its contents. We are certain only of the existence of 
consciousness^, not of its consciousness of itself.
Student: But we continue to speak about it. Surely we must be conscious of
our consciousness if we continue to refer to it.
Teacher: But it is not the same consciousness we are talking about. When
consciousness is conscious of consciousness it cannot be conscious of itself 
because its self will have changed. Originally, the term 'itself* stood for 
consciousness. But the consciousness which is to know itself will no longer 
be simply consciousness, but will be a consciousness which is attempting to 
know itself. Thus, when this new consciousness knows, it will not know itself 
(the consciousness which is attempting to know consciousness), but will know 
simply consciousness (which will be, from the standpoint of its new identity, 
not itself but another).
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Student: Could consciousness not know Itself both as itself and the itself
which is trying to know itself?
Teacher: But each attempt at knowing itself requires a fresh act of con­
sciousness. The new act of consciousness, in virtue of being new, cannot 
know itself; it can only know the old consciousness. Each attempt conscious­
ness makes to know itself always requires a new act of consciousness. Thus, 
the consciousness which is known is always a past consciousness and not a 
present consciousness. The present consciousness can never know "itself" 
since it always knows a past consciousness. You are always looking back 
upon the time before and not the now. And yet the now is always required 
to look back upon the time before. Each now that you try to capture becomes 
the time before which, in turn, needs the now for its illumination. But 
the now itself cannot be captured.
Student: Why is it that we cannot become aware of our present consciousness
with a later consciousness?
Teacher: Then the later consciousness would be our consciousness, would it not?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Then consciousness would still not be a consciousness of itself be­
cause the later consciousness would be conscious not of itself but of the past 
consciousness. The past consciousness would not really be consciousness since 
it ij3 no more, but would be an "object" of consciousness.
Student: It still is not clear to me why consciousness cannot be a conscious­
ness of a past moment of itself. Indeed, you yourself seem to allow that this
is possible, but you will not allow that the consciousness of a preceding mom­
ent is a consciousness of itself.
Teacher: I take it that the preceding moment no longer exists but has been
replaced by another or else we would not refer to it as the preceding moment.
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We would not speak of a preceding moment unless there were a moment which 
came before but is no longer now. And yet, if the preceding moment of con­
sciousness no longer exists how can it be that which consciousness appre­
hends? If there is a past consciousness, then it is past. How can the 
present consciousness be conscious of that which is no longer present as 
consciousness? The past, tdiich in being past can no longer be present as 
consciousness, could only be known (if it could be known at all) as an 
"object" of consciousness. Thus, if the past could be known, consciousness 
would not be conscious of itself.
Student: Why is it that we cannot say that the past consciousness and the
present consciousness are the same consciousness and in this way say that con­
sciousness knows itself.
Teacher: If the past consciousness and the present consciousness are identi­
cal then nothing has happened to alter the past consciousness. It is still the 
same as it was before. It begins, presumably, as consciousness. If it stays 
the same how can it ever become conscious of itself? Consciousness of itself- 
ness is different from consciousness* Indeed, If nothing has happened and cons­
ciousness is the same, then knowing has not happened either. But if knowing 
has not happened, then how has consciousness come to know itself? It would 
still be itself and not have to come to know itself.
Student: Can we not say that consciousness always knows a past moment of
itself and so that it always has been a consciousness of itself and never 
has been simply consciousness.
Teacher: Now you are saying that all consciousness is consciousness of a
past moment of Itself.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If all consciousness is a consciousness of a past moment of itself,
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then there can be no first consciousness for a first consciousness would be 
a consciousness which did not have a consciousness which came before it; and 
hence, would be a consciousness which could not be of a past moment.
Student: True.
Teacher: If there is no first consciousness then consciousness has no begin-1
ning.
Student: True.
Teacher: If consciousness has no beginning then there is an infinite number of
past moments of consciousness of which consciousness would be conscious. 
Student: True.
Teacher: If there were an Infinite number of consciousnesses of which con­
sciousness could be conscious can we say that consciousness can come to an end? 
Can there ever be a last consciousness?
Student: No.
Teacher: Can we say that that which has neither a beginning nor an end is in
time?
Student: No, for that which neither comes to be nor passes away cannot be said
to be in time.^
Teacher: If consciousness does not exist in time how can we say that it has a
past? And if consciousness has no past how can we say that consciousness is 
always the consciousness of a past moment of Itself?
Student: Very well. I was mistaken to have thought that consciousness is
22For the Buddhists, consciousness arises. Vide, Stcherbatsky, The 
Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word Pharma", pp. 7, 53. 
But how can that which is not in time be said to arise? Can something come to 
be which does not come to be at some particular time?
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23always the consciousness of a past moment of Itself.
Teacher: Is there any way in which consciousness can be conscious of itself?
Student: No.
Teacher: Then what you call "mind" cannot exist for "mind" is what you defined
as that consciousness which was conscious of itself.
Student: What then is the mind?
24Teacher: The mind is but a thought that you are having.
Student: What do you mean?
Teacher: That you have a mind is a concept that you have; it is an idea; it
corresponds to no reality. The mind exists solely as a concept. You have the 
idea that you have a mind. That is all there is to it.
Student: Why could we not just as easily say that it is consciousness which
is but an idea of the mind?
Teacher: It was your idea originally that consciousness could know itself.
Student: True.
Teacher: If consciousness can know itself then presumably there must be an
"itself" for consciousness to know. This "itself", as we proved above, can­
not be a consciousness which is conscious of itself but must simply be
23This is, in fact, the Buddhists' view of consciousness: "Conscious­
ness in the role corresponding to the place occupied in the system by the 
senses is the consciousness of the preceding moment." Stcherbatsky, The 
Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Pharma", p . 15.
^For Aristotle the mind and thought are identical: "...mind is in a
sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until 
it has thought...Mind is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as its ob­
jects are. For (a) in the case of objects which involve no matter, what 
thinks and what is thought is Identical: for speculative knowledge and its 
object are identical." On the Soul, Bk. Ill, Ch. 4. (I have supplied the 
emphasis to bring out this singular feature of the Aristotelian concept of 
the mind. Aristotle does not say that the mind is only a thought. But as 
the mind falls under the class of objects which involve no matter, how can 
we distinguish the mind from a thought?)
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consciousness. If consciousness could know itself then the object of its 
knowledge must exist to be known. Simple consciousness must exist before 
there can be knowledge of it. Consciousness must be before there can be a 
consciousness of it. Mind, as you defined it, is that consciousness which 
is conscious of itself. Consciousness, then, cannot be an idea of the 
mind's for consciousness must exist before such a thing as the mind can exist. 
While mind can be an idea which appears to be consciousness, it cannot be the 
case that consciousness is but an idea that appears to the mind.
Student: 1 can see that consciousness cannot be a creation of the mind
because mind, the consciousness of consciousness, cannot exist unless there 
first exists something of which it can be conscious. Thus, consciousness 
must precede mind. If consciousness precedes the mind it cannot be that 
consciousness exists only as a mental creation.
Teacher: Very good. And we can prove this from the side of the subject as
well as from the side of the object. For, if the mind is the consciousness 
which knows itself not only must the object exist to be known, but something 
must exist to know the object. Consciousness must exist in the first place 
because it takes consciousness to know consciousness. If there is a con­
sciousness which knows itself then there must first exist the consciousness 
that knows. There must first be a consciousness to know Itself. If there 
Is not a consciousness what would be there to know itself? From the side of 
the subject as well as the object consciousness must precede consciousness 
of itselfness. Actually, we have established this point from another 
argument.
Student: How is that?
Teacher: He proved earlier that consciousness can exist without the mind
or thinking when we proved that there must be consciousness in deep sleep
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where there are no thoughts.
Student: How did we prove that?
Teacher: Since the sleeper can be awakened there must be consciousness in
sleep. The sleeper must be conscious or else how would it be possible to 
waken him? Now, there is a state of sleep where there are no dreams. There­
fore, consciousness can exist without thought. Consciousness does not depend 
upon thought for its existence.
Student: I am satisfied with the point that the existence of consciousness
must precede the existence of mind. But I am not persuaded that the mind has 
no real existence.
Teacher: Can we ever know that which exists in itself independently of our
knowing it?
Student: No.
Teacher: You are conceiving of the mind as though it possessed existence as
an entity in itself. But you have no knowledge of the existence of a mind.
You have the thought that you have a mind. The mind exists only as a thought 
you have.
Student: But the mind has a more permanent existence than that. It stretches
through time.
Teacher: "Permanent existence" is but a thought that you have.
Student: But it seems to me that I can remember what happened before. For
memory to be possible I must be the same being as the one who knew before.
Therefore, there is an existence which lasts through time.
Teacher: That you can remember is but a thought that you are having.
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25Student: But I can remember what happened before.
Teacher: When are you remembering the before?
Student: Now.
Teacher: Where then is the before? It exists only in the now.
Student: The mind then is only a thought that we are having in the present. 
Teacher: Yes.
Student: Why did you say then that consciousness must come before the mind?
Teacher: On the hypothesis that there is a mind it can be shown that con­
sciousness can exist without the mind. To say that consciousness comes be­
fore the mind is only a way of Indicating that consciousness is a reality and 
the mind is but a thought. If we take the hypothesis that the mind is a con­
sciousness which is conscious of itself, then consciousness must precede the 
mind or else there is neither anything to be aware nor anything of which the 
mind can be aware. If the mind is not real, however, there is no point in try­
ing to understand any literal meaning in the statement that consciousness 
comes before the mind. It is only one way of indicating the real status of 
consciousness and the hypothetical (I was almost minded to say mental) status 
of mind.
Student: I find It difficult to accept that the mind is only a thought.
Teacher: Can you ever come into contact with the mind as something which
is other than a thought?
Student: What do you mean?
2^The use of memory as a proof for the existence of mind is a petitio 
principii since to assume the existence of memory is to assume the existence 
of mind. The argument from memory is only valid as the memory under question. 
Even the validity of memory as a source of knowledge extends only to its 
proper object of knowledge, the past. Memory, by its very definition, knows 
only the past. Here again there is a begging of the question because we do 
not know if the past exists. And, if it does, then all that memory can estab­
lish is what is true of the past, and its conclusions extend in no way to the 
present.
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Teacher: Do you ever come into physical contact with the mind? Can you take
it out and look at it? Can you smell it? Can you touch it? Can you hear it? 
Can you taste it?
Student: Are there not tests whereby scientists can, by placing electrodes in
26the brain, produce certain sensations such as taste, smell, and so on? In 
addition, whenever we sense something, concomitant variations in the patterns 
of the brain waves can be detected.
Teacher: Are these brain waves or the physical location of the area of the
brain from which certain sensations can be produced identical to the sensa­
tion which Is sensed?
Student: What do you mean?
Teacher: Is the segment of the brain which is being analyzed by the scientists
the same thing as the smell of a flower (supposing this could be so produced) 
that is produced by placing the electrode on this segment of the brain?
Student: By no means. The smell of the flower is one thing; the physical
area of the brain another.
Teacher: Is the brain wave or its fluctuation the same as the scent of a
flower?
Student: No, one is the pattern which is traced by a needle on a screen.
This is something which is visible; it is seen through the eyes. The scent
of a flower is a quality which is smelled through the nose.
Teacher: Very good. Is there any way to reproduce a mental state except by
"...a very wide range of sensations, including sight, smell, taste, 
touch, and others, can all be reproduced by exciting the appropriate area of 
the cortex, some of them even by the surgeon using an electrical stimulus on 
the conscious patient." Vide, Russell Brain, Mind, Perception and Science, p. 
52.
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experlencing that particular mental state, whatever it may be, directly? 
Student: No.
Teacher: If someone has never smelled a rose before, can you convey to him
what a rose smells like without his smelling a rose?
Student: No, that would be quite impossible.
Teacher: Now, do you ever come across this entity which you call a mind
except as a thought that you have a mind?
Student: No.
Teacher: You have a strictly mental acquaintance with your mind, do you not?
Student: Yes, that is so.
Teacher: Does your mind exist when you are not thinking?
Student: Surely it does.
Teacher: What of our sensations, do they exist when we are not sensing?
When you are not tasting the taste of wine would you say that there are
tastes lying about in a heaven of tastes waiting for you to taste them? Do
tastes exist apart from your sense of taste?
Student: By no means, for when we talked earlier we established that a sense
perception has no existence apart from the appropriate sense organ through
27which it is sensed.
Teacher: How about touches. If you are not touching something now, would a
touch exist in itself waiting for you to touch it? Are the touches lying 
around waiting your touch?
Student: No, touches exist only for my sense of touch. It makes no sense to
27The language of sensation reveals in at least three cases (that of 
taste, touch, and smell) an initial identification of sense act and sense ob­
ject. The sense verb (to smell, to taste, to touch) is Identical to the sense 
object (a smell, a taste, a touch). The existence of an Identity between 
active verb and acted upon object reveals that in these cases we can make no 
distinction between the act of sensing and a what that is sensed.
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think of touches existing independently of me* Where would they reside?
What would be their address?
Teacher: What of our thoughts, do they exist when we are not thinking?
What about the thought that there are marshmellows which are pink and which 
float above our heads. When we are not having this thought does this thought 
lie around existing in a thought world somewhere waiting for us to think it? 
Student: No, that would be an incredible idea. Thoughts do not have a separ­
ate existence in themselves apart from our thinking them.
Teacher: What about the time when you are not having the thought that you
possess a mind? Where is your mind then?
Student: It seems that it does not exist. What, however, of the body.
Surely the body is real. I do not have to think that I have a body. I can
feel by body directly.
Teacher: What do you refer to by this word ’body'?
Student: The 'body' is a word which stands for the totality of my physical
existence, that is, my existence which is extended, has weight, bleeds, and so 
on.
Teacher: This is an idea or a concept. Ideas we sometimes say are in the
mind. But we have shown that the mind is but an idea. Can an idea have an 
idea?
Student: I do not have to think the concept 'body'. I can feel my body
directly.
Teacher: And where do you feel your body?
Student: Why, everywhere on the body. My entire body feels itself anywhere
on its surface, whether on the outside or the inside.
Teacher: You feel the body with the body.
Student: Yes.
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Teacher: And I suppose you feel whatever"part of your body you are feeling
with the area that Is In the same location as the part that you are feeling.
I mean, if you feel your hand directly, it is the hand itself vdiich feels
itself. If you feel your leg, then it is the leg that you feel which is the
source of the feeling itself.
Student: Yes, but where is all of this leading?
Teacher: Have you not heard of victims of accidents who have lost a leg who,
nonetheless, can feel the absent member when the physical leg is no longer 
there? They can feel pain in the same area where they would, had the leg 
actually been there. But they can feel this pain in that area when the leg 
is not there. How can they do this if the part of the body that feels itself 
is the physical region which is at the same time what is felt and the source 
of the feeling that is felt. How can it be the physical body which feels 
itself when the physical body is no longer there?
Student: I do not know what to make of that. It seems that my feeling of
body cannot be a physical feeling. The source of my feeling cannot be the 
physical body.
Teacher: Hhere is the source of your feelings then?
Student: I do not quite know how to answer you. Perhaps the feeling is in my
head.
Teacher: Come now, when you are feeling happy do you mean to say that you
feel your happiness as located in the physical region above the neck as when 
we have an insect bite on a finger, the itch is felt only in that finger? 
Student: No, it seems that feelings as well as thoughts have no physical
place of residence.
Teacher: Does a feeling of joy exist in some special realm awaiting your
-41-
perception?
Student: No, feelings only exist for my perception of them.
Teacher: What of the feeling of body, then. Does the feeling of body
exist somewhere waiting for you to feel it?
Student: But surely the body exists.
Teacher: How are you aware of the existence of the body? Did you not say
that it was directly felt?
Student: I did.
Teacher: Your awareness of the body, then, is a felt perception of the body.
Student *. True.
Teacher: When you are not feeling sad, does sadness exist in itself awaiting
your perception of it as felt?
Student: No.
Teacher: If the consciousness of the body is a feeling, then does the feeling
of body exist when you are not feeling it?
Student: No.
Teacher: Can you distinguish your body from your feeling of body?
Student: What do you mean?
Teacher: Do you ever have knowledge of the body apart from your feeling of
body?
Student: No.
Teacher: And in your feeling awareness of body do you know the body as a
thing which exists independently of your feeling awareness of it?
Student: No.
Teacher: Is there any way we can distinguish between "body" and our con­
sciousness of body?
Student: It would seem not. It seems that all that we have is our
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consciousness of body.
Teacher: Very good. Now, if we can never discover what "body" is as some­
thing other than our consciousness of it does it make sense to speak of our 
consciousness of body as a consciousness of̂  a something? l£ there something 
other than consciousness which we know when we are conscious of the body? 
Student: It would seem not.
Teacher: What is there then?
Student: It follows that there is only consciousness. But surely I exist.
Teacher: Are you conscious of this "I" as a thing existing apart from your
consciousness of it?
Student: No.
Teacher: Are you conscious of yourself as something distinct from the con­
sciousness that you are having? Can you distinguish between yourself and 
your consciousness? Can you tell me what properties belong to which, indepen­





We know that there is consciousness. We do not know that there is
Student: But surely I exist.
Teacher: To what reality does the expression "I" refer?
Student: To consciousness, what else?
Teacher: Very good, then you are consciousness.
Student: This certainly seems to follow. But one thing troubles me. 
Teacher: What is that?
Student: The arguments establish that I am consciousness. But we have
shown that consciousness cannot know itself. Therefore, I cannot know 
myself. But how can I be knowledge and not know myself?
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Teacher: Consciousness does not have to know itself to be knowledge.
Student: How can that be?
Teacher: Consciousness can perhaps best be understood through the analogy
of light. For example, when it is daylight we can see objects such as trees, 
flowers, and the like. Yet, do we need to see the source of light, the sun, 
in order to see the objects?
Student: By no means.
Teacher: Likewise with consciousness or, if you will, the inner light, we 
need not see the inner light in order for it to function.
Student: I do not quite see why we need to have an inner light in addition
to the outer one.
Teacher: Will you venture upon a little experiment with me?
Student: Gladly.
Teacher: Would you be good enough to close your eyes.
Student: Very well.
Teacher: Now, tell me what you see.
Student: I do not see any outer objects. I see, as it were, only a vast
space of blackness.
Teacher: Could you see the image of a person should you care to imagine one.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Just as we need an outer light in order to see outer objects shall
we not say that we need an inner light in order to see inner objects?11 You 
understand that we speak metaphorically.
Student: But I do not quite see why we need the metaphor of the inner light.
Teacher: Light is the condition for seeing, for without light the visible
would not be visible. Without the outer light we could not see outer objects.
nCf. St. Augustine, De Magistro, xii, pp. 39-40.
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Student : True.
Teacher: We can see, as it were, with an inner eye as well. We see in
dreams, for example, when our eyes are closed. Does it not make equal sense 
to say that we need an inner light to make our inner objects visible to us?
We even use the language of vision when we refer to consciousness. You 
yourself said that you did not quite see why we needed the metaphor of the 
inner light to mean that you did not quite understand why we needed the 
metaphor of the inner light.
Student: True.
Teacher: Now, we do not have to see the outer light, as the sun, in order to
see. Why do you think that we would have to see the inner light in order to 
know?
Student: But we can see the outer light should we so choose. Yet we cannot,
as we have established earlier, ever be conscious of consciousness.
Teacher: To keep the metaphor parallel it is the sun which cannot see itself
and yet affords light for seeing. But in any case we cannot actually see the
outer light either. What we do see is some definite shade of color whether
28white or yellow or whatever, line or figure, (figures being lines which are
28For the Buddhists what we see are colors and shapes, but light is not 
included among the objects of vision: "This, 0 Brahmin, is the origin of
vision; it is a door through which to see colors and shapes." Quoted by 
Stcherbatsky in The Central Conception of Buddhism..., p. 52. Aristotle says 
that "...it is only in light that the color of a thing is seen." On the Soul, 
Bk. Ill, Ch. 7, 418 64-5. But it seems that Aristotle thinks that light itself 
can be seen for he says, "light is as it were the proper color of what is 
transparent and exists whenever the potentially transparent is excited to 
actuality by the influence of fire..." Ibid., 4l8a29. If light is a color 
and color is what is visible, then light is visible. Berkeley makes the 
same error: "You will further inform me, whether we Immediately perceive
by sight anything beside light, and colors, and figures..." Three Dialogues 
Between Hylas and Philonous, In Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists, First 
Dialogue. Actually, all that is seen is color. Lines or figures are 
divisions within or extensions of color. Division and extension are acts of 
the mind.
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bounded) . The outer light is what enables us to see. We never really see 
outer light at all. Likewise, the inner light is what enables us to see 
and is itself never seen.
Student: I still do not quite see the ultimate significance of the metaphor
of light.
Teacher: We want to understand how there can be knowledge. We can come to
an understanding of how knowledge can be through an understanding of how 
light can be. Light is because it is a source of itself. Light does not re­
quire something else in order to be; it is itself its own condition for being. 
Knowledge is itself its own source. It does not arise from something else.
Just as light, it supplies itself out of its own being. The very nature of 
light is to be self-luminous; it does not need to be lighted by another. The 
very nature of knowledge is to be self-revealing; it does not have to be known 
by another.
Student: Can you give me an example of light as a source?
Teacher: Surely. When we turn on the lamp in this room we can see the objects
in the room. Now, do we need to turn on another lamp in order to see by the 
light of the lighted lamp?
Student: No.
Teacher: The reason we do not need another lighted lamp to see by the light
of the lighted lamp is because the lamp itself is a source of light. It does 
not have to be illuminated by something else. It has already provided the 
condition which enables us to see.
Student: This is quite clear to me now.
Teacher: You understand, then, what is meant by a source.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Now, do we need another inner light to see by the light of our
-46-
inner light?
Student: No, for the Idea of light Implies that it Is a source of light.
If we needed another inner light then the first inner light would not be a 
source of light. In any case the postulation of another inner light would 
be of no use to us. For the same question can be asked of it: can we see 
by its light or does it need to be illumined by another? If we always need 
another light to see by the light of light then how would light ever be pro­
vided by which we were to see? For, if an addition to the first light were 
required, then another light would be required in addition to that light and 
it would require an infinite number of these inner lights in order to see.
Even an infinite number of lights would be of no use, for an infinite number 
of lights, no one of which provided illumination, would still leave us in the 
dark. Somewhere along the line a light must Itself provide the condition for 
seeing. That is what we mean by a light. A light that provides the condition 
for seeing need not be illumined by another light.
Teacher: Excellent reasoning. You understand, then, how we can be knowledge
without our being able to know knowledge. Consciousness must precede 
self-consciousness. Knowledge must precede mind.
Student: I see now that I can be knowledge without having to know myself.
But if I am knowledge do I not know that I am knowledge? And yet, if I know 
that I am knowledge, I must then know myself.
Teacher: You know that you are knowledge, but you cannot know yourself as
knowledge. You can never know knowledge; you can never know yourself. But 
you can know that you must be knowledge in order for knowledge to be possible 
at all.
Student: How is that?
Teacher: Old theories of knowledge held that there were minds on the one
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hand and objects on the other and that knowledge was a correspondence be­
tween an Idea that the mind possessed and the object. But this view is 
flawed in several key respects. First of all, it is already assumed that 
one has knowledge of the concept on the one and the object on the other.
But if all knowledge is correspondence how could we first know the separate
terms which are then to correspond with each other? If each term is itself 
to be known in terms of a concept and an object then this must perforce lead 
to an infinite regress and we would never come to knowledge at all. Further, 
even if knowledge of the terms to be matched were possible under the corres­
pondence theory how is the correspondence known? It is assumed that the con­
cept and the object match up. But how is this "matching" known? Is the 
matching known also through the seen correspondence between a concept and an
object? How can we tell if the concept and the object match up? If we must
have recourse to another concept, we will again be lost in an infinite regress 
and we would never come to knowledge at all. Or, if the matching were known 
in some other way, then that other way would be what was knowledge; and, the 
definition of knowledge as the correspondence between a concept and an object 
would be parasitic upon a previous and other kind of knowledge.
Student: Yes, these are flaws to be sure.
Teacher: And, there are others. The theory of correspondence as knowledge
must always remain on the level of conjecture since we can never have access
to the objects save through the ideas or images the mind has and therefore
we have no way of even knowing that there are objects, much less a corres­
pondence between the objects and the ideas the mind has of them. And, fur­
ther, the theory of correspondence cannot explain how it is possible for 
the mind even to know its own ideas.
Student: Could you go into some detail on this last point?
- w -
Teacher: Gladly. Would you perform a little thought experiment with me?
Imagine, if you will, a bear.
Student: Very well.
Teacher: Now, how do you know your imagination?
Student: What do you mean?
Teacher: You have one image of a bear do you not?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Now, do you need another image of the bear in order to compare
the image of the bear that you have in order to know the image of the bear
that you have?
Student: No, for if that were true I would then need yet another image of
bear to know that image and yet another image to know that one, I would
need an infinite series of bear Images in order to know the one. But if I
need an infinite series of bear images how can X know any one of them to be
a bear image?
Teacher: How do you know the bear image then?
Student: I know it immediately.
Teacher: Do you first form the image of bear in your mind and then see it?
In other words, is knowledge a special kind of act like the act of seeing 
that is performed upon an already existent object?
Student: No, I did not perform any special act of knowledge upon my image.
I did not have to see my image. Indeed, how could I ever have had the image 
in the first place if I could not know it without performing some act of know­
ledge upon it? How would I know upon what to perform my knowledge act? 
Teacher: Your imaging of bear, then, was identical to your knowing it?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Is there a difference between what you know (the bear), you
(the one who knows the bear), and the act of your knowing of the bear?
Student: No.
Teacher: In seeing how imagination and knowledge are one and the same
you can understand how you and knowledge must be one and the same.
Student: Yes, could you provide me with another example to make It more
clear to me that we can only make sense out of the fact that there is know-
29ledge by being knowledge?
Teacher: Surely. How do you know that you are angry?
Student: I know I am angry when I am angry and that is an end to it.
Teacher: You do not require a further act of knew ledge that you perform
upon yourself in order to know that you are angry?
Student: No, I know Immediately that I am angry when I am angry.
Teacher: You know that you are angry when you are angry. Your knowledge of
anger can only come from your being angry.^
Student: I understand this very well now.
Teacher: How do you know when you are hungry?
Student: I know that I am hungry when I am hungry. My knowledge comes from
my being.
Teacher: Very good. Do you understand now why it is that only by being know­
ledge can knowledge be possible at all? If there is a separation between 
knowledge and the known then how can knowledge ever know the known? Once 
subject and object have been split there is no way of ever getting them
29For Aristotle knowledge consists in becoming one with the object 
known. This is true of sense knowledge (On the Soul, Bk. II, Ch. 12) and 
intellectual knowledge (Bk. Ill, Ch. 4). Cf. above, n. 24, p. 33.
30Aristotle says, "Actual knowledge is identical with its object."
On the Soul, Bk. Ill, Ch. 5 430a20 and Ch. 6 431al.
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back together again. Knowledge has been construed as an event which comes 
into being through the interaction between a subject and an object. But if 
there were subjects and objects there could never be knowledge in the first 
place. A subject can never know an object*, there is no object \diich is to 
be known by the subject.
Student: If there is no object and no subject how can we call what there
is knowledge? It seems to me that the term ’knowledge’ only makes sense if 
there is a knower and a known. Why do we use the name 'knowledge' to des­
cribe what there is?
Teacher: A very good question. All names are bound to be false because 
'name* implies a duality between the name and the thing which is named.
A name is a way in which we signify reality. But reality is not signified 
in itself. Reality is not even significant in itself. Therefore, any name 
that we choose will necessarily be a falsification of reality. Reality is 
unnameable.
Student: Is 'unnameable1 a name for reality?
Teacher: It is a name only for us. In itself reality is neither nameable
nor unnameable.
Student: What justification then is there for choosing the name 'knowledge'?
Teacher: We are trying to point to reality, are we not?
Student: To be sure.
Teacher: What attributes must reality possess?
Student: How can we speak of reality as possessing attributes? Surely,
the "possession of attributes" is only a way in which we conceive reality
and is not descriptive of the nature of reality itself.
Teacher: We are only speaking metaphorically when we speak of reality as
possessing attributes. But that should not stop us. Indeed, "reality" is
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only a category of ours. What Is is not real in itself. We call it 
'reality' but it does not call itself 'reality*. But if we are to speak 
about reality, what attributes will we say that it must possess?
Student: The real is what has being and what can be known with certainty
to exist. What is real must exist in itself and in no way depend upon 
our knowing it for its existence. It must include all existence within 
it and leave nothing out.
Teacher: Very good. Should we not also include among the characteristics
that reality must possess that it must be the condition for the knowledge 
of all existence.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Should we not also say that we cannot know reality, for if
reality is what exists in itself it cannot be known since what is known 
is not what exists in itself but what exists for us.
Student: Very well.
Teacher: Now, the name we will choose to designate reality will be the
one which names that which bears the best analogue to reality. That which 
bears the best analogue to reality will be that which shares these traits. 
Student: Very well.
Teacher: Will what we designate by the name 'knowledge* satisfy the above
requirements? Let us examine knowledge and see if it shares In all the 
above named traits. Shall we begin?
Student: Please do.
Teacher: Very well. Can we say that knowledge has being?
Student: Yes, for knowledge only is by being.
Teacher: Do we know with certainty that knowledge exists?
Student: Yes.
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Teacher: Do we know of any existence outside of knowledge?
Student: No.
Teacher: If we know of no existence outside of knowledge then when we
know that knowledge is, do we know all existence?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Then knowledge includes all existence within it and leaves nothing
out.
Student: True.
Teacher: Does knowledge exist in itself?
Student: Yes, we have established this through the example of deep sleep
and through the argument for the possibility of knowledge.
Teacher: Is knowledge the condition for the knowledge of all existence?
Student: Yes, for if knowledge does not exist we cannot know anything to
exist.
Teacher: And, finally, can we know knowledge?
Student: No, for we have shown that knowledge can never be known.
Teacher: Then what better definition of reality will you have? We have
in knowledge that which has being, that \diich we know with certainty to 
exist, that which exists in itself, that which Includes all existence within 
it, and that which is itself unknowable. It is not clear to you now that 
our discussion of knowledge is at once a discussion of reality and is by no
means a mere mental game by which we are amusing ourselves?
Student: Yes, that is abundantly clear to me now.
THIRD DIALOGUE
Student: Despite our two talks, or, perhaps because of them, some matters
remain to trouble me.
Teacher: What are they? It is best to state them out in the open so that
we can discuss them rather than holding them inside yourself.
Student: I was afraid that you would think it foolish of me, or perhaps
a sign of intransigence, if I kept raising difficulties.
Teacher: By no means. How should we ever realize the validity of what we
say unless we expose it to all the possible criticism we can muster? Please 
tell me what difficulties you see, for if we cannot give an adequate response 
to your difficulties we must revise what we have been saying. And, if we 
can respond to your difficulties, it should make our perspective all the 
stronger for we can illustrate how it can meet and withstand criticism. 
Student: Very well, since you give me encouragement I will state what I
have been feeling. It seems to me that the view you have been expressing
makes light of all the differences in the world, that is to say, it makes
it impossible that one thing be different from another. But surely there
are differences in the world.
Teacher: Do you think that difference is something real?
Student: Why, yes.
Teacher: Is difference something which is perceived in itself or do we
always perceive x to be different from y?
Student: We always perceive x to be different from y.
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Teacher: And where do we perceive this difference? Is it in x or in y? 
Student: It is in neither. It is a judgment which I make upon seeing x 
and y.
Teacher: Where does this difference come from? If it is not in either
object alone, it is not in them taken together. Where is it then?
Student: It is in my mind. If x is hotter than y, I feel x affecting me
differently than y; x feels hotter.
Teacher: The difference is not in x alone.
Student: No.
Teacher: Nor in y alone.
Student: No.
Teacher: If it is in neither alone, then it is not in both together.
What is altogether absent in each taken severally cannot suddenly be present 
when the same two are taken together.
Student: It would seem not.
Teacher: Then, can we say that difference lies solely in your mind.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Then, why are you so quick to affirm that difference is something
real?
Student: Perhaps I was too quick to say that difference is solely in the
mind. After all, why do different objects affect us differently? If we
feel one object to be hotter than another, it must be something in the ob­
ject itself that is different.
Teacher: You want to say now that difference is in the object itself?
Student: Yes, for if difference is something real it must somehow exist
in the nature of an object; it cannot arise out of nothing. If difference 
arises out of nothing, then differences would be made up of nothing. But
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we cannot say that that which is made up of nothing can itself be some­
thing .
Teacher: Does difference exist in the object as it exists in itself?
Or, must we bring the object into relation with other objects before we 
predicate difference of it?
Student: Suppose we say that difference is in the object itself.
Teacher: Is it true of each object that it possesses its difference in
itself?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If it is true of each object that it possesses its "difference in
Itself", then how will any one object be different from any other? Will 
not all objects be alike, rather than being different, in that all objects 
will possess the characteristic of being different in themselves?
Student: I think now that I was mistaken to have said that difference
exists as a property inherent in each object taken by itself, for then we 
could point to no characteristic by means of which one object could be said 
to be different from another. There is no property of difference in itself. 
Difference arises only from a comparison of two objects taken together.
Without a comparison the idea of difference cannot even arise for there
can be difference only if there is two.
Teacher: How does the idea of difference arise?
Student: One object may possess the quality of heat and another the quality
of cold. When we compare the object possessing the heat with the object 
possessing the cold we say that the one object is different from the other. 
Difference is not a separate quality in itself as is heat or cold. We are 
conscious of a perception of heat or cold, but we are never conscious of a 
perception of difference. That heat differs from cold is a judgment we
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form upon perceiving heat and cold and comparing them one to the other. 
Teacher: When we compare two objects, one of which possesses the quality
of redness and the other of which possesses the quality of greenness, do 
we say that they are different from each other?
Student: To be sure.
Teacher: Is the difference between redness and greenness different from
the difference between heat and cold?
Student: By no means. There is no difference between or among differ­
ences. If there were a difference between Individual differences, how 
could we then call them all by the same name?
Teacher: But if there is no difference between differences then every
object differs from every other object in precisely the same way. But if 
every object differs from every other object in precisely the same way, 
then how can we say that any one object is different from any other?
Student: I think now that I was incorrect in saying that there is no 
difference between cases of difference. It now seems to me that every case 
of difference is unique unto Itself.
Teacher: If each case of difference is unique unto itself then no case may
be compared with any other case. For what is unique unto itself is incom­
parable. But if no case can be compared with any other case then the idea 
of difference cannot even arise, for did we not agree that difference can 
arise only through the comparison of objects and has no existence In Itself. 
Student: Perhaps I ought not to have said that difference has no existence
in itself. It now seems to be that we must have reference to a concept of 
difference in itself apart from objects. For, did we not say that there 
is no difference between cases of difference?
Teacher: Yes.
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Student: And yet, how can we say that there is no difference between cases
of difference unless we have access to a conception of difference in itself? 
How can we compare one case of difference (that between red and green) to 
another case of difference (that between cold and hot) and judge that they 
are not different from each other unless we have access to an idea of differ­
ence which is different from the difference between red and green and the 
difference between heat and cold. Indeed, how can we judge that these are 
cases of difference unless we have reference to a conception of difference 
in itself which the two cases of difference share in common with each other.
If there can be more than one case of difference then there must be a
difference between the particular cases of difference and that of which they 
are cases, namely, difference.
Teacher: You are now saying, if I understand you rightly, that there is
such a thing as difference in itself. Difference in Itself exists as a con­
ception or an idea that you have.
Student: Difference is not merely an idea that I have. If it were merely
an idea that I possess you would ask me how it arises. Difference exists as 
a standard by which we can judge that there is more than one case of 
difference, that one case of difference is not different from another case 
of difference, and that one object is different from another.
Teacher: You are now saying that it is through reference to an idea of
difference that you can determine that objects are different from one another. 
Student: Yes. It is only if I know what difference is that I can say that
one object is different from another.
Teacher: Are the differences between all things included within the idea of
difference? Does the idea of difference contain within itself the differ­
ence between red and green, cold and hot, and so on?
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Student: No, for if the idea of difference must include within it all the
differences that there are, we would have to know all individual differ­
ences before we could know what difference was. But how could we know all 
the differences before we knew what difference was? We could not recognize 
a case of difference unless we knew that for which we were looking. If we 
do not know what difference is, how can we know that we have before us an 
individual case of difference? Moreover, if we had to know individual cases 
of difference before we knew what difference was, this would be contrary 
to the hypothesis that it was through an idea of difference that we could 
recognize individual cases of difference. In any event, the idea of differ­
ence cannot arise from examining Individual cases of difference for, if cases 
of difference do not differ, then the idea of difference cannot arise from 
the cases.
Teacher: The idea of difference, then, not including within its conception
individual differences, must be but an empty idea. Actually, if there is no 
difference between individual cases of difference then they are all the same. 
Thus, even if the idea of difference included within itself all the indivi­
dual cases of difference that there were, it would contain no more cases of 
difference than an idea which included no cases of difference within it; for, 
if all individual cases of difference are the same, there is not a single 
case of difference. And so in either case, whether the idea of difference 
contains within itself individual differences or not, the idea of differ­
ence is devoid of content.
Student: So it seems.
Teacher: But if an idea has no content in it how can we know it? What can
we say that we are knowing when we are knowing it? And, if we cannot know it, 
how can we employ it as a standard of judgment? If the idea of difference
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contains no individual differences within it, how can it be employed to 
enable us to judge that there is more than one case of difference, that one 
case of difference is not different from another case of difference, or that 
one object is different from another?
Student: These are formidable difficulties that you present. But I can­
not give up my belief that we have reference to a conception of difference 
in itself apart from objects.
Teacher: Is this idea of difference different from cases of difference?
Student: To be sure. For, no one case of difference differs from any other
case of difference qua being a case of difference. But if there is no dif­
ference between or among cases of difference, then the idea of difference 
cannot be identical to cases of difference. If the idea of difference were 
no different from cases of difference, it would be an idea of sameness, not 
difference. What is more, you could not even ask if the case of difference 
were different from the idea of difference unless you made reference to an 
idea of difference which was different from the case of difference and the 
idea of difference you were comparing.
Teacher: If the idea of difference is different from Individual differences,
how is it known to be different? Must you have recourse to another idea of 
difference in order to judge that the idea of difference is different from 
individual differences?
Student: No, that cannot be. For, if I must have recourse to another idea
of difference in order to judge that my first idea of difference differed 
from difference, I could never know that there was a difference between 
difference and an idea of difference. For, if in order to judge the differ­
ence between difference and an idea of difference I must always refer to 
another idea of difference, I must then of necessity refer to an infinite
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31number of ideas of difference. Since I cannot complete an Infinite 
series, I could never come to know that the idea of difference differed 
from difference. Indeed, even an infinite number of ideas of difference 
will not be of the slightest help in informing me that any of the ideas 
that I possess are ideas of difference. If I know difference at all, it 
cannot be that I know difference through ideas.
Teacher: How, then, do you come to know difference?
Student: Could it be that the idea of difference is formed from our ex­
perience of individual differences, as those between red and green, cold 
and hot, and so on? It seems that difference can only be known either from 
encountering differences in our experience and then forming the idea, or 
from first understanding the idea of difference and then imposing it upon 
our experience.
Teacher: We have agreed that there is no difference between cases of
difference. Thus, all cases of difference are identical. And yet, if all 
cases of difference are identical, there can be no individual differences.
31Aristotle suggests this line of argument in his criticism of Plato's 
theory of Ideas: "And If the Ideas and the particulars that share in them
have the same form, there will be something common to these..." Metaphysics, 
Bk 1, Ch. 9, 991a 2-3. Plato brings the argument up himself in much 
greater detail in his dialogue Parmenides in which he imagines a discourse 
between Socrates and Parmenides: "But now take Largeness itself and the
other things which are large. Suppose you look at all these in the same way 
in your mind's eye, will not yet another unity make its appearance— a Large­
ness by virtue of which they all appear large?
So it would seem.
If so, a second Form of Largeness will present Itself, over and above Large­
ness Itself and the things that share in it and again, covering all these, 
yet another, which will make all of them large. So each of your Forms will 
no longer be one, but an indefinite number." Parmenides, 132 AB. Cf. also 
Parmenides, 132C-133A.
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The idea of difference can certainly not arise from cases of difference, as 
we said earlier, where there is no difference between cases of difference, 
there is not a single case of difference from which the idea of difference 
could arise. But neither can we have reference to an idea of difference 
existing in itself, apart from objects for difference arises always through 
comparison and is never known in itself. And, even if we could make refer­
ence to an idea of difference in itself how would we know if the case of 
difference we had before us were a case of difference. As we said earlier, 
we would have to compare our case of difference and our idea of difference 
to a further idea of difference. This would lead to an infinite regress.
Since we can never complete an infinite series, it follows that we can never 
come to a knowledge of difference. It is impossible to know differences 
whether we say that our knowledge of difference arises from empirical 
examples or from ideas.
Student: I think now that the mistake I have made throughout this discus­
sion is in having construed difference as something other than the object 
itself, whether as a property of the object, a judgment formed from the 
comparison of objects, or an idea existing apart from the object. Difference 
is not something other than the object itself. When we know what the object 
is in itself, then we know that this object is not some other object. We 
know what red is. We know what green is. We know that red is different 
from green simply in that red iŝ  not green. All difference lies simply in 
one object not being another. Whatever makes the object what it is is pre­
cisely what makes it different from other objects. The positive quality which 
makes the object the object that it is is what constitutes its difference. 
Teacher: You are saying now that whatever it is that makes the object Itself
is what makes it not being another.
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Student : Exactly.
Teacher: What it is Co be a table for example, is what makes it not to be
a chair; and, what it is to be a chair is what makes it not be a table.
But if this is so, we can have neither table nor chair. For, if a chair's
being is identical to its difference from table, then to be a chair is not to
be a table. But if chair only means not being a table and table only means
not being a chair, how can there be either table or chair? If each means
the non-existence of the other, there will be no existence to be non-existent
in the other. If all the object is is identical to its not being another,
then no object will have any content and there will be no objects to be
32either the same as or different from any other.
Student: I do not quite see how this follows.
Teacher: If what makes the object itself is what makes it different, then
the same object is both the same as Itself and different from itself. But 
how can an object be both the same as itself and different from itself?
What makes it the same as itself will make it different than itself. Its 
self-identity will make it something other than itself. But plainly it is 
self-contradictory for the identity of a thing to be something other than 
the thing that it is.
Student: What makes the object the same as itself is what makes it differ­
ent from another, not different from itself.
Teacher: It works out the same in the end. Now follow the argument care­
fully. If table i£ not being a chair, and chair jte not being a table, then 
there is no other, chair or table, which the one chair or table is not. If 
there is no other which the one is not, then not being a chair means not
For arguments of a similar nature regarding the nature of differ­
ence, Vide, Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, 
pp. 130-132.
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being a table. The expressions may be substituted for each other. Being 
a table means not being a table, which, of course, is contradictory. The
meaning of an object, what it is to be the object that it is, cannot be not
to be the object that it is.33
Student: Why do you say that a chair is only not being a table? Is there
not a positive quality of "chaimess" as well?
Teacher: A chair cannot mean "being a chair" as something different from
"not being a table" since on the hypothesis with which we began, the object 
is not something different from the character of difference. We began with 
the hypothesis that what makes the thing the thing that it is is what makes 
it different from other things. You stated that difference i£ the positive 
quality which makes the thing what it is and is not a special property all 
of its own. If "not being a table" is different from "being a chair", then 
difference and the thing cannot be the same. But this is contrary to the 
hypothesis.
Student: This is a most difficult matter to make out. It seems that differ­
ence cannot be the same as the object Itself and yet it must, in some sense, 
be in the object if it is to be real. Perhaps difference is part of what it 
means to be something, but not the whole of it.
Teacher: If how something differed from everything else were part of what
it meant to be the thing that it is, then we could never come to identify 
any particular thing to be what it is. If we could not perceive this chair 
to be a chair unless we perceived as part of its being as chair its
33Ibid, Vol. I, pp. 462-464.
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difference from every other object, how could we ever come to a percep­
tion of chair in the first place?
Student: Do you mean that we would have to know every object before we
could know any object, and, therefore, we would never come to the knowledge
of the one since it is impossible for us to know all.
Teacher: Yes, for obviously we must first go through the one before we can 
reach the all. And, if we need the all before we can know the one, we 
could never come to perceive an object in the first place. But there is 
another reason as well why difference cannot be part of what it means to be 
an object.
Student: What is that?
Teacher: If difference existed in the nature of an object, then in the
essence of every object its difference from every other object would be 
Included. If this is true, then no one thing would be different from any 
other thing since the concept of all things is included in each thing.
It will be true of everything that part of its nature would be identical to 
all other things. But if all things are included within the nature of each 
thing, what means do we have for differentiating one thing from another?
If no one thing can be identified as different from any other thing, how 
could we ever recognize anything to be the particular thing that it is? 
Indeed, if we cannot distinguish one thing from another thing, could we 
even say that we ever perceived an individual thing? For, if all things 
are alike, would we even be conscious of an individual thing?
Student: It̂  seems that difference cannot even be part of what it means to
be an object.
Teacher: True. In fact, we can apply the same dialectic we applied to the
notion that the difference of an object is the same as its Identity to the
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notion that the difference of an object is a partial identity of the object. 
Student: Could I trouble you to show how the same dialectic which applies
to the whole applies to the part?
Teacher: Surely. If part of what a thing is is to be different from some­
thing else, then part of what a table is is to be different from a chair, 
and part of what a chair is is to be different from a table. Now, the part 
of what it means to be a table (not being a chair) requires for its "table­
ness15 not being a chair. By the same token, the part of what it means to 
be a chair (not being a table) requires for its being a chair that it not be 
a table. If each meaning requires itself in the other before it can be in 
itself, there can be no meaning in itself, and a fortiori, no meaning in the 
other.
Student: I now see that I was mistaken to say that what makes the object
the object that it is is identical, whether in whole or in part, to what 
makes the object different. What makes the object different is different 
from the object.
Teacher: How do you detect this difference? If it is a character of differ­
ence to which you appeal that is shared in common, then it will be of no use 
in distinguishing one object from another. If what makes the object differ­
ent is different from the object as a character which is unique in every case, 
then how would we even know to call it by the same name? What is more, if 
the character of difference were different in every case then all objects 
would be the same in this respect and no one case of difference (each being 
unique) would be different from any other.
Student: It seems to me now that difference is not a positive quality
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34which exists in itself hut is simply the absence of a quality in a thing. 
Teacher: If a table is different from chair simply because the quality of
chair is absent from table then, in order to be a table, it is necessary 
not to be everything else; for, to be the thing that it is, all other positive 
qualities must be absent from it. It will be part of the meaning of every­
thing to be void of the qualities of everything else and no positive qualities 
will exist to be absent in anything. For, if before we can have a thing it 
must not be other things, then this must be true of all things. But if it 
is true of all things, then how can the qualities come into being which must 
be absent in other things? Hence, there will be no positive content to be 
experienced and we will never experience anything. Further, if difference is 
but absence, then there is no difference between not being a table and not 
being a closet. If difference is but the absence of somthing, there is no 
quality present to distinguish not being a table from not being a closet.
If there Is no difference between differences, they all become identical.
But if all differences are identical, by what right do we call them differ­
ences ?
Student: Perhaps I was mistaken to say that difference was only absence.
I think now that difference is not merely the absence of a positive quality, 
but is an absence which is a positive quality in itself.
Teacher: Do you mean to say that there is a difference between not being a
closet and not being a chair? This reminds me of the subsidy given in 
this country to farmers for not raising crops on their land. One farmer 
wrote In to inquire what kinds of crops were best for not raising and which
For arguments similar to those given above, Vide, Ibid., Vol. I,
p. 464.
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crop would yield the highest subsidy not to raise.
Student: X do not know what to say. Each rendering of difference that I
put forth you seem to dissemble and yet, I cannot escape from the belief
that things are different from one another.
Teacher: Shall we review the hypotheses you have advanced?
Student: Very well.
Teacher: Is difference something which is perceived in itself?
Student: No, difference is always perceived as a result of the comparison
between two objects.
Teacher: Is the difference which is perceived upon the comparison of two
objects actually existent In the objects or only in the mind?
Student: If It is only in the mind, then it cannot be real. But we have
seen that difference cannot exist in the object either.
Teacher: Is every case of difference unique unto itself?
Student: No.
Teacher: Is there a difference between differences? Is one different in
terms of being a difference from another difference?
Student: No, that cannot be.
Teacher: Do we have reference to an abstract idea of difference In Itself
apart from objects?
Student: No.
Teacher: Is difference part of the meaning of an object?
Student: No.
Teacher: If difference is not identical to the object, is it different from
the object?
Student: It seems that although we have shown that difference cannot be the
same as the object, we cannot say that it Is different from the object either;
for, to say that difference is different from the object, we must have 
reference to a concept of difference apart from the object, but this we 
have shown to be impossible. Is it not strange that we cannot say that 
difference is either the same as or different from the object?
Teacher: And there are stranger things to come. Can we say that difference
is but absence, whether as the absence of a positive quality or as an absence 
which is a positive quality in itself?
Student: No.
Teacher: And earlier we demonstrated, did we not, that difference was not
a positive quality which could be experienced in itself.
Student: That we did.
Teacher: And so in difference we have a phenomenon, each case of which is
neither unique unto itself, the same as any other case, nor different from 
any other case, which can neither be the presence of a positive quality nor 
the absence of a positive quality nor an absence as a positive quality, which 
cannot exist in itself as an idea, which cannot exist in the mind, and 
which is neither identical to the object whether in whole or in part, nor 
different from the object.
Student: Our examination of the idea of difference seems to have led us
to contradictory conclusions.
Teacher: This should come as no surprise to us for from a false premise,
any number of conclusions, including contradictory ones, may follow.
Student: What is the false premise with which we have begun?
Teacher: The false premise is the assumption of the reality of difference.
It is only if we assume that difference is something real that we would 
attempt to say something about it as whether it is in the object or in the 
mind, whether it has positive existence or is the absence of positive
existence, whether it exists in our experience or only in idea, or 
whether it is the same as the object or different from the object. It is 
because difference does not really exist that we are able to predicate any­
thing we please of it, including properties which contradict one another. 
Student: I have one more difficulty.
Teacher: What is it?
Student: If there is no difference then how can there be sameness? If we 
cannot perceive difference, then how can we perceive self-identity? If 
one thing does not differ from any other thing, how could we even have one 
thing? If there Is no other which differs from the one, how would we even 
have a one?
Teacher: You are quite right. Without difference there can be no sameness.
But you should not let this be of concern. Sameness and difference only 
make sense if there are things. But if there are no things, there is no 
comparison between them; and, if there is no comparison, there is neither 
sameness nor difference.
Student: Why is there then no cause for concern?
Teacher: Identity and difference are categories which can have meaning only
with reference to things or objects. Identity and difference can be meaning­
ful to us only if that to which they have reference (objects) really exists. 
But, as we have established earlier, that there are objects is only an hypo­
thesis. It should not surprise us then that the categories which are designed 
to describe that which has no existence in Itself (the object) will them­
selves have no existence in themselves.
Student: Very well.
Teacher: Are you satisfied now that difference does not stand for anything
that is real?
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Student: Yes, the logic of the arguments has established that conclusively.
Teacher: We should not be concerned then if the view we are advancing does
not account for the differences between things. If difference is not any­
thing real, we should be more surprised to discover that it existed. If the 
terms of a relation do not exist (things) then, _a fortiori, the relations 
between those terms cannot exist (sameness and difference).
FOURTH DIALOGUE
Student: One thing still troubles me.
Teacher: What is that?
Student: If there is just knowledge or being or experience, why is there
the appearance of plurality?
Teacher: Under what conditions may there be the appearance of more than one?
Student: I do not know.
Teacher: If we could state the only conditions under which there can be
plurality and these conditions themselves turn out not to be real, then will 
plurality be anything real?
Student: Assuredly not.
Teacher: There are only two ways in which it is possible that there can be
an appearance of more than one.
Student: What are they?
Teacher: Why, space and time. Space is the way in which we can have more
than one existence at the same time. Time is the way in which we can have 
more than one existence in the same space.
Student: Could you explain this to me?
Teacher: Of course. How can you have more than one at the same time? You
can have more than one at the same time only if you put your existences next
to each other in space— either in the space of your imagination or in what
we may call outer space. Can you think of any other way to have more than
one at the same time except than by placing the existences alongside of each




Teacher: You can see then how space Is the only condition under which we
can have a plurality at the same time.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Now, is space something that is real?
Student: What do you mean?
Teacher: Does space have an existence in itself apart from you?
Student: I do not know.
Teacher: How do you know that there is something outside of you in the
first place?
Student: I see it as outside.
Teacher: You see it as outside of what?
Student: I see whatever it is I see as outside of me, as outside of my
body.
Teacher: Good. The body, then, is the orientation point for space. If
there were no body we could not say that certain things were outside and 
others inside of us (as our internal organs).
Student: What you say seems to be correct.
Teacher: We do not have to leave this at the level of seeming. Without the
body as an orientation point could you say that something, x, was to the 
right of something else, y?
Student: No, for all directions are taken with reference to the body.
Originally, I suppose someone chose the word 'right* to stand for one hand 
and the word 'left' to stand for the other hand. Since that time everything 
that is either left or right can be traced back to that original starting 
point.
Teacher: Excellent. And so whatever stands on your right hand is to the
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right and whatever stands on your left hand is to the left.
Student: True.
Teacher: It is your body, then, that is the orientation point for right­
ness and leftness. What is right is right of your body; what is left is 
left of your body.
Student: Correct.
Teacher: Without your body would there be either left or right?
Student: I do not see how that would be possible.
Teacher: Without your body could you say that things in themselves are
outside of you?
Student: If there is no body surely we could not say that things were out­
side of us, but would they still not be outside of one another?
Teacher: How is it that one object can be outside of another object?
Student: If I drop a stone in the water I may say that the stone is inside
of the ripples it creates and the ripples are outside of the stone.
Teacher: But how can you say that the stone is inside the ripples unless you
imaginatively project yourself as a body in the place of the stone. Is it 
still not with reference to your body that you say that objects are inside 
or outside of one another? It is only in these cases that the process is a 
step further removed from when we say that these objects are either Inside 
or outside of our bodies.
Student: Yes, what you say is right. But could we not say that objects are
35external to one another?
35For Hegel, what is meant by nature is the world in which existences 
are external to one another. R. 6 . Collingwood attributes this view to Hegel: 
"Nature, then, is the realm of outwardness; it is a world (or rather the 
world) In which things are outside each other." R. G. Collingwood, The Idea 
of Nature, p. 126.
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Teacher: What do you mean by the word 'external'?
Student: Why, we say that objects are external to one another when they
are next to one another or when one object is between two other objects.
Teacher: When we say that one object is next to another object do we not
always imaginatively portray our bodies as alongside one of these objects?
We say that x is next to y because we have projected ourselves as next to 
y. Actually, the "next to" is next to our bodies but it is only at some 
steps further removed. When we say that one object is between two other 
objects we always imaginatively place our bodies between x and z in order
to say that y is between x and z. All spatial relationships must ultimately
36be brought back to ray body if they are to exist at all.
Student: I understand what you mean now, and X see that what you say is
correct.
Teacher: Without my body then can we say that things are external to one
another?
Student: By no means.
Teacher: What about above and below. Can we say that some things are above
other things or below other things?
Student: Above and below can only exist if ultimately they are brought into
relation with my body.
Teacher: What of right side up and upside down?
Student: The same would hold of that.
Teacher: And farther away and nearer to?
36The 'my* is symbolic of any subject's body.
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Student: The same.
Teacher: Is there any kind of spatial relationship that would be possible
without reference to my body?
Student: No, I do not see how any would be possible at all. Wait a moment.
Is it not true that we can picture two men standing next to each other 
within our imaginations?
Teacher: Must we not imaginatively project our bodies as alongside these
two men even here in order to say that they are next to each other? We 
first imagine these two men as next to tie and then, and only then, as next 
to each other. It is just that the force of habit has caused us to suppress 
the major premise and to say simply that the men are next to each other. 
Student; Very well.
Teacher: Would you agree now that no spatial relationship can exist with­
out reference to my body.
Student: Yes, I quite agree.
Teacher: Shall we not say then that my body is the condition for the exis­
tence of space. For if it were not for my body, could space exist at all? 
Student: Are you equating space with spatial relationships?
Teacher: Do you think that space is a something which exists in itself?
Student: I am not certain.
Teacher: Do you ever see space in itself or do you always see space as a
relationship between objects?
Student: I never see space in Itself. It is true that I only see space
as a relationship between objects.
Teacher: Very good. If we were to say that space was a something that
existed in itself, we would be saying that space is itself a magnitude 
existing in itself.
-75-
Student : Yes, that Is so.
Teacher: And if space is itself a magnitude then what about objects? Are
37objects also magnitudes in themselves in addition to space or are they 
magnitudes which are made up of the magnitude which is space?
Student: They cannot be separate magnitudes or else we should have two
magnitudes which are taking up the same space. But that is impossible.
It must be that either space itself is a magnitude and objects are not 
magnitudes, or objects are magnitudes and space itself Is not a magnitude.
But it cannot be that objects possess no magnitude. It must be that space 
is not a magnitude in itself, but is made up of objects which possess mag­
nitude .
Teacher: You are saying that, only objects have magnitude and space has no
magnitude.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If space has no magnitude can we say that it has any extent?
Student: Why not?
Teacher: If space has no magnitude in itself then it cannot be divided.
Student: True.
Teacher: If space has no magnitude in itself then neither can it be added to.
Student: Quite right.
Teacher: Can we say that that which can neither be divided nor added to has
any extension? Can we say that that which has no magnitude is of any length? 
Student: No.
The term 'magnitude' is used In the sense of quantity. Spatial 
quantities or magnitudes are measured In terms of extension. Temporal quan­
tities or magnitudes are measured in terms of duration.
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Teacher : Can we say that that which Is without length Is of any extent?
Student: No.
Teacher: Can that which has no magnitude or extent be said to be farther
away, or nearer than, or between, or next to, or beneath, or above, to the 
left of, or to the right of?
Student: No, I do not see how that would be possible.
Teacher: Then all of these spatial relationships must be comprised of the 
objects which are in them, I suppose.
Student: Yes, for relationships can exist only between objects. Relation­
ships have no existence in themselves apart from objects.
Teacher: And it is the objects which are filled with magnitude.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: And space itself is devoid of objects.
Student: True.
Teacher: How is it that an empty space can be filled up with objects which
have magnitude?
Student: No, that will not do. It must be that space itself is a magnitude
and what we call objects are in fact divisions within that space.
Teacher: Objects then are made up of the magnitude which is space.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If space is a magnitude it can be subdivided.
Student: To be sure.
Teacher: Can it be subdivided infinitely or is there a smallest part of
space?
Student: For whatever part we say is the smallest it can always be divided.
Teacher: If space can be divided infinitely it must possess an infinite
magnitude.
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Teacher : How can there be objects then which are of finite magnitudes?
How can there be a finite magnitude which is made up of an infinite mag­
nitude?
Student: That seems to be impossible to me. To tell you the truth I can
make no sense of this.
Teacher: Can we make any sense out of space as an existence in itself ex­
cept as construing it either as a magnitude existing in itself or as empty 
and having Its magnitude made' up of objects which are of certain magnitudes? 
Student: No, I can think of no other alternatives than these.
Teacher: Then perhaps we were wrong to think of space as an existence in
itself. What if we were to say that space has no existence in itself but 
consists entirely of a relationship between objects.
Student: Tes, that sounds like it will help us out of these difficulties.
Teacher: Now, all spatial relationships between objects are ultimately
traceable and reducible to relationships between my body and its objects,
are they not? For to have any spatial relation must I not always imaginative
ly identify my body with one of the objects in relation? The spatial 
relationship then is always a relationship between my body and an object, 
is it not?
Student: Let us imagine that this is true for the moment.
Teacher: Now, which is the orientation point, the object or my body?
Student: Why, my body.
Teacher: Excellent. The relationship, then, is one which is from us.
We create the relationship. The relationship would not exist if it were 
not for the fact that my body serves as the orientation point.
Student: True.
Teacher: Shall we say, then, that if it were not for my body space could
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no t exist. For, if space is nothing but a relationship between objects and 
all relationships between objects are relationships between my body and 
objects, unless my body has existence, space cannot have existence.
Student: Very well.
Teacher: Now, is my body real?
Student: You are asking me if I know my body as an existence which exists
in itself.
Teacher: Yes.
Student: No, for my own knowledge of my body is a feeling awareness that
I have.
Teacher: And when there is no feeling awareness, where is my body?
Student: Why can say?
Teacher: We cannot say, then, that my body is real.
Student: Very well.
Teacher: Now, you asked me why it was that there was an appearance of
plurality even though in reality plurality did not exist, did you not? 
Student: I did indeed.
Teacher: It appears that we can see, touch, smell, hear, taste, imagine,
remember, understand more than one thing at a time because we set whatever 
it is to be cognized alongside whatever else there is to be cognized next 
to it in space, whether in outer space or in the space of our Imagination. 
Student: Could you give me an example of this?
Teacher: Gladly. We think we can hear two sounds at once because ve 
imaginatively arrange these sounds in two separate places. How can we 
hear two sounds at once? It seems that we can hear one sound in one place 
and another sound in another place. If we did not sec the sounds in two 
separate spaces we would never say that we could hear two sounds at once.
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Can you hear two sounds at the same time if you think of them as occupying 
the same space?
Student: By no meanB.
Teacher: Can you appear to touch two things at the same time unless they
occupy two separate places?
Student: No, for how would they be two unless they occupied different
places in space?
Teacher: Can it seem that you can see more than one thing at a time unless
these things occupy different places in space? Can it seem that you can 
taste two things at a time unless the two things at a time unless the two 
things are in different places in space?
Student: No. For space is the only way in which there can be more than one
existence at the same time.
Teacher: Quite right. Now, can there be different places in space if it is
not for my body?
Student: Can there not be different places in space without my body?
Teacher: What do you mean by a different place? Can there be an abstract
place or must not all places be either next to, on top of, on the bottom of, 
and so on?
Student: You are quite right. It makes no sense to think of a place in
itself. Every place must exist in some spatial relation to some other place. 
Teacher: And by place I take it you mean object, for did you not say that
space was no existence in itself but rather was nothing more than a relation­
ship between objects?
Student: Yes, that is right.
Teacher: Can we say then that there are different places in space without
my body?
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Student: No, we cannot say that.
Teacher: Now, can we be aware of a plurality if it is not for space?
Can it seem as if we can see, hear, touch, smell, taste more than one thing 
at a time if it were not for space?
Student: I do not see how.
Teacher: Space, then, is the condition for plurality.
Student: True.
Teacher: If it were not for my body, would there be space? If all space
is a relationship between the body and objects and it is a relationship 
that exists from the perspective of my body, can space exist if my body 
does not exist?
Student: No.
Teacher: Is 117 body something that has existence in itself?
Student: No.
Teacher: Then how can plurality have any real existence? If all plurality
depends upon space and all space depends upon my body and my body has no
38existence in itself, why should we think that plurality has any existence 
in Itself?
Student: I can see that we must think of space as real if we are to attri­
bute reality to plurality. If space is a perspective which exists from the 
point of view of my body, then that more than one object can exist at a time 
is also a projection on our parts and has no reality in itself.
Teacher: Indeed, we could have taken a shorter road than this.
Student: How so?
38Vide, p. 78. Vide, also Second Dialogue, p. 42.
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Teacher: Did we not say that space was not a something that existed in
itself but was a relation between my body and objects.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: And have we not shown that objects have no existence in themselves.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: And have we not also shown that my body has no existence in itself.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If space is a relationship between my body and the object and
neither term of the relationship can exist, how can the relationship exist?
Student: It cannot. But space is not the only form in which plurality
comes to us. Did you not yourself say that time is the way in which we can
have more than one existence in one and the same space?
Teacher: You are quite right to remind me of this. We must now show that
time is not something real if we are to say that all forms of plurality are 
not real.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Very well. Do you hold that time is a magnitude which exists in 
itself or is it made up of the events which come to pass.
Student: Suppose I say that it is a magnitude in itself.
Teacher: If time is a magnitude which exists in itself, then are the events
which come to pass also temporal magnitudes which exist in themselves?
Student: No, for if time were a magnitude in itself and events also pos­
sessed temporal magnitudes in themselves, there would then be two times 
at once. But the only way in which there can be a plurality in time is if 
one is before and the other after. But if one is before and the other after, 
the "two" do not exist at once. Any plurality in time must be the result of 
divisions within one and the same time. We could not make sense of the
"before" and the "after" unless the "before" and the "after" were parts of 
the same time.
Teacher*. Very good. X suppose that the events which come to be are made up 
of the magnitude that is time.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Xs there a smallest possible unit of time?
Student: No, for any unit of time that we have can always be divided.
Teacher: And, if time can always be divided then there must be something
there to be so divided. And what is there is time.
Student: Yes, or else why would we say that it is time which is capable
of an infinite divisibility.
Teacher: Time then is an infinite magnitude.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If time is an Infinite magnitude and the events which come to be
are made up of the magnitude that is time, then haw is it that any event
would pass? Xf any event is made up of an infinite magnitude, then it
would require an infinite time to pass. But if it required an infinite 
time to pass no event would ever pass.
Student: I was wrong to say that time was a magnitude in itself and events
were made up of the magnitude that is time. It must rather be that time 
itself is empty and is made up of events .which are, in themselves, temporal 
magnitudes.
Teacher: But we can apply the same dialectic to events as well. Xs there
39The Saravastivadin school of Buddhism thought it could determine 
the duration of a moment which nonetheless would be the smallest imaginable 
particle of time: "The Saravastivadin school makes an attempt mathematical­
ly to determine the duration of a moment. It, nevertheless, admittedly re­
presents the smallest particle of time imaginable." But is this not impos­
sible? For any chosen duration, no matter how small, can we not always ima­
gine its subdivision? Central Concept..., p. 32.
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a smallest possible event?
Student: No. Any temporal unit can always be sub-dlvlded further.
Teacher: If any temporal unit can always be divided then there must be
something there to be so divided. What this something Is Is time. Time,
then, Is an Infinite magnitude. But how can a finite event be made up of 
an Infinite magnitude?
Student: I do not know what to make of this. It seems that time can
neither be a magnitude In itself nor can it be made up of events which 
are made up of temporal magnitudes.
Teacher: Why do you think of time as an existence In itself? May it not
be that time is a way which we have of grouping events, but has no existence 
in itself.
Student: What do you mean?
Teacher: I mean that the fact that events take up time or occur one after
the other in time has nothing to do with the event but rather has to do with
us. Time has a meaning only In relation to us. Events have no temporal 
relation among themselves.
Student: If time has no existence in itself, then time Is not something
40which is real. But I cannot believe that time Is unreal.
Teacher: But what do you mean by the reality of time?
Student: I mean that all of our experience Is in time.
Teacher: If I could show you that, on the contrary, none of our experience
was in time, would you give up your belief in the reality of time?
According to Sankhya-Yoga, time is unreal: "Time is an idea without
reality, an empty construction of the mind." Central Concept..., p. 37.
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Student: If you could show that none of our experience was in time that
would certainly give me pause to think.
Teacher: Very well, then. Now, to say that our experience is in time is
to say that it takes time to experience, is it not?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If it takes time to experience we may say that a time span t
must elapse before an experience can take place.
Student: Very well.
Teacher: It requires the entire time span t for an experience to take
place.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: And time span t is made up of time is it not?
Student: Yes, or else why should we call it a time span?
Teacher: So time span t is of a certain magnitude.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Can time span t be sub-divided?
Student: Yes, for any magnitude of time may be made smaller.
Teacher: Is there any limit to this divisibility?
Student: No.
Teacher: If something can be divided into an infinite number of parts it
itself must be infinite must it not? Or else we would not speak of divid­
ing a something infinitely.
Student: That is true.
Teacher: Then time span t must be Infinite in temporal magnitude.
Student: So it seems.
Teacher: If tine span t is an infinite magnitude and time span t must
elapse before experience can take place, we should never come to
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experience for we must first wait upon the passage of an Infinite lapse 
of time.
Student: I was wrong to say that a time span t must elapse before an
experience can take place. We experience directly over certain spans of 
time.
Teacher: I see that you are not lacking in ingenuity. What are we to
make of this? By saying that we can experience directly over a certain span 
of time I presume you mean that all of our experience is direct and none of 
it is remembered experience.
Student: Yes, that is what I mean.
Teacher: Is the entire time span t required in order that there be an
experience?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Does our experience come into being all at once at the end of
this time span or does it come into being a little at a time during the 
duration of this time span?
Student: It cannot be that it comes into being all at once at the end of
the time span for if it came into being all at once, we could not say that 
our experience was in time. What would be happening during the earlier 
part of the time span if our experience came into being all at once at 
the end? It must be if the entire time span t Is required in order to 
have experience that our experience comes into being a little at a time. 
Teacher: Is time span t of some measurable length?
Student: Yes, if it is a temporal magnitude it can be measured.
Teacher: If it is of some measure may we not sub-divide it so that if we
represent time span t by t we may represent its division by t^...t where 
the numerical sequence stands for the chronological sequence.
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Student: Yes, we may do this if you like.
Teacher: How do I distinguish between one part of the time span and
another? Can I, as with a candy bar, simply cut the time span In half
and by looking at the two halves distinguish which is the first part of
the span from the second?
Student: By no means. In order that there can be a second part of the
time span, one part must replace the other. For there to be a second or
later part the first part must disappear and its place be taken by the
second. We can identify the later as later only if t^ has already passed 
away.
Teacher: Very good. Within any time span t, t ^  comes into being only
because It has replaced t^...^ which have already passed away. can
come into being only if t^...tg have passed away.
Student: True.
Teacher: Our hypothesis is that the entire time span t is necessary for
there to be experience and that our experience comes into being a little 
at a time. But if this is so, our experience cannot be direct but must be 
in part remembered experience. For, at t ^  we no longer have t^ to directly 
experience. At t ^  all that we can experience directly is, so to speak, 
t^Q. All of the earlier parts have already passed away. If our experience 
comes into being a little at a time, then only a small part of our experience 
can be said to be experience; the rest of it will be memory. The hypothesis 
was, however, that we could experience directly over certain time spans. 
Student: Suppose that is true. Some of our experience is remembered. What
follows from that?
Teacher: I will ask you about any part of the time span what I asked you
about all of it. I may ask about t^. Is some of our experience of t^
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remembered?
Student: And suppose it were?
Teacher: If t-̂  is in part experience, in part memory, then we may analyze
t̂ . is part of t which is of some magnitude, and if t is of some mag­
nitude and t^ is part of it, then t^ is of some magnitude. T^ may be re­
presented as being itself made up of t....t and the question reappears, is
jL X
some of the experience of t^ comprised of memory?
Student: And suppose it were?
Teacher: How should we ever have experience in the first place? He must
first have an experience before we can remember it. There is no memory 
unless there is an experience to be remembered. Memory does not precede 
experience; it must follow it. But on this account we can never begin 
with experience. For, if experience takes time we can never have an experi­
ence in the first place to remember.
Student: I am not sure that I understand.
Teacher: Experience takes time does it not?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: And experience comes into being a little at a time.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: To have an experience, a time span t must elapse for that is what
we mean when we say that experience takes time. To form any part of time
span t (t̂ ) a certain time must pass. But for time to pass certain units of 
time must pass into the past and be replaced by others. If an experience 
is made up of parts which take time, and in order for there to be any one 
part a certain time must pass, then how could we ever have an experience in 
the first place? At best we would have a memory of what happened before.
But we would not even have this because in order to have a memory, there
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must be an experience to be remembered. But on the hypothesis that an 
experience comes into being over a time, there would never be an oppor­
tunity for an experience to form. Therefore, if experience takes time 
we would not ever have an experience in the first place.
Student: But this is to assume that for there to be direct experience all
experience must be experience of the present. Why is it that we cannot have 
a direct experience of the past?
Teacher: How do you know that it is the past that you are experiencing?
Is it the past itself that is present? When you remember now that you were 
once five years old, are you presently five years old?
Student: No.
Teacher: How can you distinguish the present from the past?
Student: The past itself is not present. What we mean by calling it the
past is that it has passed; it is gone.
Teacher: What is it that you remember?
Student: I remember an linage of the past.
Teacher: How do you know that? How do you know that your memory is an
image of the past? Do you have the past itself available to compare your 
memory Image to it?
Student: No.
Teacher: We cannot say that memory is an image of the past.
Student: I see that I was wrong to say that each time span is itself com­
prised of smaller temporal units. I see now that each time span must be, 
as it were, instantaneous for our experience to be direct. It is in this
way that we will have direct experience, not of the past, but of the
present.
Teacher: You are saying now that a time span is not made up of units of time.
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Student : Yes.
Teacher: If each time span is not itself made up of time then we cannot
say that a time span is of any magnitude at all, for we cannot reach a 
temporal magnitude by adding together units which are not themselves made 
up of magnitude.
Student: True.
Teacher: How then can we say that our experience is temporal? If it is
made up of non-temporal units these cannot be added together so as to yield 
a temporal experience. If, in order to have a direct experience of the 
present moment the moment must be instantaneous, then we cannot include a 
moment which is made up of no time in the time order. But if our experience
is not in the time order, what sense does It make to speak of it as temporal?
Student: I am not sure that I understand this last point.
Teacher: Look here. If there is experience at any moment, we must say
that it comes after a previous moment and before the next moment. We can 
give each moment a temporal location in the series.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: But if each moment is, as you say, not supposed to take up any
time, how could we locate any moment with respect to any other moment?
If each moment is timeless, then it cannot be part of a time order, for a 
temporal period cannot be constituted by non-temporal units. But if a 
moment Is not part of the time order, how can we say that any moment is
before or after any other moment? But If we cannot place any moment in
the series how can we speak of our experience as coming to us in a 
sequence t^...t^g?
Student: Why is it that a timeless moment cannot be placed within a tem­
poral series?
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Teacher: If a moment Is timeless then it cannot be said to happen before
or after another moment. But If it cannot be said to be either before or 
after, how can we say that it is part of a series?
Student: It seems that we cannot experience directly over certain time
spans, for that would be to have a time Bpan which itself is made up of 
moments which are not in time. But as we have said before, we cannot have 
a time span which is made up of timeless moments. We must reject the analy­
sis of time into moments and say that the entire time span is required for 
an experience to come into being. Experience does not come into being a 
little at a time.
Teacher: Does experience come into being all at once at the end of a time
span?
Student: No, for we could then perform the same analysis upon this experi­
ence as "coming at the end". If the experience comes into being all at 
once or Instantaneously it must take no time. But if it takes no time, 
how can we place it in a series as at the end or the beginning or any place 
at all? Or, if it is timeless then how can we say that it is part of a time 
span (whether the end or any other part) which is of temporal duration? 
Teacher: Very good.
Student: It must be that it is over the entire time span itself that we
have direct experience.
Teacher: If it Is over the entire time span itself that we have direct
experience and experience does not come to be as some at the first, more 
at the middle, and the rest at the end, then how do we fit this experience 
into a temporal relation with other experiences. Over this time span t no 
time has elapsed since time passes only when certain moments recede into the 
past and are replaced by other moments. To experience directly over the
-91-
length of t Is to say that there is no time passage within t, for to experi­
ence directly is to experience not the past but the present. For there to 
be a past there must be a time passage, but then we would not have a direct 
experience but a memory. A memory is not a direct experience because we must 
first have an experience before we can remember it. On the hypothesis, 
however, we are having direct experience. A direct experience during which 
no time passes cannot be said to be temporal. But an experience which is 
not temporal cannot be placed within the time order. If the entire time 
span t takes up no time, we cannot say that time span t comes before time 
span r and after time span s. To say that we experience directly over cer­
tain temporal spans is to say that there is no temporal order to our experi­
ence. We reach this conclusion by extending the analysis of the time 
moment in relation to the time span to the time span in relation to the time 
order. To say that we can experience directly over a time span is to say 
that our experience cannot be ranked in a time order. But when we say that 
our experience is in time, we mean that we can say that an experience b can 
be said to occur before c and after a. If we cannot say when an experience 
occurs, what sense does it make to say that it is in time?
Student: What you say seems undeniable. We cannot experience the past direct­
ly or else it would not be past. If we have a direct experience it cannot be 
of the past. We can have no experience of the present, for to do so would be 
to experience a present which was not in time and, thus, could not be located 
as present. We cannot experience the present as becoming over a span of time 
for it would then no longer be present but would already be past.
Teacher: It must follow, does it not, that our experience is not in time.
Student: In terms of the logic of the arguments presented the conclusion
is inescapable. And yet it seems to me that I experience time.
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Teacher: Let us attend then to your experience. In order for there to 
be time there must be a past, must there not?
Student: To be sure.
Teacher: Do you ever experience the past?
Student: Yes, in memory.
Teacher: And where is your proof that what you remember is what happened
before. Is it not true that all you have is the now?
Student: May I ask you a few questions?
Teacher: Why not?
Student: All we can be certain of, I suppose, is that everything is in the
moment, or, the moment is all that there is.
Teacher: Very well.
Student: Can the moment be short or long?
Teacher: What do you mean?
Student: Suppose 1 say, "shhhh!"
Teacher: Yes.
Student: When I said "shhhhh"! could have said "shh" or "shhhhhhh". Thus,
the moment can be shorter or longer.
Teacher: From the present moment you look back and compare a longer with a
shorter moment. But where are your longer and shorter moments? Is it not 
true that all you can have is the present moment?
Student: Do we not have a sense that "shh" is shorter than "shhhhhhhhh"?
Teacher: Have you not sometimes thought that you saw an object, reached out
for it and discovered that it was but a mirage?
Student: We are speaking only of the moment.
Teacher: In this moment, "shh!" Is there length?
Student: It seems that I can feel the moment with one eye, as it were, and
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with another eye, at the same time notice its duration.
Teacher: You are already in a different moment. Is the one whose duration
you are noticing the same as the one whose presence you felt?
Student: You are saying that we are not really going back and forth but
are always aware of something new.
Teacher: Yes.
Student: It still seems to me that "shh" is shorter than the earlier
"shhhhhh".
Teacher: You are intent upon bringing in the past. How do you know that the
"shhhhhh" you just now mentioned is the past that you remember? Are you say­
ing that it is the past Itself that you remember?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If it were the past Itself we would still be saying "shhhhhh"!
We would never have come to the place where we are now in thinking that we 
remember the "shhhhhh".
Student: You are right. It is not the past itself that I remember. For if
we were still in the past we could not remember it as passed. It is an image 
or symbol of the past that I have when I say, "shhhhhh". I, in thinking of 
this "shhhhh" can use It as a sign to refer back to that previous experience 
"shhhhhhhh."
Teacher: And how do you know that it is a sign of that previous experience
when you no longer have the previous experience with which to compare it? 
Student: If we have no knowledge of the past, but all knowledge is in the
present, how can we speak of the present? All we have then is the moment.
Teacher: We should not even say 'moment' for moment makes sense only in time
and the concept of time requires that there be a plurality of moments.
Student: Is the moment instantaneous or is it an eternity?
Teacher: What is the difference between eternity and a moment?^
Student: Suddenly, I understand now.
Teacher: Can you apply your present understanding to our previous discus­
sion?
Student: I see now that my question whether a moment was long or short was
asked without my being in the moment. For a moment there can be no time. 
Teacher: Excellent. Have you come to experience the truth that in experi­
ence there is no time?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Then we have shown both through argument and through experience
that time is not anything which exists in itself.
Student: Could you go over once more why it is that time has no existence
in Itself, using as a reference point the moment?
Teacher: Very well. If a moment were made up of time, we would never come
to experience it in the first place.
Student: How is that?
Teacher: Suppose a moment were made of time. How much time would there
be in a moment?
Student: Suppose we said about l/10th of a second.
Teacher: What of that unit? Is it made up of time?
Student: If I say no, you will ask me how time can be made up of that which 
is of no time. It would be as if a cup of water were to be made up of drops, 
but in each drop there were no water.
^Aquinas appears to be making the same point: "The now of time is
not time, the now of eternity is really the same as eternity." (emphasis his) 
Commentary, I, Sentences, ixix, ii. 2. Vide, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Phlloso- 
phical Texts, selected and translated by Thomas Gllby, p. 84.
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Teacher : Very good. You see that In order to have a cup of water there
must be water in each droplet. Each moment, then, is made up of time. 
Student: That must be.
Teacher: If each moment is of some duration, then is there a smallest pos­
sible moment?
Student: No, for any duration there can always be a Bhorter period.
Teacher: If something can be divided, I presume that there must be some­
thing which can be so divided. If a pound can be divided into sixteen 
ounces, then there must exist a pound to be so divided.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If something can be divided infinitely, then there must be some­
thing of Infinite magnitude to admit of such division.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: There must be an infinity of time, then, in each moment.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: How can we get from moment to moment? If there is an infinity of
time in each moment, then an Infinity of time is required for the moment to 
elapse. In that case we would not even have one moment, for we have not yet 
used up an infinity of time.
Student: I am satisfied. I can see that a moment can neither be made up of
time nor can it be timeless. There is no moment. Therefore, there is no 
time.
Teacher: Do you still hold that time is something that is real?
Student: It now seems that time cannot be real. But, what then is time?
Teacher: If time is not anything that is real, how can you expect me to
tell you what it is?
Student: If time is nothing that is real, why do we think that there is
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time?
Teacher: Time is nothing more than memory. The belief in the reality of
memory is the belief in the reality of time. We have proved that memory 
cannot exist, have we not? For, if we have no knowledge of the past, then 
the word ’memory* cannot refer to anything that is real. If memory is not 
anything real, how can there be time?
Student: How is it that memory does not exist?
Teacher: Your difficulty stems from your objectification. You are making
a thing, an entity, out of memory. Are you acquainted with the memory as a 
thing which exists in itself?
Student: No.
Teacher: What way is it that you are acquainted with what you call the
memory?
Student: I remember this discussion with reference to the mind. The ans­
wer must be the same here. Memory is a mental acquaintance.
Teacher: What you call the memory, then, is a thought that you are having.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Now, where is the memory when you are not thinking of it?
Student: But I have a capacity for remembering that I can draw upon.
Teacher: "Your capacity for remembering that I can draw upon" is also a
thought that you are having now.
Student: True.
Teacher: When are you having the thought?
Student: Now.
Teacher: What proof then is there of the memory?
Student: But we have just spoken of the memory again which means that It was
there before and, therefore, that time exists.
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Teacher: "Again!" What proof do you have of the "again" except now? All 
that you are aware of Is the now. What you call the past Is a theoretical 
object. Actually, the phrase 'theoretical object' Is redundant since all 
objects are theoretical.
Student: Just a moment. The recollection of the past exists now. But
that is not wiping out the past. That is bringing it up to the present 
and making it exist in the present.
Teacher: If our knowledge of the past exists only now, how can we say
that there is such a thing as the past? The only proof we have of the past
is the present. The past is never here to bear witness to itself. It is
only a hypothetical object of the present.
Student: What about the future. Does the future exist?
Teacher: Our anticipation of the future exists. Our anticipation exists
now. The future exists only as the present. The future as future is never
present.
Student: All that there is is the present.
Teacher: The future is never present; the past is never present. If there
is no past and no future, can there be a present?
Student: Yes, that is all that there is, the present.
Teacher: Can you be aware of that?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: When are you aware of that? Now?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Are you aware of it now?
Student: In a sense I must be even to answer, "No". I must have an aware­
ness of whatever it is I am saying I am no longer aware of.
Teacher: This awareness that you have, is it an awareness you have now,
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or one you had then?
Student: One that I have now.
Teacher: It is a "now11 awareness saying that it iB aware of a "then"
awareness.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: But the awareness is in the now.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: To call it a "then awareness" is only a hypothesis since we can
never have a "then" awareness.
Student: How can we even have the word ’then1, if all we have is the now? 
Teacher: Can we even have the now? Are you aware of that now, now?
Student: No.
Teacher: What can we say then that is not false?
Student: I do not know since every reference to the present is false. I
thought you were driving me to say that all we were aware of was the present 
moment, but I can now see that we cannot even be aware of it.
Teacher: We cannot be aware of the present. We are in the present. If we
could be aware of the present, it would be to say that awareness could be 
aware of itself. But we have shown that this is impossible.
Student: If there is no past and no present and no future, then there is
no time.
Teacher: Quite right.
Student: And if there is no time, then there is no way in which there can
be more than one existence in the same space.
Teacher: Yes.
Student: It seems that plurality cannot exist. For there are only two ways
of being two. There can be two existences at the same time (which is space).
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There can be two existences in the same space (which is time). But we 
have shown that space and time do not have any existence in themselves.
It follows that there is no way in which plurality can exist.
Teacher: Excellent!
Student: But it still seems to me that I exist on the one side and objects
exist on the other.
Teacher: What is the ”1"?
Student: It is that existence which lasts through time.
Teacher: Do you have any knowledge of the "I" apart from your experience?
Student: No.
Teacher: If your experience is not in time, what can we say about the "I"?
Student: The "I" is never experienced for the '’I" is that existence which
lasts through time.
Teacher: Does anything exist outside of our experience?
Student: Anything outside of our experience can have only a hypothetical
existence for us.
Teacher: And if there is no "I", can there be that which is other than "I",
the object?
Student: No.
Teacher: Then there is neither subject nor object.
Student: What is there, then?
Teacher: Is there not experience?
Student: But is our experience of anything that is real?
Teacher: What word best describes the state of nontemporality?
Student: 'Being *.
Teacher: Shall we say then that all we can experience is that which is.
Student: Tes.
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Teacher: Are we ever not at a moment of experience?
Student: Mo.
Teacher: Then are we ever not experiencing that which is?
Student: No.
Teacher: If we are always experiencing that which is, can our experience
be of anything other than reality itself?
Student: No.
Teacher: Then we are always experiencing reality.
Student: Then why is there the appearance of plurality?
Teacher: Plurality can only appear in space or time. Space exists only
in relation to the body; time exists only in relation to the mind. So long
as I think that my body is as an independent existence, there will be
space and there will be objects outside of me. So long as I think that my 
mind is a permanent existing substance in itself, there will be time and 
objects such as the past and the future will exist.
Student: Why do I think that my mind and my body exist in themselves?
Teacher: The answer is in the question.
Student: What do you mean?
Teacher: If all that there is is reality, then it is the raising of the
question which creates the circumstance of there being something other than
reality.
Student: Can you explain more?
Teacher: You cannot keep asking for further explanations, for explanation
itself creates duality. Where there is an answer there must be a question. 
Instead of asking for the meaning of what I am saying as something additional 
to what 1 Bay, you must try to experience just what it is that I do say. I 
attempt descriptions of reality. Every description, being a description,
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is removed from reality, since a description implies a dichtomy between
that which is and the description of it. You must not look for reality in
the description. Rather, you must look upon the description as a way of
looking for reality. The description leads you to reality. To ask for
further descriptions only leads you back away from it. The description
'Being* is perhaps the best description since it at once summons up the
connotation of reality and, at the same time, is empty of any particular
qualities. In its emptiness of any specific qualitative reference, it is
the least misleading description of reality since we will not be misled
42into thinking that reality can be specified by any particular name.
Student: Thank you. That was a very helpful "explanation".
Teacher: You can see why questions must come to an end, for every question
Is itself a creation of dualism.
Student: Could you say just a little bit more about this?
Teacher: So long as you have questions, I will have answers. You want to
know why it is that every answer is contained within its question.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: When you ask, "Why?", you are asking a causal question. You are
asking the question what is the cause of x. You have one phenomenon, one 
state, and you are asking what other state or phenomenon is responsible 
for the existence of the first.
^For Hegel, Being is the emptiest category: "But if when we view the
whole world we can only say that everything is, and nothing more, we are ne­
glecting all specialty and, instead of absolute plenitude, we have absolute 
emptiness." The Logic of Hegel, Ch. VII, A, 87, translated by William Wal­
lace from The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Hegel, p. 163.
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Student : Yes.
Teacher: The question creates duality because a causal question demands a
causal answer. If I say, "x Is the cause of duality," I have not only 
admitted to the existence of duality, I have created it, for I admit there 
Is a problem and a cause of that problem. Duality then becomes impossible 
to remove for you can ask, "Why?" for whatever explanation I give. If I 
give legitimacy to the form of the causal answer by employing it myself, I 
help to perpetuate the duallstlc situation. There is no end to the question, 
"Why?", once we admit it in the first place. The answer to the question,
"Why do we think there is duality?", is in the question because the question 
demands an answer, which creates the dualistic situation of question and 
answer. Without the question there would be no answer. If you truly want 
an answer to the question, "Why do we think there is duality?" where else 
could it be but in the question? The only answer which does not create a 
dualism is one which turns back the question.
Student: I keep thinking that there must be a cause for the appearance of
duality.
Teacher: If you Insist that duality has a cause we may say that it is ig- ,
norance for ignorance is something which is not anything real in itself. 
Ignorance is the absence of knowledge. Ignorance is not a positive state 
which exists in itself. Ignorance is like darkness which is not a positive 
state which exists in itself, but is only the absence of light. If we say 
that the canse of the appearance of duality is ignorance, then the answer 
to our question will dissolve the question, for ignorance disappears when 
there is knowledge. Just as darkness disappears into light so does ig­
norance disappear into knowledge.
Student: What do you mean by saying that ignorance disappears rfien there
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1s knowledge?
Teacher: When we turn on the outer lamp where is the darkness?
Student: It is no more.
Teacher: When we turn on the inner lamp, where is the darkness?
Student: It is no more. But how is it possible that it no longer exists? 
Teacher: You must not think of darkness or ignorance as real states. 
Darkness depends upon light; Ignorance upon knowledge. When there is 
light, light takes the place of darkness. When there is knowledge, know­
ledge takes the place of ignorance. It is in this way that the question 
is dissolved.
Student: But 1 can keep questioning.
Teacher: Do you think that questions are infinite?
Student: It seems that they are.
Teacher: If you think that questions are infinite, then why are we talking
together? If questions are infinite, then we can never come up with an 
answer. If we have no hope of an answer, then why should we carry on any 
further?
Student: You are quite right. If questioning is an Infinite process then
this Inquiry would be a futile one.
Teacher: But we have already shown that questions are not infinite. 
Student: How is that?
Teacher: Have we not found out some things that are certain?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If we have found out something that is certain, then questions
cannot be Infinite.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: We know, for example, that we know.
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Student: Yes.
Teacher: And If we know we cannot be Ignorant.
Student: Quite right.
Teacher: And only Ignorance Is the cause of thinking that there Is duality.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Is Ignorance a real state on its own or Is It a lack of knowledge?
Student: It is a lack of knowledge.
Teacher: Questions come only when we do not know.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Questions can only be prompted by ignorance.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: When we know, there will be no more questions.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Do we know?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Then how can there be any questions?
Student: If there are no questions, then there are no answers.
Teacher: Yes. This is the situation that we desire. For, if we are left
with an answer we are still in duality. We want to arrive at a place where 
there is neither question nor answer. If there is an "answer" then there 
must be a "question".
Student: I think that I understand now what you meant by your delphic
utterance that the answer to the question, "Why do we think there is duality?" 
is to be found in the question. But I cannot keep the question from arising. 
Teacher: Do not be disturbed by the fact thatyou keep raising the question,
"Why?". The existence of questions points beyond itself to the existence of 
that which is beyond questions.
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Student: How is this possible?
Teacher: All questions ask what is the cause of x. Questions, then, are
indications that there are events which have causes. Now, we have shown 
that questions are not infinite. If questions are not infinite, then causes 
are not infinite either. What does it mean to say that causes are not 
infinite? To say that causes are not infinite is to say that the chain of 
causes has a beginning. For the chain of causes to have a beginning, there 
must be a cause which is itself uncaused. The existence of the caused or 
conditioned proves the existence of the uncaused or unconditioned.
Student: I do not see the need for postulating the existence of the uncon­
ditioned. It seems to me that all existence is conditioned existence.
Teacher: All existence cannot be conditioned existence. If all existence
were conditioned existence then everything that existed would be an effect.
But it is impossible that everything be an effect. For, if everything is an 
effect, no causes will exist to produce the effects. If there are no causes 
then neither can there be any effects. Therefore, everything that exists 
cannot be an effect.^ The unconditioned must be actual if the conditioned 
is to be possible.
Student: Why is it that that which is an effect cannot also be a cause? An
event 'b' may be the effect of event 'a' and still be the cause of event ’c1.
I see no reason why we must come to that existence which is absolutely uncon­
ditioned.
43A similar argument is made by Aquinas in his proof from motion: "If
that which sets in motion is itself in motion then it also must be set in mo­
tion by another, and that in its turn by another again. But here we cannot 
proceed to infinity, otherwise there would be no first mover unless they be 
moved by a former mover, as stick by hand. Therefore, we are bound to arrive 
at the first mover set in motion by no other, and this everyone understands 
to be God." Summa Theologies, I. a. 11. 3. Saint Thomas Aquinas Philosophi­
cal Texts, translated by Thomas Gilby, p. 49. Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas,
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Teacher: If there Is nothing vhlch is absolutely unconditioned, there will
be no first cause, for every cause being conditioned will be caused by 
another. Thus, for the explanation of any event we must specify an infinite 
series of conditions. But the specification of an Infinite series of condi­
tions is no explanation, for we must then explain the existence of the in­
finite series of conditions. We will have compounded the problem. Instead 
of one unexplained condition, we now have an Infinite number.
Student: Suppose no explanation is ever final. I do not see how It follows
from this that we have no explanation at all.
Teacher: Let us choose a concrete example of a caused event, say, the
movement of my arm. Now, if it is true as you say that there are no uncaused
causes, it must be that an infinite set of conditions must take place before 
I can move my arm. If an infinite number of conditions must take place then 
no condition may be left out, for to say that there exists a condition which 
is not included is to limit the set of conditions. But ex hypothesi, the set 
of conditions is infinite. Thus, we may say that 1 cannot move my arm unless 
some gentleman in China takes a sip of tea.
Student: Surely you must not understand what I am saying to draw such absurd
consequences from what I am saying. All I am saying is that there is nothing 
which is unconditioned. It does not follow from the fact that there is no 
unconditioned existence that each event requires for its taking place every 
other event. All that follows is that we cannot single out any event which 
does not have some other event as the condition for its existence. From the 
fact that some other event is required for the existence of an event it does
Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 13. Cf. also Aristotle, Physics, Book VII, Ch. 1, 
24lb24 - 243a4 and Book VIII, Ch. 5, 256a5 - 256b5.
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not follow that every other event is a condition for its existence.
Teacher: Even if I should grant you the truth of this argument, it will
be to no avail. If every event, as you say, may be both cause and effect, 
then there is no beginning to any sequence of events. For, any cause 
which we may choose as the origin of a sequence of eventB will itself have 
been caused by another. And since, as you say, there is no uncaused cause, 
every cause will require for its existence an infinite number of predeces­
sors. If an infinite number of causes must act before there can be any 
one cause, then how shall the action of any one cause exist? For, the 
action of an infinite number of causes will require the passage of an infin­
ite span of time. But an infinite span of time cannot be traversed. There­
fore, no cause can ever begin to act. But if no cause can act there can be
no causal efficacy and, hence, no conditioned existence.
Student: It seems to me that you are always seeking a determinate something
which is the cause of an effect. But this need not be the case. There need
not be a definite something which exists which is responsible for the exis­
tence of a something else. Everything which happens simply follows upon an 
45earlier moment.
44This seems to be the substance of the argument of Kant's thesis in 
the First Antinomy of Pure Reason: "If we assume that the world has no begin­
ning in time, then up to every given moment an eternity has elapsed, and 
there has passed away in the world an infinite series of successive states 
of things. Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it can 
never be completed through successive synthesis. It thus follows that it is 
impossible for an infinite world-series to have pasned away, and that a be­
ginning of the world is therefore a necessary condition of the world's exis­
tence." Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Kemp Smith, B 454.
^This seems to be the Buddhists' view of causality: "A cause for the
Buddhists was not a real cause but a preceding moment, which likewise arose 
out of nothing in order to disappear into nothing." Central Concept..., p. 32. 
And again, "A force...should not be regarded aB a real Influence of something 
extending beyond its own existence in order to penetrate into another..but 
simply as a condition, a fact, upon which another fact arises...", Central 
Concept..., p. 18.
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It Is not that that which happens after is the effect of a specific event 
which has preceded It. It is simply that that which happens after must 
always be preceded by an earlier condition or state of things. It is in 
this sense that we may say that every event has a cause. I do not mean that 
for each specific occurrence there is a determinate existence without the 
particular existence of which, what follows would not exist. What I mean is 
that no matter what event you single out it must follow upon "something 
else". The "something else" need not have any determinate character. 
Teacher: But even to say that there must always be a preceding moment will
lead us to impossible consequences. For if everything that occurs follows 
from a preceding moment we would have no conception of "following". For, 
if there is never a first moment, the series of moments must be infinite.
But if the series of moments is infinite it must be without both beginning 
and end. For that which either begins to be or comes to an end cannot be 
said to be infinite. Now, can that tftich has no beginning or end be said to 
have a middle?
Student: No, for if we do not know the starting point and the finishing
46point, we certainly cannot say where the mid-point would fall.
Teacher: Now, to say that something begins to be is to say that we can
locate its occurrence in a temporal sequence as before z and after x. 
Student: To be sure.
Teacher: If there is no beginning, no middle, and no end, how can we say
which moment comes before and tfiich after? And yet, if we cannot say which 
moment comes before and whl'ch after, we cannot say one moment precedes
^The Mandukyopanisad With Gaudapada's Karika and Sankara's Commen 
tary, IV, 31.
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another moment or that one moment follows another moment.
Student: Perhaps in an absolute sense we cannot say which moment follows
from which. But this has no practical consequences. For all practical pur­
poses we can choose one moment as the "before" and another as the "after". 
Teacher: Actually, we could not even do this. For, we could not select
any moment as coming "after" unless it occurred after a time during which 
it was not. Otherwise, we would not see it as coming "after" any other 
moment but as always having been.
Student: True.
Teacher: But if our series of preceding moments has no beginning, then it
stretches back infinitely. If there is an infinite series of preceding 
moments then there is no time during which there is no preceding moment. All 
preceding moments must exist. For, if there is a time during which a moment 
does not exist, we could not say that the series was an Infinite series for 
it would lack the existence of one moment. Thus, the moments after which we 
can say that something comes to be, always were. If the conditions for the 
occurrence of something always are, then the conditioned always is. For if 
all the conditions for the conditioned exist then the conditioned must exist 
as well. And yet, if the conditioned always exists, we cannot say that it fol­
lows or comes after a preceding moment for "following" or "coming after" is 
true only for that which comes into being after a moment before which it was 
not. But the conditioned always is. Therefore, It cannot be said to "follow" 
or "come after”.^
47In the Prolegomena, Kant arrives at the same conclusion from a 
different line of argument: "As appearance every effect is an event, or
something that happens in time; it must, according to the universal law 
of nature, be preceded by a determination of the causality of its cause 
(a state), which follows according to a constant law. But this
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Student: I am persuaded that all existence cannot be conditioned existence.
Indeed, you have proved that to me beyond any doubt. But it still is not 
clear to me why we must posit the existence of the absolutely unconditioned.
It seems sufficient to me that there be an unconditioned condition relative 
to a certain set of events. Thus, what is the unconditioned condition for 
one set of conditioned events may be a conditioned existence relative to 
another condition. I see no necessity in postulating the existence of that 
which is unconditioned in an absolute sense.
Teacher: Your suggestion is that what Is a condition from a certain point
of view may be a conditioned from another point of view.
Student: Yes, that is my meaning exactly.
Teacher: There is no condition, then, which is self-dependent. Every con­
dition is dependent.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If every condition is dependent, then there is no condition which
must exist. All conditions will have but contingent existence.
Student: True.
Teacher: Is it necessary that all existence is contingent?
Student: No, for if there is no necessary existence, I cannot maintain that
it is necessary that only contingent existence exists.
determination of the causality must likewise be something that takes place or 
happens; the cause must have begun to act, otherwise no succession between it 
and the effect could be conceived. Otherwise the effect, as well as the 
causality of the cause, would have always existed." Prolegomena to any Future 
Metaphysics. Ill, 2, 53. Kant, however, says that an event can be causally 
determined (as appearance) and free (in itself): "Nature therefore and free­
dom can without contradiction be attributed to the very same thing, but in 
different relations— on one side as a phenomenon, on the other as a thing in 
itself". Ill, 2, 53, Translated by Paul Carus. But what is said above is 
that even on the level of appearance it is impossible that all appearances 
be effects. If every cause always la, then its effect always would be, and 
hence could not appear as an effect.
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Teacher: Then it may be that there is necessary existence.
Student: Yes, I must allow that this is a possibility.
Teacher; But ire cannot say that the necessary is possible. For, to say that 
the necessary is possible is to say that it may or may not exist. But that 
which may or may not exist cannot be that which is necessary. The necessary 
cannot have a possible existence. Either it is necessary or it is impossible. 
Possibility cannot be a modality of the existence of the necessary. Either 
it is actual or it is impossible. To say that necessity cannot possibly be 
(is impossible) is to say that it is, for that which is not a possibility 
must either be actual or necessary. You cannot avoid necessary existence, for 
either to disclaim its existence or to make no claim on its existence (to say 
that it is possible) is to proclaim its existence.
Student: It seems true that, as in the ancient Greek tragedies, there Is no
escape from necessity.
Teacher: Have we come to an end of our discussion, then?
Student: One more question. What is necessary, I take it, is unconditioned 
exis tence.
Teacher: Yes, for all conditioned existence may or may not be.
Student: Do we still not have to explain necessary existence?
Teacher: No, for what exists of necessity is uncaused. Only dependent
existence needs an explanation. If an existence is not caused by another 
and exists of necessity, it follows that it must be self-caused. What exists 
of necessity is the cause of itself.
Student: True.
Teacher: Are you satisfied, then, that the unconditioned must exist?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Is there anything more that needs to be explained?
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Student: No, for the conditioned is explained by the unconditioned, and
the unconditioned explains itself.
Teacher: Then nothing more needs to be said.
FIFTH DIALOGUE
Student: There are some questions which have long restricted my attempts at
solution. Do you think that the fruits of our discussion can he of use to 
us?
Teacher: I should hope so. What are the questions?
Student: There are several.
Teacher: Well, let us take them up one at a time.
Student: Very well. I have never been able to understand the relationship
between language and meaning. On the one hand it seems that no meaning can 
be taught without the use of language. On the other hand, this seems to be 
an impossibility for we could not have a language, that is, a sign system, 
unless we were acquainted with the realities for which the signs were the 
signs.
Teacher: Could you give me an example of what you mean?
Student: Surely. How does one come to know that the word ’hungry' stands
for the state of needing food?
Teacher: The mother says the word 'hungry' and points to the stomach and
then the mouth or some such way, I suppose.
Student: But this pointing, you see, is itself a sign system. The pointing
must itself be understood to stand for these states. Without the pointing,
we have no way of communicating meaning from one person to another.
But how can language be learned if language is required for teaching? How
can the baby know that this pointing is to mean some reality unless the
baby Is already acquainted with the reality? How can the baby know that
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' father' is to mean father unless the baby is already acquainted with 
father? But how can the baby be acquainted with the meaning of 'father' 
except as it is taught by means of a language, whether a verbal language 
or another type of sign system such as pointing? A language or set of signs 
cannot exist unless the meaning exists first. A sign for a meaning is not 
understood unless there is already an understanding of the reality for 
which the sign is a sign. But there can be no understanding of realities 
except through the use of signs. It seems that language and meaning are 
each required as a necessary condition of the other. But this cannot be 
or neither of them could have come into being. If neither could have come 
into being without the other, how is it that we have both? We have both 
language and meaning. And yet it seems impossible that we should have 
either one.^®
Teacher: Why do you think of language as a sign system? It is the concep­
tion of language as a sign system that is the cause of your difficulties. 
Actually, the conception of language as a sign system is derivative from the 
object theory of knowledge. We think that what we know is the object. 
Whether the object is conceived as a physical object existing independently 
of the human mind or as an object which is in part constituted by the opera­
tions of the human mind, it is still something other than the subject; it is 
still the object which is what Is known. But the question is never answered,
^This problem is posed by St, Augustine. Vide, De Maglstro, x, 30, 
x, 33-36, Medieval Philosophy, edited by Herman Sharpiro, p. 30, pp. 32-34. 
His solution, however, is that we learn not by words but from "...the things 
themselves which inwardly God has made manifest..." De Maglstro, xii, 40, 
Medieval Philosophy, p. 36. But the question still remains, what is the 
relationship between words and knowledge? So long as words and knowledge 
are considered as two, the question of their relationship must always arise. 
If ultimately there is a relation between words and knowledge, how is this 
relationship known?
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indeed Is never asked: how Is the object known? If the object is some­
thing other than knowledge, something which knowledge knows, then language, 
which Is a sign of this object (meaning), is something other than knowledge 
or meaning as well. We then have the problem if language is something other 
than meaning and we can only learn through language, how can we ever learn 
what meaning is in the first place, and if language is other than knowledge, 
how is language ever learned in the first place.
Student: If you do not have the view that language is a sign system, what
other view of language do you have?
4 9Teacher: Language is not a sign of what is known but is what is known.
We call what is known language when we look at knowledge in its expressive
aspect.
Student: This is somewhat dark to me.
Teacher: Can you think of an example of knowledge which is without an image
or some other sign or its presence?
Student: No.
Teacher: Why is that?
Student: An image is a necessary condition for knowledge.
Teacher: If you go back to the language of conditions, you will be left with
the paradox with which you began. How will you have one without the other
49At times Augustine seems very close to suggesting that there Is no 
distinction between language and knowledge: "Men are wrong when they call
those teachers who are not. But because very often there is no interval 
between the moment of speaking and the moment of knowing, and because they 
inwardly learn Immediately after the speaker has given admonition, they 
suppose that they have been taught in an external fashion by him who gave 
the admonition." (emphasis mine). For the Italian philosopher Benedetto 
Croce, intuition and expression are one and the same: It is impossible to
distinguish intuition from expression in...(the) cognitive process. The one 
appears with the other at the same Instant, because they are not two, but 
one." Aesthetic, Ch. I. Translated by Douglas Alnslle.
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and, if you must have both before you can have either one, how can you have 
either one In the first place. If you simply say that an image of some 
kind Is a necessary condition for knowledge or a necessary accompaniment 
of knowledge, you will leave yourself no way to relate the image to know­
ledge or knowledge to the image. The relationship between the two will be 
inexplicable for the explanandum will be required for the explanans.
Student: But it is true that there is no example of knowledge which is
imageless.
Teacher: That is because the image or the sign and knowledge are one and
the same thing looked at in different ways.
Student: Hew can this be? Is there not a difference between knowledge and
its expression?
Teacher: After the fact of knowledge we take the expression of knowledge
and call it by the name ' language1. But at the moment of knowing there is 
neither an experience of a what which Is known (to which a label is then 
affixed) nor is there language. There is only knowingness. What we call 
language is only knowledge itself viewed after the fact. Language Is as it 
were the calling card of experience; it tells us that knowledge has deigned 
to pay us a visit.
Student: Are you now saying that first there is meaning and language comes
afterwards?
Teacher: We can never say which comes first, meaning or words because
neither meaning nor words stand for anything which is real. The word "first" 
is itself a falsification. During experience there Is no first or second. 
These words come afterwards as an attempt to categorize an experience. 
Student: I think I am beginning to follow what you mean. Is what you say
with regard to the relationship between language and meaning applicable to
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the relationship between form and content?
Teacher: Yes, the distinction between form and content is itself a
pseudo-distinction. That is why the relationship between form and content 
has never been understood. It has never been made Intelligible what it 
would mean to have a form without matter or a matter without form. The 
usual solution to the problem of how a formless matter and a matterless 
form can be related is simply to say that they must always be in conjunction 
with one another. But to say that they must always be in conjunction is to 
imply that there are two separate existences, one of which is formal and the 
other of which is material. The formal Is understood to be that which makes 
whatever it is intelligible; the matter has been taken to be that stuff which 
Individuates the thing. But if matter is unintelligible on its own, what
positive content does it add to the cognoscendum? If form is empty, how
can it apply to a concrete situation? All attempts to wed form and matter 
in a mechanical synthesis are doomed to failure since two unintelligibles 
cannot make an intelligible.
Student: Why do you say that the synthesis is a mechanical one?
Teacher: All synthesis must be mechanical for the idea of synthesis pre­
supposes two prior self-dependent elements which are then brought together. 
But their "bringing together" is left unexplained and their relationship 
upon being together is left inexplicable.
Student: How do the perspectives of form and matter come about?
Teacher: Form is a perspective which waits until knowledge is, separates
out its generalizable aspect, and calls this the intelligible aspect. Form 
is parasitic because it must always wait upon the knowledge situation to 
perform its theft. The perspective of matter comes into being because it 
is realized that what is understood with the mind cannot be all that there
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is to a knowledge situation. It is the separation out of elements and 
hypostatizing of these elements that gives rise to all of our difficulties. 
If we realized that form and matter did not have any real existence In the 
first place, we should not be vexed with the question of how they can be 
brought into relation with each other.
Student: But how else are we to explain the knowledge situation? It
seems to me that there must be a sensible component and an intellectual 
component in every act of knowledge.
Teacher: Why do you think that knowledge is an "act"? Perhaps if we 
explored the notion of knowledge as an act we can more fruitfully return 
to the question of the formal and the material in knowledge.
Student: Very well.
Teacher: If knowledge is an act then there is an agent (the actor), an
instrumentality through which he acts, and a something upon which the action 
Is performed. But we have seen that there is no object and no subject. 
Student: It still seems that knowledge is something that you do.
Teacher: But the analogy of doing will not explain knowing. Take walking,
for example. That is an action.
Student: To be sure.
Teacher: But you still have to know that you are walking. The action of 
walking is not sufficient to the knowledge of it. Doing and knowing are 
not the same. If knowledge were a kind of doing, that would still have to 
be known, just as walking as a kind of doing, still has to be known. The 
source of all of our difficulties is the belief that there are subjects and 
there are objects. If we could see through this interpretation of experi­
ence we would have a clearer insight into the source of our problems and 
the way out of our difficulties. It is the separation of ourselves from
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our experience that gives rise to the notion of the separate existence of 
subjects and objects.
Student: Can you think of a way, different from the ways that you have
already attempted, to bring me closer to the realization that there are 
not subjects and objects?
Teacher: Think of a mother's hearing a baby's cry. Can the baby's cry
exist without the mother's hearing?
Student: You are giving me the old argument that if a tree falls in a forest 
where there is no one to hear it, that there will be no sound. But there can 
be sound. It is just that there will be no one there to hear it.
Teacher: How do you know that there will be sound?
Student: Why, a machine can be left in the forest on which the sounds can be
recorded.
Teacher: If there Is no one to hear the machine, how can you say that there
is sound?
Student: Are there not sound waves which can be recorded on the machine?
Teacher: Do you mean to say that the sound waves that the machine records
are the same as the sensed quality of the sound which is heard?
Student: No.
Teacher: We are back at the same question. Can there be sound without
hearing?
Student: It would seem not. At least we have no proof of its independent
existence.
Teacher: Is the existence of something which we can never experience of any
interest to us?
Student: No.
Teacher: Then let us concern ourselves with our experience. It is our
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experience Chat we are trying to interpret. Can we say that there^ls an-r 
object, the sound, unless there is a mother who hears?
Student: No.
Teacher: Would the baby utter a cry unless there were something wrong with
him?
Student: No, the utterance of a cry is always a sign of some discomfort.
Teacher: Did the baby begin to cry of his own volition?
Student: I am not sure of what you mean.
Teacher: Would the baby cry unless he were in pain?
Student: No.
Teacher: Did the baby choose to cry?
Student: This is a difficult matter to make out.
Teacher: Could we say it was the baby who was the author of the cry or should
we say that it was the pain that was the author of the cry?
Student: 1 do not know what to say.
Teacher: Suppose there were no atmosphere to carry the sound waves from
the baby to the mother. If there were no air, no medium through which 
the sound waves could travel, could the mother hear the baby’s cry? Or, 
could we even say that there was a cry if the medium of air did not exist? 
Student: If there were no medium we could not say that such a thing as
the cry existed. For after all, where does the existence of the cry begin
and where does it end? Can it be said to exist if the baby's lips move
and no sound is uttered?
Teacher: Very good. You are getting to the point. Suppose now that the
mother is not a mother after all but only a visiting lady friend. Is it
not likely that she will not hear the cry at all.
Student: Yes, that is quite likely. It is commonplace for a baby's mother
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to hear the child cry out while others who are not related to the child 
will hear nothing.
Teacher: Then can we say that it was the mother who heard the cry? If the
woman were not mother of this baby would she hear the cry? Can we say then 
that It is she as an individual who hears the cry? Or is the fact that she 
hears the cry more justifiably attributed to the biological link that exists 
between her and the child?
Student: We cannot say that it is this woman as an independent agent who
hears the cry, but rather this woman as the mother of the child who cries 
out.
Teacher: Are you getting the point of the example?
Student: Yes. At the outset it appeared that there were subjects and ob­
jects existing independently of each other. It was through the action of 
subjects upon objects that an event came to pass. But a close examination 
of the case proved that we could not really decipher the author of the action. 
We could not really say that it was the baby who cried. In a way it was 
the pain which was making itself known through the medium of the baby's throat. 
The baby did not decide to cry of his own accord. Who then uttered the cry? 
Teacher: Excellent.
Student: It appeared at the first that there was an object, the sound, which
existed independently of baby and mother. But we cannot speak of the exis­
tence of the sound unless there is air to carry the sound and mother to hear 
the sound. There cannot be object without environment. We cannot speak of 
the physical existence of the sound without the atmosphere and we cannot 
speak of the phenomenological existence of the sound except through the 
existence of the mother. We cannot speak of the object as existing in itself 
either as a physical existence or as a sensed quality. What right then do
we have to think of the object as a something which exists in its own 
right?
Teacher: Very well said.
Student: Finally, we cannot speak of the woman as hearing the sound be­
cause it was not the woman qua woman who heard the sound but the woman as 
the mother of the child. The woman was not (in this context) responsible 
for being the mother of the child. We cannot say that it was the mother 
who heard the sound anymore than we can say that the mother cat is respon­
sible for running to the kitten when the kitten cries out. We may with more 
justice say that it is mother nature or Instinct that caused the cry to be 
heard. It is instinct that caused the cry to be issued. And it is mother 
nature who caused the cry to be carried. No one of the elements Involved 
can exist Without the others. Haw then can we speak of subjects when we 
can discover no agent responsible for the event? How can we speak of ob­
jects when we can find no object existing without an environment and a 
subject?
Teacher: Wonderful! I think you understand the point very well now. We
cannot speak of subjects and objects as if there were subjects responsible 
for acts and objects existing Independently of subjects waiting to be acted 
upon. We cannot conceive of the world as made up of separate existences.
It is a whole from which the separate existences are our own abstractions 
which do not in reality have any existence In themselves. It should be 
clear to you now why it is a falsification of reality to think of knowledge 
as an action an agent performs upon an object.
Student: Yes, that is quite clear to me now. Why Is it, however, that we
should not take knowledge to be a possession? We often talk this way.
We say, for example, that "I have knowledge".
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Teacher: We say, "I have knowledge" in the same way as in the German lan­
guage it is said, "Ich habe hunger". Knowledge is not something apart from 
us that we possess. If it were, how would we know it? We still have to know 
other things that we possess, such as, automobiles, houses. How do we know 
what we have7 To say that knowledge is something we have is not to solve 
any problem. The solution is only pushed back one step further.
Student: But ideas are something that we have. Our knowledge comes from
our ideas, does It not?
Teacher: How can knowledge come from our ideas? An idea is nothing but a
thought, is it not?
Student: Yes, the word 'idea* and the word ’thought' stand for one and the
same thing.
Teacher: And thoughts come and go, do they not? I mean one moment we are
thinking about one thing and the next moment about something else.
Student: True.
Teacher: But knowledge cannot come and go.
Student: Why not?
Teacher: If knowledge came to an end, how could it start up again? If
knowledge came to an end there would be no continuity between the sequence 
of ideas that came to an end and the new sequence. Actually, there could 
not even be an "end". An end must always be an end within knowledge. Or 
else how would we knew that there was an end? Beginning and ending are only 
ideas. In order for there to be a starting point or a finishing point know­
ledge must be there before the starting point and after the finishing point. 
Otherwise, how could we know that there was either a beginning or an end? 
Student: What you are saying, if I understand you rightly, is that we can
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50never experience a division of consciousness. Any consciousness is always 
51complete.
Teacher: Very good. Indeed, to understand that consciousness can never be
divided is to understand that plurality can never be experienced.
Student: How does it follow from the fact that consciousness cannot be divided
that we can never experience a plurality?
Teacher: A plurality implies a separation between objects, does it not?
Student: To be sure.
Teacher: And did we not establish in our first two conversations that all
there is is consciousness?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If all that there is is consciousness, a separation can only be a
separation of consciousness. But this, as we have shown above, is impossible. 
Student: Very well, I am quite satisfied that knowledge cannot be divided,
but I cannot escape from the belief that our knowledge has arisen from the 
ideas that we have.
^Aristotle holds that consciousness, in certain cases, is complete: 
"Seeing seems to be at any moment complete, for it does not lack anything 
which comes into being later will complete its form; and pleasure also seems 
to be of this nature." Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. X, Ch. 3, 1174al4-17. But 
why would this not be true of all forms of consciousness?
"*̂ For Descartes, mind is entirely indivisible. Vide, Meditations, VI. 
Kant seems to extend this analysis to every consciousness: "...each represen­
tation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything 
but absolute unity." (emphasis his), Critique of Pure Reason, A99, translated 
by Kemp Smith, p. 131. It would appear that Kant qualifies his notion of 
the indisiblllty of intuition with the suggestion that there can be more than 
one moment of consciousness. But any plurality must again be contained within 
a unitary consciousness: "There can be in us no modes of knowledge, without
that unity of consciousness which preceded all data of intuitions, and by 
relation to which representation of objects is alone possible. This pure 
original unchangeable consciousness I shall name transcendental apperception." 
(emphasis his), Critique of Pure Reason, A 107, translated by Kemp Smith, 
p. 136. Cf. also A113n.
-125-
Teacher: But how could It? If knowledge must be there both before and
after our Ideas, how could it be that our ksowledgE^taffiB“ forfrm our Ideas?
f W -
How do we know that we have a thought or an Idea? Is it not in knowledge
or consciousness that ideas come to us? It is in knowledge that ideas come.
Student: But I have always thought that it was ideas that give us knowledge.
Teacher: But I can prove it to you, if you like, that ideas cannot give us
knowledge.
Student: Yes, I would like that very much. And perhaps in this context you
will make good on an earlier promise.
Teacher: What is that?
Student: You will make clear the difficulties Involved in distinguishing
between formal and material elements of knowledge and indicate the solution 
to these difficulties afforded by the viewpoint you are advancing.
Teacher: I will do my best. Let us take the example of the idea of a
triangle. Would you say that you understood the idea of a triangle?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Does your understanding consist of the figure you may Imagine
in your mind or in the figure you may choose to draw?
Student: 1 am not certain of what you are asking.
Teacher: My meaning is very plain and when I explain it to you you will see
what an absurd idea I had in mind. What I mean is: does your understanding
of the idea of triangle consist of the particular little triangle you may 
picture in your mind?
Student: You are asking me if what I understand by the idea of triangle
consists of an image 1 may conjure up, say perhaps of an Isosceles triangle 
of about one inch in height and the same in width.
Teacher: Yes, that is exactly what I am asking you.
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Student: The answer is no. Although 1 could have pictured just what I
described, what I did, in fact, imagine was a much larger scalene triangle 
of about six Inches along the hypoteneuse, five Inches in height, and around 
seven inches along the base.
Teacher: But in either case you would have had an equally good understanding
of triangle.
Student: Of course. What could we possibly mean by the idea of triangle if
it did not hold for each and every instance of triangle that we may imaging 
no matter how much each one might vary from each other in terms of its sen­
suous determination.
Teacher: Your idea of triangle is not at all limited to any particular sen­
suous determination.
Student: Of course not. If it were, how could it function in enabling me to 
pick out any triangle that I see as a triangle. If it were limited to a par­
ticular image, it could function to enable me to recognize only those images 
as triangles and no others. Our idea of triangle transcends any image of 
triangle that we may choose to imagine.
Teacher: Your idea of triangle has no determinate, sensuous characteristics
at all?
Student: That is right. An infinite number of varieties of images of triangles
can all equally well be triangles.
Teacher: If your idea of triangle has about it no sensible characteristics
at all, how can it be of any use in selecting out which Images are triangles 
sb opposed to squares or circles? If your idea of triangle is devoid of any 
sensible traits, how can it enable you to pick out any particular image you 
see to be a triangle?
Student: We may choose a representative image arbitrarily to stand for the
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idea of triangle. It is by means of this representative image that all 
other Images are known.
Teacher: If you do not have an idea of triangle of which this image is
supposed to be the representation, how do you choose the representative 
image in the first place and where does it reside? And yet the idea has 
no clue in It which aids you in selecting out an image which can match it. 
Further, even if you selected one image to be the representative image, I 
fail to see how you can recognize by this image other images visibly differ­
ent from the representative image unless you had access to an idea which 
transcended both of these images. And if you had access to a transcendent 
idea, of what use is the representative image?
Student: Is it not possible that the memory we have of all the Images we
have seen in the past coupled with the capacity of our imagination accounts 
for our understanding of triangle?
Teacher: How could that be? A man powered with an infinite power of memory
and an infinite power of imagination would still have to have an idea of 
triangle to know what it was he was remembering or imagining. How could he 
know what it was he was to remember or Imagine in the first place if he did 
not possess an idea of triangle?
Student: What of this. Suppose our imaginary man was possessed of an infinite
supply of images. Could he not examine his stock of images and by matching 
up what he came upon with one of his store recognize what he came upon to 
be a triangle?
Teacher: You remind me of the man xrfio when asked to explain night without
referring to day said that night was the absence of day. How would our 
hypothetical man judge that any two of the images that he paired matched 
up? Must he not refer these two Images to another idea, perhaps the idea of
matched images, to see whether or not they were matching? With the Infinite 
set of images that this hypothetical man has in his mind and the infinite 
set of images that it is possible for him to meet up with in the world, he 
would need an equally infinite set of ideas of matched images to match up 
the two infinite sets.
Student: My mind is growing dizzy at the thought of all of these triangles.
Teacher: Perhaps you are beginning to see the difficulties Inherent in the
thesis that it is from our ideas that we have knowledge.
Student: But surely it must be in reference to an idea that we can know
triangles that we see to be triangles. I realize now that it cannot be in 
reference to an image at all whether a representative image or an Infinite 
supply of images. It must simply be in reference to an abstract idea of 
triangle that we have in mind that we can judge which Images we see to be 
triangles. If the Images we find fit the idea of triangle that we have, 
then we say they are triangles. If the images do not fit the idea that 
we have, we say they are not triangles.
Teacher: How do you know that any particular triangle fits under your idea
of triangle? Do you need to have reference to another idea to which you
compare the image you find with the first idea of triangle that you have in 
order to judge whether or not the image that you find fits under your idea 
of triangle? If so, how do you know that your first idea of triangle and 
the image that you find fit tinder this new idea? Do you need yet a further 
idea to know that? If so, you will need another idea to know this new 
relationship and another idea beyond that until you will need to have re­
course to an Infinite number of ideas in order to come to know that a tri­
angle is a triangle. But if you must have recourse to an infinite number 
of ideas you would never have come to know a triangle in the first place.
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You would, In fact, still be searching through the infinite series of ideas 
of triangle as the examination of an infinite number of triangles would 
require an Infinite span of time. We have not passed through an infinite 
span of time since more time can always be taken. Hence, an infinite span 
of time can never be passed through. Thus, you would still be looking to 
see among your ideas if you had In fact come across a triangle. But the 
fact of the matter is that you have already come to know a triangle. 
Therefore, it cannot have been that you reached this knowledge by means 
of ideas.
Student: Just a moment. 1 do not need to look through all of those ideas.
I can simply see with my eyes that a figure is a triangle and that is an 
end to it.
Teacher: Now, you have moved from your thesis that our knowledge comes to
us through our ideas. You realize that if at any step of the process an 
idea is required for knowledge, then an idea must be required for knowledge 
at all steps. But this makes knowledge an impossibility. Therefore, an idea 
Is never required for knowledge in the first place.
Student: Yes, that is what I am saying now. We do not need this myriad of
ideas. Once we admit that -we need ideas for knowledge at any step along the 
way, how can we say that a step will come where we do not need Ideas for 
knowledge. If we do not need Ideas for knowledge at one juncture, then we 
do not need them at any juncture.
Teacher: Then you simply see that a triangle is a triangle.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Can you really see that an Image is a triangle? What, after all,
is your idea of a triangle?
Student: My idea of a triangle Is of a figure enclosed by three straight
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lines in two dimensional space the sum of the internal angles of which are 
equal to 180 degrees.
Teacher: Can you see three straight lines?
Student: I must acknowledge that I cannot see three straight lines. The 
idea of straight can only be more or less approximated by the images which 
I do see.
Teacher: Then how do you know that the figure you do see is, in fact, a
triangle?
Student: The figure I see corresponds closely enough with the idea of tri­
angle that I have in order that I may judge it to be an instance of the idea 
that I have.
Teacher: How can you tell that this image corresponds to an idea if your
idea is one for which you can never have•an image? If you never picture in 
your mind or draw an image which corresponds with the idea that you have, 
how can you judge by means of this idea whether or not an image corresponds 
closely enough to this idea to be an instance of this idea? If you can never 
have an ideal image, how can you use it to judge whether Images approximate 
it at all, whether closely or not closely. If you can never have one of 
the terms of a relation, how can the relation exist? What is more, need I 
remark that you have all too quickly retreated to the position that ideas 
are needed for knowledge.
Student: I do not know how to reply to what you say. It does seem that I
have embraced my previous position again that ideas necessary for knowledge. 
And your objection here seems to be a very potent one. How can I judge by 
means of an idea if I never have an example of this idea? Perhaps it is 
not exactly an idea which I use. Perhaps the word 'definition’ best ex­
plains the matter. I am taught from early childhood to give the name
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’triangle1 to any figure in a two dimensional space which is bounded by 
three straight lines.
Teacher: Does not the same problem reappear? You must still judge if the
figure you see fits the definition of triangle.
Student: But I can see that a figure fits the definition.
Teacher: How is this possible? Do you have an ideal image in your mind to
which you refer in order to check your visible image against it, to see if 
it is a triangle?
Student: No, for an ideal image will be of no use. An ideal image (an
image which can have no sensuous determinations) is a contradiction in terms. 
There can be no such thing. Any image must have some sensuous form. An 
ideal image is not to have any image at all. What is more, you will ask me 
how I know my ideal image to be a triangle and we will be lost in an infinite 
regress of ideal images or ideas. I am led to the conclusion that I do not
know an linage to be a triangle. A triangle is simply defined in this way.
Teacher: But this will not help us. We must still be able to judge if an
image comes under the definition.
Student: A definition is a general rule for recognition. X do not have to
have a general idea but only a rule for finding triangles. Whatever has 
three straight lines in a two dimensional plane and which encloses a space 
is to be called a triangle. It is not really a problem of knowledge at all. 
Teacher: What a fine thing this rule of yours is. You do not know what an
instance of the rule is unless you apply the rule, for what else could a 
rule for finding triangles be? What I want to know is when you know to apply 
the rule and when you know not to.
Student: You apply the rule whenever you have an instance of the rule.
Teacher: But in order to know if you have an instance of the rule you
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must already have applied the rule.
Student: Why is it that we cannot simply see a triangle and bring it under
the rule?
Teacher: See a what? It does not become a triangle for you until it has
been brought under the rule. That is the function of the rule.
Student: Why is it that we cannot see a something which upon bringing
under a rule we discover Is a triangle.
Teacher: How will you know under what rule to bring this something unless
you already know that it is a triangle. And, if you already knew it to 
be a triangle, you would not need to bring it under any general rule. 
Student: Could we not just see a something and judge it as fitting under
a rule?
Teacher: If nothing else, you are persistent. How do we judge that this is
a case that fits under the rule? Do we need to apply another rule that this 
is a case that fits under the first rule? And, how would we know that this 
case of fitting under the rule fits under the rule for fitting cases of 
that sort of rule under that rule? We would need still another rule until 
we had an Infinity of rules. But if we had to apply an infinite number of 
rules before we could come to judgment, we would never come to judgment in 
the first place. Furthermore, these notions of applying rules to cases are 
not only deficient on the side of the case (how do we know that this is a 
case that fits under the rule), but also they are deficient on the side of 
the rule as well. For, how do we know which rule to apply? This cannot 
come from the case for we do not know the case to be a case of the rule 
until we have applied the rule to it.
Student: I am at a loss. It seems that ve cannot make any sense out of
recognizing even such a simple object as a triangle.
Teacher: We cannot make sense out of recognizing triangles under the
analogy of applying rules to cases. You desired that we bring out in full the 
Implications of holding that form and matter were too self-dependent terms 
which then could he brought into relation. It is clear that a form devoid of 
all sensible determination can be of no use in aiding us to know that which 
has sensible determinations. It is equally clear that if there were such a 
thing as formless matter, there would be no way of picking it out as an 
instance of such and such form. There is no way of getting these two together 
in the first place even if they could exist Independently of each other. It 
is clear that it is not through rules that you have knowledge. A rule only 
helps you to group, to classify. You must already know what it is you are 
grouping. Your knowledge of what it is you are grouping cannot be supplied 
by the rule. Whatever rule, formula, definition you may have, you must know 
the reality these rules, formulas, definitions are rules for finding. If you 
know that a triangle is a figure bounded by three straight lines In a two-dimen­
sional space, you must already know what a triangle is in order to know if this 
definition is a satisfactory one, or even to know that this is a definition of 
a triangle. If what a triangle is is purely made up, purely conventional, 
then we must still know that. We must know the definition. Knowledge of the 
definition cannot be supplied by the definition.
Student: How is knowledge possible at all? How can we see that an image
is an image of a triangle? We do not do so through reference to a general 
idea since a general idea as general cannot include within its definition 
that this particular image is a triangle. Our general idea is not an image 
at all. How can we go from an idea which is not an image to something 
which is an linage. How knowledge is possible at all is beyond my
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comp rehenaion .
Teacher: It Is quite right that this should be beyond your comprehension.
The problem is that we are trying to solve a crime by inventing non-existent 
culprits and then asking how they were accomplices to the act. We are 
assuming that there is, on the one hand, such a thing as an image, and on 
the other, such a thing as an idea and that judgment, that the particular 
is a universal, comes about by fitting one (the image) under (the idea).
But idea and image are abstractions which do not exist in reality. There 
is no such thing as a pure (non-sensuous) idea or a sensuous image which is 
itself unintelligible and takes on its intelligibility only from an idea 
which is imposed upon it from without. What exists in reality is knowledge. 
Knowledge cannot be classified into two elements, one of which is an under­
stood intellectual abstraction and the other of which is a sensed concrete 
particular. We are trying to translate what we know by resorting to sense 
and intellection and then trying to figure out how they can be brought into 
a meaningful relation. The truth of the matter is that they were never 
separated in the first place and that knowledge does not come into being 
by some mysterious (unexplained and inexplicable) fitting together of the 
two.
Student: What, then, is knowledge?
Teacher: Are you asking me for a definition of knowledge or for the reality
of knowledge?
Student: I realize that you cannot give me the reality which is knowledge
since what you say will be in words and knowledge is not something which 
can be encapsuled in words. Knowledge is a reality, not a string of words. 
You cannot give me this reality. But perhaps you can give me a definition 
of knowledge.
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Teacher: But If I were to give you a definition of knowledge, you would
still have to know whether the definition I gave you were of knowledge. 
Knowledge must be undefinable, because if we could define it, how could 
we know the definition? The reality of knowledge which enables us to know 
the definition must exist outside of the definition. The ultimate term 
of analysis is neither sense nor understanding but knowledge. We have a 
prejudice that the ultimate term of explanation is either sensation of a 
concrete particular or understanding of an Intellectual meaning. We 
attempt to reduce every act of knowledge to one of these two terms. We take 
what is actually farthest away from us, sensed images and understood ideas, 
and try to conceive of them as what is most real. What is closest to us, 
what we do not see at all, is knowledge. Knowledge Is what is most real.
But because it is closest to us, we cannot see it at all. We take abstract­
ions from what is real to be real and do not see that which alone is real, 
knowledge, which cannot be reduced to either sense or understanding.
Student: Why do the perspectives of idea and image, form and matter, appear
in the first place?
Teacher: The problem appears because we think that there are two. We think
that there is an idea on the one side and an Image on the other. We then 
imagine the problem to be how can we judge if this image falls under that 
idea. We think what we are doing is recognizing images, seeing them to 
be instances of ideas. What is actually happening is that these Images are 
not at all what we know. We are knowing that which is neither idea nor 
image. But all that we have left with us after the actual fact of knowledge 
is an abstraction— the image or the idea. At the moment of knowledge there 
is neither idea nor image but knowledge: a state which cannot be reduced 
to either because it transcends both. After the fact of knowledge, analysis
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takes place. He analyse out two elements and ask of them what Is their 
relation. What we must remember Is that these two elements never existed 
In knowledge; they only exist ex post facto. We make an existence out of 
our own abstractions. Properly speaking, we do not have Ideas at all. We 
never have Ideas. What we call 'Ideas' are only period stops In knowledge.
The period stop Itself Is knowledge. Ideas do not exist; they are reflections 
of knowledge.
Student: What do you mean by saying that Ideas are reflections of knowledge? 
Teacher: We think ideas give us knowledge just as when we look into a re­
flecting pool we think we are seeing our faces when in fact we are seeing 
our own reflections. The reflections we see in the water reveal that we 
have knowledge, but they are not themselves knowledge. Ideas reveal that 
we have knowledge but they are not themselves the sources of our knowledge 
but only its reflection. Knowledge is the reality; idea the reflection.
You have to know if ideas bear any resemblance to truth. How can you know 
this unless knowledge is something different from ideas. What we call an 
'idea' is a trace or footprint of knowledge. Then we try to reduce knowledge 
to the idea. But the idea is not the source of knowledge; it is only the 
revelation that we have knowledge.
Student: What is knowledge?
Teacher: Hhat knowledge is cannot be stated because knowledge does not lie
in propositions. Knowledge is not a property of ideas, or definitions, or 
facts, or relations between these. As soon as a relation is posited, then 
that relation must be known and a relation cannot be known by a relation. 
Knowledge must be, and not simply be known, or else there will be a gap 
forever between knowledge and reality. If there were a gap between know­
ledge and reality, what is real could not be known, which would make
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knowledge impossible for knowledge can only be of what is real.
Student: Perhaps what we call 'knowledge' is only an idea that we have.
Perhaps reality, too, is only an idea.
Teacher: An idea can be thought, can it not?
Student: Of course.
Teacher: Can reality be thought?
Student: No.
Teacher: Then how can reality be an Idea?
Student: What I mean is that perhaps there Is no such thing as reality.
Teacher: Is there a difference between the concept of experience and
experience?
Student: To be sure.
Teacher: Can you have the idea of experience if you have no experience?
Can you have the concept of experience without experience?
Student: By no means.
Teacher: Is there a difference between the idea of reality and reality?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Can you have the idea of reality If there were no reality?
Student: No.
Teacher: Then reality must be.
Student: What of knowledge?
Teacher: If reality and knowledge are the same and there is knowledge,
there must be reality.
Student: Is knowledge unlimited or are there limits to knowledge?
Teacher: What do you think?
Student: I think that knowledge Is limited.
Teacher: But to know that knowledge is limited you must be beyond those
52limits. Otherwise, you would not be aware of the limits as limits.
Student: Could you explain more?
Teacher: Suppose a small boy were inside a room and he were told that the
universe was constituted by the walls of his room. How could he know that 
there is nothing more to the universe unless he could open a door and look
out? If he cannot see out, he cannot know that the walls make up the outer
limit of the universe. He can only know this if he can look out and see 
that there is nothing beyond the walls. But to see outside of the walls, 
the walls cannot be the outer boundary. One must see beyond in order to know 
that which is limited. Only the unlimited can know the limited. Only the 
infinite can know the finite. If you must be beyond the limits in order 
to know the limits as limits, then of course, they are no longer your limits. 
Student: You are saying that there are no limits to knowledge.
Teacher: To be aware that knowledge is limited you must be aware beyond
those limits. But if you are aware beyond those limits, then you cannot
know that knowledge is limited. Indeed, if knowledge is all there is, what 
could limit it?
Student: If there are no limits to knowledge, then we cannot distinguish
the object of knowledge from knowledge.
Teacher: Excellent.
52This is, in fact, the substance of Hegel’s criticism of Kant's 
view that we can know knowledge to be limited without being beyond those 
limits: "No one knows, or even feels, that anything is a limit or defect, 
until he is at the same time above and beyond it...A very little considera­
tion might show, that to call a thing finite or limited proves by implica­
tion the very presence of the infinite and unlimited, and that our know­
ledge of a limit can only be when the unlimited is on this side in conscious­
ness." (emphasis Hegel's). Science of Logic, IV, ii, 60. Translated from 
The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, by William Wallace, 
pp. 116-117.
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Student: If there are no limits to knowledge, then we cannot distinguish
between knowledge and being.
Teacher: Quite right.
Student: Did you not say that knowledge cannot know itself? Is this not to
set a limit to knowledge?
Teacher: Your cleverness is laudable. Now watch me closely here and make
sure that you can follow me.
Student: I will keep a close watch. You may be sure of that.
Teacher: Knowledge is unlimited.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: Knowledge cannot know itself.
Student: Yes.
Teacher: If knowledge knew itself there would be two: knowledge and the
itself which it knew. But did we not say that knowledge was all that there 
is?
Student: Yes•
Teacher: For knowledge not to know itself is not to set a limit to knowledge,
for knowledge is all that there is. If knowledge is all that there is, what
could limit knowledge? Knowledge cannot limit itself because only the un­
limited can set limits. For the unlimited there is nothing to know. The 
unlimited is everything that there is.
Student: But the idea of the unlimited requires the idea of the limited.
Teacher: But the idea of the unlimited and the unlimited are not one and
the same. We may have an idea of the unlimited, but the unlimited is not
contained in an idea.
Student: If what is is unlimited, then everything must be included in It.
Nothing must be left out. All possibilities must be contained within it.
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If all possibilities must be contained within reality, then it is possible 
that reality is not. It is possible that nothing is.
Teacher: Possibility is not contained within reality because possibility
is not something real. It is what might be real. It is not what is real. 
Everything that has positive existence is contained within reality.
Possibility has no positive existence. Hence, there is no possibility in 
reality. Reality does leave out what is not. But what is not has no exis­
tence. Thus, reality leaves nothing out.
Student: I do not find myself altogether convinced.
Teacher: Then let me convince you on your own terms. If you like, we may
show that everything cannot be possible.
Student: Yes, I would like that very much.
Teacher: Very well. If everything is possible then possibility is infinite.
It is possible that something is actual. Therefore, everything cannot only 
be possible.
Student: But It is equipossible that something is not actual.
Teacher: If it is equipossible that something is and that it is not, then
these two cancel each other out. One of the two possibilities cannot be. 
Therefore, possibility cannot be infinite. If possibility is not infinite, 
it must be limited. It can be limited only by what is possible, what is 
impossible, what is actual, or what is necessary. The possible cannot be 
limited by the impossible for the impossible is what is not and what is not 
has no being. That which has no being is nothing, and nothing cannot limit 
being. For if there is nothing to limit being, how can we say that being, 
in this case the being of possibility, is limited. The possible cannot be 
limited by the possible for then possibility would limit itself. If possibil­
ity limits itself, then possibility is limited and not everything is possible.
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If possibility is limited then possibility is not Infinite. But only that 
which is infinite can set limits. Therefore, if possibility is limited, it 
must be limited not by itself but by another. The possible must be limited 
by the necessary or the actual. Thus, either something is or something must 
be. If the possible is limited by the actual then something is. If the 
possible is limited by the necessary then it is necessary that something is.
In either case, something exists. If something is, then we have shown that 
everything cannot be possible.
Student: Is it not possible that nothing is?
Teacher: It cannot be that nothing is, for if nothing is, then there cannot
even be nothing. Or, if nothing is, then there is something. In either case, 
something is.
Student: And what is is reality and reality is what is.
Teacher: Yes.
Student: And reality is unlimited.
Teacher: The language of 'limited1 and 'unlimited' is only meaningful for us.
Reality Itself is not unlimited to itself. What is is. It is beyond descrip­
tion. We have no terms adequate to the description of reality itself. What­
ever we say about reality is bound to be Inadequate since whatever we say 
about reality is not the same as reality. It is helpful to know that what­
ever we say about reality will be Inadequate. For it is an early warning 
signal that our words and reality are not identical. Knowing this will help 
to keep us from getting too caught up in our words. We must use language 
since one person is attempting to describe something to another person. All 
language is thus on the subject-object level. But we try to use the subject- 
object language to take us beyond both subjects and objects.
Student: What about knowledge?
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Teacher: Knowledge is above Che subject-object level. Plato fastened upon
the problem of participation as the proper problem but he applied it wrongly. 
He thought the problem was how do objects participate In universal forms.
The verb Is the right one: It Is a question of participation. However, it
is a question not of knowing the truth, but of being the truth. Knowledge 
is not something that you know or something that you have. It is what you 
are. Knowledge and being are one.
EPILOGUE
Student: What you said at the end of our last talk about knowledge and
being is finally beginning to make sense to me. It was very difficult for 
me to understand how knowledge and being can be one. But now I think I 
understand. What I want to know is why did we participate in what seemed 
to be Intellectual discussions?
Teacher: It was my purpose to show that there is no disjunction between
the realms of logic and experience. I wanted to show that we can show 
through reason what we can discover by experience. Reason alone cannot 
assure us of the truth of what we discover, but if there is no duality, 
there should be no contradiction between the findings of reason and the 
findings of experience. There is no discontinuity between what the intel­
lect can find and what there is. Knowledge and reality are one. The truth 
is one. Indeed, if there were two truths, how could we know them both to 
be true? For both to be true there must be one truth.
Student: Why can there not be a distinction between what follows from a
logical analysis and what is revealed in experience?
Teacher: In reality there is no plurality. One can make distinctions
only when there is more than one. If there are no distinctions in reality, 
how can there be a distinction between the findings of logic and the find­
ings of experience?
Student: If there are no distinctions in reality, then the knowledge of
reality is identical to reality.
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Teacher: Yes, how could it be otherwise? If all that there is is knowledge,
how could the knowledge of reality be anything other than reality? When we 
come to knowledge we know that all that there is is knowledge. The knowledge 
of reality is identical to reality.
Student: If all that there is is a unity, then why are there so many differ­
ent names?
Teacher: We have seen that there is no plurality in reality.
Student: True.
Teacher: Is it not clear that being, knowledge, experience, reality all
equally are?
Student: Yes.
Teacher: How can all of these equally be if there is no plurality in reality?
Must it not be that these are all but different names for reality? If each 
one is, and, with no plurality there are not two to be different from one 
another, then all must be the same. But there cannot be an "all" if there 
is no plurality. The "all" can only refer to the different names which do 
not exist in reality. Therefore, 'knowledge', 'being', 'unity','experience', 
and even 'reality' can only be different names which stand for one and the 
same reality. 'Being', 'unity', 'knowledge', 'experience', 'reality* all are 
convertible terms. Even the name 'reality' is only a name for us. Reality 
does not call itself 'reality*. Reality is not real to itself. It is real 
to us.
Student: For itself, it just is.
Teacher: That, too, is another description. We really cannot say anything
about what it is in Itself.
Student: I cannot find fault with your logic. But it seems to me that you
are describing a realm which is far beyond our grasp. What is the purpose
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of describing this other world? Is It to take us beyond this world, to 
escape from Its evils and from suffering?
Teacher: I am not describing another world. There are not two worlds.
I am describing the reality of this world. This reality Is not beyond 
your experience. It is only because you are removed from your own experi­
ence that you think what I say is about some other world. It Is only when 
we separate ourselves from our experience that we make it appear that It 
is a many. In our fear of experience we divide it up and categorize it 
so that we can control it. I am only trying to call your attention to 
your own experience. There is nothing I can say which you will not find 
to be true in your own experience.
Student: What are we to make of our thinking that there is duality? 
Teacher: When you have a dream and during the dream you see objects, and 
then later when you awaken you see that the objects that you had thought 
you had seen are not there; what do you make of those objects?
Student: We say that they are not real.
Teacher: Might not the world of duality be like a dream object which upon
awakening we will see to be unreal?
Student: What is the relationship between the reality and the unreality?
Is the relationship real or unreal? Is it part of the reality or part of 
the illusion?
Teacher: Relationship can exist only if there are two. Relationship is
part of the seeming. In reality there is no relationship.
Student: But did you not say that this world of objects may be likened to
a dream world?
Teacher: Yes.
Student: Have you not created a relationship between reality and dream?
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Teacher: If you saw this world as a dream world, then this world of ob­
jects would have no existence. All there would be would be yourself.
Student: What do you mean?
Teacher: In the dream there is no difference between the object and yourself.
Student: I do not understand.
Teacher: When you are dreaming, do your dream objects really exist?
Student: No.
Teacher: The lion, the castle, the princess that you dream are really your
own creations. They are projections of your imagination. In this sense 
they are all really yourself. They have no other existence.
Student: True.
Teacher: All that really exists in the dream is yourself.
Student: Yes, that is so.
Teacher: If you saw this world as a dream world, then all there would be
would be yourself.
Student: If all that exists Is the self, then each man will be out for
himself alone. No man will help any other man. This would be a terrible 
case of affairs.
Teacher: But if there is nothing but the self, then the "other" will be
seen as the self as well. The drive to provide for the "self" will, by 
no means, be limited to your own person. If the self is all that there 
is, then self-love is universal love.
Student: By the same token, no man will do any harm to any other, for if
there is nothing but the self, then to do harm to another is to do harm 
to oneself.
Teacher: Yes. We must remember that this talk of self and other is but
a metaphor. We are trying to stretch language beyond its limitB. We are
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trylng to describe the state which Is beyond self and other in terms of 
self and other. If there is nothing but yourself, there is not really 
a concept of "yourself"; because if there is nothing but yourself, you
would not see "yourself" as distinct from "another".
Student: What you are describing is a perfect state of love between men.
What is the point of describing that which is beyond our capacity to
realize?
Teacher: But we have been talking about nothing but reality. Reality is
a state in which there is no division between subject and object. Our 
natural state is one of love. It Is only because we are removed from 
our own real nature that we do not exist in a state of love. We are 
alienated from our real nature because we are so heavy laden with false 
conceptions of ourselves and reality. The only point of our discussion Is 
to dispossess ourselves of some of the false conceptions of ourselves so 
that we will be more open to experience. It is only the false conceptions 
of reality that keep us from our real nature. What better ideality is 
there than reality? What better philosophy is there than one which describes 
the unity between oneself, one's knowledge, and what there is. But all of 
this talk is, of course, useless, unless it helps us to live. We must be­
come what we are. Philosophy, talk about reality, only exists to take us 
beyond philosophy. Talk about reality only exists to take us to reality.
The test of philosophy is life. If philosophy helps us to live, then it 
is true philosophy.
Student: Thank you. I shall try to put into action what we have discussed.
PREFACE TO APPENDICES
The purpose of the appendices is to indicate if and how the 
objections of certain contemporary philosophers to idealism apply to 
the position which is developed in the dissertation, and what critical 
reply can be made to these philosophers. These appendices do not pre­
tend to be exhaustive expositions of the criticisms of each philosopher 
vis-a-vis idealism. But between them all they attempt to cover what 
seems to lie at the core of the criticisms of idealism offered by these 
contemporary philosophers.
G. E. Moore's early essay, ’The Refutation of Idealism' is treated 
because of its immense historical importance, even though the later 
Moore no longer subscribes to its basic tenets.^ In order to account
for this, however, the position of the later Moore is treated as it
54appears in his ’A Reply To My Critics1. The criticisms of Bertrand 
Russell are discussed as they appear in the title essay of his book,
ECOur Knowledge of the External World. Last, there is an appendix on
53G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & Co., Inc., 1922), pp. 1-30. In the preface to this work,
Moore says of his early paper: "This paper now appears to me to be
very confused, as well as to embody a good many down-right mistakes."
Vide, also the appendix on The Later Moore, p. 161.
54Paul Schlipp, ed., The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, IV 
(Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1942),
pp. 653-660.
55Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World,
(New York: The New American Library, 1960), pp. 54-80.
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the famous criticism of Ralph Barton Perry as it appears in his chapter, 
'The Cardinal Principle of Idealism' in his work, Present Philosophical 
Tendencies.^
56Ralph Barton Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, (New York: 
Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968), pp. 113-134.
APPENDIX I
G. E. MOORE, 'THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM*
Professor Moore begins his now classical essay with the statement 
that Modern Idealism asserts that the universe Is spiritual. One of the 
meanings he ascribes to this statement is: "Chairs and tables and moun­
tains seem to be very different from us; but when the whole universe is 
declared to be spiritual, it is certainly meant to assert that they are 
far more like us than ire t h i n k . H e r e ,  Professor Moore takes for granted 
the existence of the subject and assumes that the Idealist argues that the 
object is in reality like the subject. The possibility that is not contem­
plated by Moore is a view of reality which transcends the subject-object 
duality altogether. Under this view neither object nor subject are ultimate 
ly real so that neither one exists to be either like or unlike the other. 
Since Professor Moore does not contemplate this possibility his arguments 
are directed against dualistic positions which are other than the position 
taken in the dissertation. Essentially, Professor Moore's criticisms do 
not touch upon the position taken in the dissertation.
Professor Moore holds that for Idealism the universe, "...has what
58we recognize in ourselves as the higher forms of consciousness."
^G. E. Moore, 'The Refutation of Idealism', Philosophical Studies, 
p. 1 (emphasis his).
58Ibid., p. 1 (emphasis his).
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However accurate Professor Moore's description may be of Modern Idealism, 
it does not come into contact with the position taken in the dissertation.
For, if by the universe Moore means the world which is made up of objects, 
then this is held not to exist in reality. That which does not exist in 
reality cannot possess forms of consciousness whether higher or lower.
But Professor Moore, as he later notes, is only interested in Ideal­
istic arguments and he concentrates on the one argument which he believes
that all Idealists must rely upon to establish the conclusion that 'Reality 
59Is spiritual'. Now, If it is not the Intent of the dissertation to estab­
lish this conclusion then it would appear that however damaging Professor 
Moore's criticisms of this one argument are, they will not constitute a 
refutation of the position taken in the dissertation. But even if Professor 
Moore's arguments seem to be at cross purposes with those contained within 
the body of the dissertation, let us examine them closely to see if his 
arguments can nonetheless apply and possibly present serious objections to 
the doctrines advanced in the dissertation.
The proposition upon which Professor Moore claims all Idealism rests
60is the proposition, esse is percipi. Professor Moore states his philosophi­
cal translation of Bishop Berkeley's celebrated formula: "If esse is percipi,
this is at once equivalent to saying that whatever is, is experienced; and
this, again, is equivalent, in a sense, to saying that whatever is, is some- 





62dissertation. The dissertation Is concerned only with that kind of exis­
tence which can be known in the sense which satisfies the criteria for know- 
ledge given in the text. According to these criteria we can never know
that objects exist. All that we can know to exist is knowledge. Therefore, 
it would not be accurate, in the strictest sense, to say with Moore that, 
"...whatever is, is experienced...", for this implies that there is a some­
thing \diich is experienced. If we are to state the position of the disserta­
tion In Professor Moore's language of experience, we would say that we cannot
know that there Is a something which is experienced. All that we can know
64is that there is experience. If we were to adopt a paraphrase appropriate 
to articulating the essence of the ontological committment of the disserta­
tion we might say, "Experience is what is". For experience does satisfy the 
requirements for that which can be known to be.
The reasons for placing 'experience' first in the philosophical para­
phrase are not only epistemological and ontological; the choice of word
order is dictated by reasons of interest as well. For the dissertation is
65interested only in that which can be a possibility of experience. It is 
62The subject and the mental have no privileged status in the disser­
tation. Vide, Preface; First Dialogue, pp. 17-23; Second Dialogue, pp. 33-38; 
p. 42; Fourth Dialogue, p. 99; Fifth Dialogue, pp. 120-122; Epilogue, pp. 146- 
147. While the arguments in the dissertation are often couched in the 
language of subjects and objects, this is due to the fact that we must work 
within the limits of language while at the same time aspiring to that which 
exists beyond language. We must not confuse the dimensions of the sign with 
that to which the sign points. Vide, Second Dialogue, p. 50; Fifth Dialogue, 
pp. 136-137; Epilogue, p. 147.
63Vide, Preface; First Dialogue, p. 3; Second Dialogue, p. 49.
64'Knowledge' and 'experience' are employed as equivalent expressions 
in the dissertation as well. Vide, Fourth Dialogue, pp. 69-70; Epilogue, pp. 
143-144; Vide, also f. 83, below.
^Vide, Fourth Dialogue, p. 99; Fifth Dialogue, p. 119; Epilogue, pp.
144-145.
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66argued extensively that it is never possible to experience objects. The 
possible existence of that which is not a possibility of experience is a 
possibility which falls outside of the scope of the interest of the disser­
tation.
It is crucial to see that the-validity of Professor Moore's argument
at every stage depends upon the acceptance of the subject-object duality,
the very supposition that the dissertation calls into question. For example,
Professor Moore states: 11 ...since the whole world must be an object, we
must conceive it to belong to some subject or subjects."^7 What is said in
the dissertation is, if there is an object, then there must be a subject; or,
the concepts of subject and object are interdependent, but not that the con- 
68cepts are valid.
Professor Moore's argument depends upon another equally important
assumption as well, namely, that reality is a whole, part of which is not 
69experienced. Nowhere does Professor Moore prove that perception 1b only
a part of a whole which is reality.
Why does Professor Moore think that there is something more in 
reality than there is in experience? He thinks this because otherwise he
70thinks that the proposition, esse is percipi, will be an absolute tautology.
^Flrst Dialogue, pp. 5-9; pp. 11-23; Fifth Dialogue, pp. 118-123; et
passim.
67G. E. Moore, 'The Refutation of Idealism', Philosophical Studies,
p. 6.
68Vide, above, f. 62; f. 70.
0p« cite, p. 9,
700p. cit.. p. 11.
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But the proposition, 'Whatever Is, Is e x pe ri en ce 'i s only empty if we
assume that experience is the experience of objects, and if we then take
the objects away, experience is empty. But if there are no objects, we are
not taking anything away. We assert only what is.
But let us inquire into why Professor Moore says what he does. He
holds that if there is not a reality in addition to experience, to assert
that esse is percipi will amount to making a "perfectly barren analytic 
72proposition". But the proposition, 'Whatever is, is experience', is not
an analytic truth in the same sense in which the proposition, 'All bachelors
are unmarried males', is an analytic truth. The latter proposition is
analytically true because of the rules of language. The former proposition
is analytically true because it is analytic of experience; i.e., it is
analytic of what is found in experience. That a truth of experience is
analytic for experience follows from its being a truth of experience. If
we assert that which is necessarily true of experience that does not make
our assertion an empty truth.
The question may well be asked of the author of the dissertation,
"Why do you not accept the assumption that there is something in addition
to experience?" The author can only reply: "I must confine myself to
accepting as truths only those propositions which are consonant with the
73findings of experience and which are not logically contradictory. I permit
71Por the sake of a harmony of reference we will change only the 
past tense of the verb form 'experienced' to the noun form 'experience' and 
leave the word order of the paraphrase intact. However, we must keep the 
above arguments in mind. (Vide, pp. 3-4 above)
72Op. cit., p. 10.
73Cf. Epilogue. pp. 143-144.
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myself no assumptions. I do not find In my experience an example of a 
reality which Is not experienced. Therefore, I do not permit myself this 
hypothesis."
But let us proceed with the argument of Professor Moore. Professor 
Moore states:
We have then in every sensation two distinct terms, (1) 'conscious­
ness', in respect of which all sensations are alike; and (2) some­
thing else, in respect of which one sensation differs from another.
It will be convenient if I may be allowed to call this second term 
the 'object' of a sensation....We have then in every sensation two 
distinct elements, one which X call consciousness, and another 
which 1 call the object of consciousness.75
This analysis of Moore's states the problem in a nutshell. The question at
issue is, are there two distinct elements in sensation, namely consciousness
and the object of consciousness. In the dissertation the position is taken
that the introspection does not reveal there is to be two distinct elements in 
76sensation. But we cannot appeal to introspection to settle the case as 
according to some Introspection reveals there to be two elements in conscious­
ness while to others introspection reveals no duality within c o n s c i o u s n e s s . ^
First Dialogue, pp. 1-2; Third Dialogue, pp. 68-69. As Plato says 
in the Republic, "For where the starting point is something the reasoner does 
not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not 
really known, what possibility is there that assent in such cases can ever be 
converted into true knowledge or science." Republic, 533 c.
^G. E. Moore, ’The Refutation of Idealism1, Philosophical Studies,
p« 17«
^Vide, First Dialogue, pp. 21-23; Fifth Dialogue; pp. 124-125.
^Professor Errol E. Harris states that he can find no such distinction 
in sensation: "I am myself unable to distinguish in my own experience of sen­
sation between anything describable as an act of consciousness and the immed­
iate object of consciousness." Vide, 'The Mind-Dependence of Objects', The 
Philosophical Quarterly, April, 1955, p. 224. Professor Harris states that 
Bertrand Russell is also unable to find such a distinction in sensation: Vide,
Russell, Analysis of Mind, pp. 17, 141 f. and Our Knowledge of the External 
World, p. 83. (I have been unable to discover the claim of Russell in this 
last source that professor Harris cites.) On the other side there is Moore
-156-
On the basis of Introspection, at least, It appears to be a moot point as to 
whether or not there Is a duality within sensation.
At this point it may be useful for us to inquire into the way in 
which Professor Moore has arrived at his conclusion that there are two dis­
tinct elements in sensation. Consciousness, for Moore, is a name given to all 
cases of sensation on the ground that while Individual sensations differ from 
each other, they all nonetheless share in common the characteristic of being 
sensations. However, from the fact that the experience of blue shares in 
common with the experience of red that they are both consciousnesses, it does 
not follow that in either experience alone there is a distinction between con­
sciousness and an object of consciousness. Why do X say this? The analysis 
from which Professor Moore draws his conclusions we may call an abstract ana­
lysis since the existence of that to which Moore refers with the term 'con­
sciousness' is not, in terms of that analysis, immediately known in introspect­
ion but is deduced from the inference that all sensations must have something 
in common. Moore has confused what we may call existential orders. Conscious­
ness, which according to Moore had but an abstract existence (that which all 
sensations have in common) is given a phenomenological existence, i.e., an 
existence detectable as a datum of immediate experience. Moore has taken 
what may be true of the abstract order of existence and inferred that it is 
true of the phenomenological order of existence. But there is no legitimate 
ground for such an inference. An inference iriiich is made without a legitimate 
ground we may call a fallacious inference. In this case we may accuse
himself, Brentano, Husserl, and others. Professor Ducasse states: "Profes­
sor Moore asserts that in any case of awareness of blue it is possible (even 
if not easy) to distinguish by careful introspective observation the aware­
ness from the blue. This I readily grant..." Cf. Moore's: "The Refutation 
of Idealism", The Philosophy of G. IJ. Moore, p. 239.
-157-
78Professor Moore of committing the fallacy of confusing existential orders.
There Is a way In which we may say that the distinction Moore draws 
between consciousness and an object of consciousness Is a valid distinction. 
While we cannot argue that Introspection allows us to distinguish between 
consciousness and an object of consciousness, we can make different use of 
statements which refer to one as opposed to the other, without Involving 
ourselves in ontological committments. For example, let us take the state­
ment, TI am aware of blue* to stand for the case in which one wishes to draw 
attention to consciousness, and the statement, *1 see blue1 to stand for the 
case in which one wishes to draw attention to the simple object of conscious­
ness. We can (and do) make certain statements in connection with one of these 
statements that we do not make in connection with the other. In connection 
with the simple awareness blue we may say, "I see blue" Instead of "I see 
red". In connection with the statement, 'I am aware of blue* we may say,
"I am aware" rather than saying, "I am rowing a boat". The difference be­
tween these different verbal forms of description is entirely due to the con­
text in which they are to be used. The difference between the two kinds of 
statements falls on grounds of linguistic convenience and pragmatic utility. 
The existence of differing verbal forms of description is a convenience in 
allowing us to make differing and varying forms of connections among our 
statements allowing for the richness of language and the variety of our
78'We may take as an analogy of items existing on different existential 
levels the family trait of the Hapsburg jaw and the existential instantiation 
of the trait, i.e., the actual occurrence of an individual with such jaw.
There is no separate family of cases of Hapsburgs who exist apart from indivi­
dually occurring cases of Hapsburgs with Hapsburg jaws. Moore’s analysis of 
consciousness into two distinct elements is to place the family trait of the 
Hapsburg jaw on the same existential level as the case of the individually 
occurring Hapsburg with Hapsburg jaw.
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purposes and intentions.
But let us turn to Professor Moore's final description of sensation:
The true analysis of a sensation or idea is as follows. The element 
that is common to them all, and which I have called 'consciousness' 
really is consciousness. A sensation is, in reality, a case of 
'knowing' or 'being aware of' or 'experiencing' something.79
From this analysis it would appear that sensation is a case of subject knower
"knowing" an object. Sensation, in this analysis, is not the object known,
but the knowing of it.
Later on, Jiowever, Moore gives this analysis of sensation:
...I am aware of blue, and by this I mean, that my awareness has to 
blue a quite different and distinct relation. It is possible, X 
admit, that my awareness is blue as well as being of blue: but
what I am quite sure of is that it is of blue; that it has to blue 
the simple and unique relation the existence of which alone justifies 
us in distinguishing knowledge of a thing from the thing known,
Indeed in distinguishing mind from matter. **0
Here, Moore admits the possibility that awareness can be blue a£ well as
being of blue. But I will argue that if awareness is blue then it makes no
sense to say that it can be of blue as well. For, if awareness is blue then
we do not need to become aware of it. If there is already a blue awareness
we would not need to become aware of it or else why should we have said that
it was a blue awareness in the first instance. The only possible alternative
is that it is not a blue awareness of which we are becoming aware, but it is
blue simpliciter of which we are becoming aware. But if it is blue simplici-
ter of which we become aware, it seems then that we must first have the blue
before knowing it. But this, even on Moore's own account, is impossible. On
the one hand, if there is already a blue awareness there would seem to be no
7QG. E. Moore, 'The Refutation of Idealism', Philosophical Studies, 
p . 24 (emphasis his).
^Ibid., p. 26 (emphasis his).
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need to become aware of It, or else why do we refer to it as a blue aware­
ness. On the other hand, If it Is a blue slmpllclter, we could have a
81sensation without knowing. But this Moore himself does not allow.
What Moore actually discovers in introspection Is, 1 think, blue 
awareness and not blue slmpllclter. Why else would he allow for the possible 
existence of blue awareness? And yet, if what he actually discovers Is blue
awareness, it would not seem that he would need a further entity, conscious-
82ness, to become aware of this.
Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism' follows quite simply from his last
description of sensation;
There is, therefore, no question of how we are to "get outside the 
circle of our own ideas and sensations." Merely to have a sensation 
is already to be outside that circle.®3
What Moore intends in this analysis is simply this. If sensation is comprised
of two distinct elements, consciousness and the object of consciousness, then
to have a sensation is already to be aware of something which is other than
consciousness. But Moore's analysis depends upon his having access to that
to which he has no access, namely a blue in itself. If the blue Moore speaks
about is a blue awareness then he would not have to become aware of it, in
which case there are not two items, consciousness and its object. If the
blue Moore speaks about is that of which he must become aware before he can
know it as blue then it must be that he can have a blue before he knows it as
blue. But this is impossible. For how could you "have a blue" without knowing
81Vlde, above f. 79.
^Vide, Second Dialogue, pp. 47-49; Fifth Dialogue, pp. 118-123. The 
question addressed here is, what is knowledge? While Moore calls it a 
'simple and unique relation1 he does not analyze what is the relation.
83Op. cit., p. 27 (emphasis his).
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lt was blue? It must be that "having the blue" Is discovering a blue
awareness, or, In a word, that blue and consciousness are not two distinct
84elements, but one. It seems that Moore's argument for the 'Refutation of 
Idealism’ is not actually an argument for the 'Refutation of Idealism'. It 
seems rather to be an argument offered on its behalf.
84Cf. C. J. Ducasse, Moore's "The Refutation of Idealism", The Philosophy 
of G. E, Moore, pp. 232-233; 236-237; 239; 242; et passim. In Professor Du­
casse 's very cogent analysis he argues that blue Is a kind of experience as 
waltzing Is a kind of dance. The discovery of a blue awareness would be the 
discovery of a kind of awareness. In Professor Ducasse's terms, blue is not 
an object of experience, but a species of experience.
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THE LATER MOORE
In all justice to Professor Moore we must take into account his
later position and not leave off our analysis with his early one. As best
as I can understand Professor Moore's later position, it is this. Professor
Moore no longer subscribes to the position that there can be unsensed sensi-
bilia, i.e., that blue exists Independently of our sensing it. He does,
however, insist that there are a class of objects of trtiich it would be true
to say that they exist independently of our sensing them, e.g., something
which possesses the property of blue. This is, at least, what I understand
Professor Moore to be saying in these comments:
In that early paper I really was asserting that the sensible quality 
"blue" (and, of course, also should have asserted the same of the 
sensible quality "bitter") could exist without being perceived: that
there was no contradiction is supposing it to do so. Mr. Ducasse's
view is that it cannot: that there iŝ  a contradiction in supposing
it to do so. And on this issue I am now very much Inclined to think 
that Mr. Ducasse is right and that I in that paper was w r o n g . . .
...I now agree with Mr. Ducasse and Berkeley, and hold that that 
early paper of mine was wrong. As an argument for my present view I 
should give the assertions that a toothache certainly cannot exist 
without being felt, but that, on the other hand, the moon certainly 
can exist without being perceived."88
...when we say that a tie is blue or quinine is bitter...here each 
word stands for a property, in Mr. Ducasse's sense of that term, 
and a property which may belong to physical objects, and hence cer­
tainly may exist when it is not being perceived.8^
Q C G. E. Moore, 'A Reply to my Critics', The Philosophy of G. E. Moore,
p. 658.
86Ibid., p. 653 (emphasis his).
87Ibid., p. 658 (emphasis his).
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IC would appear, then, that Professor Moore would not suppose that 
the sensible quality "blue" could exist without being perceived, but a blue 
thing could exist without being perceived, e.g., a blue wall. But it is not 
at all clear how a blue wall can exist without blue existing. Professor 
Moore seems to hold that blue would exist as a property of the wall. But 
how can this be if the blue of the blue property cannot exist outside of 
perception according to Professor Moore?
What then can it mean to say that the blue property of the wall exists 
outside of perception? It can only mean, I suppose, that the wall possesses 
the property, not strictly speaking of blue, but of being capable of exciting 
that blue upon being perceived. This seems to be the only way of saving 
Professor Moore from a contradiction. Blueness can only exist in sensation 
according to Professor Moore. But the wall can exist outside of sensation.
If the wall can exist outside of sensation but blue cannot and blue is none­
theless a property of wall it seems that the only manner in which we can give 
meaning to the expression ’blue property' is to say that should the wall be 
observed by someone, that it is blue will be experienced. Yet, if this is 
what possessing a blue property means, (and it is difficult to see what else 
it can mean), then the wall must in some way be responsible for causing the
-•l ** 'sensation of blue to arise in us. Moore, in a word, is back to a causal
theory of perception and all the criticisms brought forth in the dissertation
88against a causal theory of perception are relevant here.
Indeed, with the causal theory of perception that (we say) Moore
88First Dialogue, pp. 5-9; Second Dialogue, pp. 46-48; Fifth Dialogue, 
pp. 118-122; et passim.
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seems to be committed to, he cannot at the same time maintain that blue is
a property of wall. For, If blue arises In us upon our perception of wall,
and this Is our only contact with blue, then by what right can we say that
that same blue exists In the wall when it is not perceived? The criticisms
advanced in the dissertation against the representative theory of perception
89would apply equally well here as well.
Now, it might seem unfair to attribute causal and representative 
theories of perception to Professor Moore, but we did so Initially to save 
him from a contradiction. If we do not ascribe a causal and representative 
theory of perception to Professor Moore, there is another consequence which 
will follow. There are two classes of entities for Professor Moore, those 
which can exist unperceived (as the moon) and those which cannot (as blue). 
The class of entities which cannot exist except as perceived are, for Profes­
sor Moore, directly apprehended:
...I am inclined to think that it is as impossible that anything 
which has the sensible quality "blue” and, more generally, anything 
whatever which is directly apprehended. any sense-datum, that is, 
should exist unperceived, as it is that a headache should exist 
unfelt.90
It would seem from this analysis that Professor Moore holds that whatever is 
directly apprehended cannot exist apart from perception. If this is true 
then whatever exists apart from perception cannot be directly apprehended.
It follows then either that the moon, for example, is not directly appre­
hended (in which case, I take it, we are involved with some form of a causal 
theory of perception), or, that the moon does not exist apart from being
90G. E. Moore, 'A Reply to My Critics', The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, 
p. 658. (emphasis his).
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perceived. Now, of these two alternatives, X think that Professor Moore 
would prefer the first.
Professor Moore Is himself troubled by the problem. He wants both
to be able to say that we can directly apprehend objects and still maintain
realism. He states his puzzlement with regard to the question of whether
physical surfaces are directly or indirectly apprehended:
Now at the end of the last section X said that X was strongly in­
clined to agree with Mr. Bouwsma, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Marhenke that 
physical surfaces are directly apprehended. X am, therefore, now 
saying that I am strongly inclined to take a view incompatible with 
that which I then said I was strongly inclined to take. And this 
is the truth. I am strongly inclined to take both of these incom­
patible views. I am completely puzzled about the matter, and only 
wish I could see any way of settling it.^
Professor Moore wants to be able to say that we can directly see objects
which possess qualities and yet he realizes that he cannot say this or else
he must give up his realism, for whatever is directly apprehended cannot
exist apart from being perceived according to his own notions. How can we
resolve this problem?
Xt seems that the resolution to this problem Is the realization that 
we do not directly perceive objects but that what we call an object is a 
creation of the mind. We hear a sound; we infer that it is a train. We see 
a color, a line, a shape; we judge that it is a chair.^ If we understand 
that our perculiar mode of grouping qualities together so as to make of them 
objects is a function of the human intellect and does not reflect what exists
^Ibld., pp. 658-9 (emphasis his).
92It is a more complicated affair than simply this, to be sure. There 
is combination in conformance to certain rules. But the example makes the 
point clear. For the rest, one may be referred to Kant, The Critique of 
Pure Reason, Transcendental Analytic.
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in independence from the human intellect, we should be able to resolve
Professor Moore's dilemma. It is Professor Moore's conception that we
directly see objects that is a cause of his difficulties. A fuller conception
of the contribution of the human mind to perception would, I think, obviate
many of his difficulties. Let us examine a particular case in point. We
may take a very late description of sensation given by Professor Moore:
It seems to me evident that I cannot see the sensible quality blue, 
without directly seeing something which has that quality - a blue 
patch, or a blue speck, or a blue line, or a blue Bpot, etc., in 
the sense in which an after-image, seen with closed eyes, may be 
any of these things.^3
Now, that blue is seen no one would deny. What we might alter in Professor
Moore's description is the status of the object. We could just as easily say
that it is blue which has the quality shape, could we not? Or, we could say
that it is the patch which is blueing. Another possible description of the
blue pattern is that it is the patch which Is in the blue. In all of theae
cases the same qualities are seen; it is only the arrangement of them that
differs.
The point of these varying possible descriptions is that our arrange­
ment of colors and lines into what we call objects is a matter of epistemolo- 
gical convenience. The fact that varying and differing descriptions are pos­
sible indicates that no one description can claim to be the description of 
the way things are. It indicates, I think, that what we call a "blue patch" 
is not something that we directly see, but is a composition which we have 
made up because it best fits our epistemologlcal natures. "Blue patch" is 
something done, rather than something directly seen. The resolution to
930p. cit., p. 659 (emphasis his).
Professor Moore's dilemma is in fact the conclusion of the dissertation. 
We never perceive objects; what we call an object is a creation of the 
mind.
APPENDIX II
BERTRAND RUSSELL, ’OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD'
In the title essay of his now classic volume, Our Knowledge of the
External World, Lord Russell puts forward a hypothetical model which will
afford us probable grounds for the belief in the existence of an external
world and other minds. Inasmuch as this is his objective, we should have
no quarrel with him. He has with some clarity set forth a working hypothesis
94from the standpoint of belief. From another level, the level of knowledge, 
we must take issue with Lord Russell. For, given the criteria of knowledge 
proposed in the dissertation, we cannot accept the proofs offered by Russell 
for the existence of an external world and of other minds. In this little 
essay we shall set out certain of Russell's arguments and indicate that 
however persuasive they may be an the level of belief, they are not compel­
ling on the level of knowledge.
Russell takes for granted, "...our acquaintance with particular ob­
jects of daily life - furniture, houses, towns, other people, and so on." 
These existences are not subject to doubt. He reasons that, "...we do not,
as practical men, entertain for a moment the hypothesis that the whole edi-
95fice may be built on insecure foundations."
Now, as practical men, of course, we are in complete accord with




Lord Russell. On the level of the subject knower there are indeed houses,
96towns, and other people. But on the level of knowledge, we cannot begin 
by assuming the real existence of that which our previous inquiry calls so 
much into question. From the standpoint of knowledge, let us examine one of 
Lord Russell's proofs for the independent existence of the object.
The analytic technique of Russell is to reduce an allegedly obscure 
sentence to a sentence from which all the obscurity - as if placed through 
a linguistic filter - has been purified. For example, one possible linguis­
tic reduction of the question, "Can we know of the existence of any reality
which is independent of ourselves?" is: "Can we know of the existence of
97any reality of which our Self is not part." This latter formulation of the 
question can then be answered in the affirmative since Russell assumes that 
we can know of the existence of objects of which the Self is not part, e.g., 
a book.
Does Russell succeed on his own terms? The key word here is the word
'part*. In order to assume, as Russell does, that the book is not part of the
Self, we must assume that we can distinguish the Self and the book from each
other. But much of the preceding dissertation is devoted to showing that
98this cannot be done.
Much of Russell's analysis depends upon what he means by the terra 
1 Self'. For Russell the only philosophically relevant meaning of the term 
'Self' is:
96Vide, Preface.
970P. cit., p. 63.
98Cf. Appendix on G. E. Moore, p. 152, JE. 62.
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...the whole assemblage of things that would necessarily cease 
to exist If our life came to an end.^
In this analysis he seems to beg the question for he assumes that a book
Is one of the members of the class of things which would not cease to exist
should the Self cease to exist. Our response must be that while we may
surely believe that the book exists Independently of the subject, and while
existing on the subject-object plane must have this belief, that we can
never know that the book exists independently of the Self.
But not only is the independent existence of the object taken for
granted. The independent existence of the subject is taken for granted as
well:
Now it is fairly obvious that, whatever legitimate meaning we give 
to the Self, our thoughts and feelings are causally dependent upon 
ourself, ijSA, do not occur when there is no Self for them to 
belong to.100
What may be fairly obvious on one level certainly is not obvious on the
other. It is true that on the 3ubject-object level, subject and object are
correlative terms. Russell's conclusion that objects exist external to the
Self depends, of course, on the validity of the assumption of the existence
of the Self.*®* While this is certainly an article of reasonable belief, it
is argued in the dissertation that the subject, no more than the object,
102cannot be known to exist.
99B. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 62.
*°°Ibid., p. 63.
■^^Professor Hartshorne does not assume the existence of the substantial 
self. He does, however, have the conception of the ego in a certain state: 
"Thus the state, not the substance, the experience (in its aspect of awareness 
of something) not the ego, is the subject." C. Hartshorne, Reality as a Social 
Process, p. 70. There seems to be the concept of a subject-object relation 
present though it is much refined. There is still the distinction between 
experience and what that experience is of.
102Cf. above, £.98.
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Russell himself seems to be aware of the difficulties inherent
within his earlier formulation of the question:
It is a mistake to state the problem in the form: "Can we know of
the existence of anything other than ourselves and our states? or:
"Can we know of the existence of anything independent of ourselves?" 
because of the extreme difficulty of defining "self" and "Independent" 
precisely,103
Therefore, Russell proposes a second linguistic reductio:
The problem is: "Can the existence of anything other than our hard
data be inferred from these d a t a . "104
Is this new reductio free from the difficulties that beset the previous for­
mulation. I do not think so. The word 'our' in Russell's putatively.lin­
guistically purified formulation is parasitic upon the meaning of Self which 
Russell himself admits the difficulty of defining precisely. It was on 
account of this difficulty, among others, that Russell proposes his lin­
guistically purified version. But the second version still contains this 
difficulty! The personal pronoun 'our' is dependent for its meaning and 
its reference on the person to whom it refers. Russell has not succeeded 
on his own terms. He has not succeeded in reducing the philosophical ob­
scurities but only in making them less visible in virtue of the surface 
level clarity of the language employed. The problem remains with us no 
matter how we formulate it: "Can we know anything to exist independent of
the subject knower?"
There is a state in which the seeming reality of the independent exis­
tence of the objects of sense is considered to be an illusion, and that is the
Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 69.
104Ibid. By hard data Russell means: "...those which resist the sol­
vent influence of critical reflection...The hardest of hard data are of two 
sorts: the particular facts of sense, and the general truths of logic." Ibid.,
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dream state. Russell makes the astute point in reference to the dream state
that what happens in the dream cannot be said to be an illusion. We really
do see the objects that we see in our dreams. They are real to us. The
illusion is only in the Inference that we make about the dream objects, namely,
what connection they will have with other objects of sense. This is, I take
it, what Russell means when he says:
Objects of sense, even when they occur in dreams, are the most in­
dubitably real objects known to us. What, then, makes us call them 
unreal in dreams? Merely the unusual nature of their connection 
with other objects of sense. I dream that I am in America, but I 
wake up and find myself in England without those intervening days 
on the Atlantic which, alas!, are inseparably connected with a 
"real" visit to America.105
We may refer the reader directly to the dissertation at this point.
Lord Russell calls the dream objects unreal because they do not cohere with 
the objects in waking life. But one can turn this argument around. Why not 
call the objects in waking life unreal because they do not cohere with the 
objects in dream life? Russell takes for granted the reality of the experi­
ences in the wakingllfe. Russell tells us that:
The analogy in waking life is only to be preferred to that in dreams 
on the ground of its greater extent and consistency. 7
p. 60. We shall have more to say about some of these hard data later on. At
the moment the distinction between hard and soft data does not affect the
discussion. (By soft data Russell means: "...those \riiich, under the opera­
tion of this process, ((the process of critical reflection^ become to our
minds more or less doubtful.") Ibid., p. 60.
105Ibid., p. 71. Here, it would seem, Russell employs a criterion which 
is more ultimate than the criterion of "hard data", one of which was "particu­
lar facts of sense". Here, particular facts of sense are not enough. The 
criterion employed is the coherence of certain facts of sense with other facts 
of sense.
106Vide, First Dialogue, pp. 11-17.
1070p. cit., p. 78.
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And:
Certain uniformities are observed in waking life, while dreams seem 
quite erratic.108
But the argument from consistency, uniformity, and extent is made from the 
waking state. It is said that the waking state is more uniform while in the 
waking state. But from the point of view of the dream state the dream is 
perfectly lawful, i.e., the dream state may have its own laws but it is per­
fectly self-consistent.
But finally, and the crux is this, the argument assumes that one can
tell which state one is in at the time of the argument. If we are dreaming
now, the idea that there are two states, one of them real and the other
illusory, and one state to be preferred to the other on the grounds of its
greater consistency with other experiences, may all be part of the dream.
Russell himself seems to be well aware of this possibility:
...it is obviously possible that what we call waking life may be 
only an unusually persistent and recurrent nightmare. ...This may 
be true, since it cannot be shown to be false, yet no one can really 
believe it. 109
It is clear that on the level of knowledge, Russell appears to be in agree­
ment with us that we cannot know whether we are dreaming or awake. If we 
cannot know this, it follows that even on Russell's own analysis of the dis­
tinction between the waking and the dream state (which connects better with 
other experiences), that we cannot prove either the reality of the external 
world or of other minds. For, if we are dreaming now, it follows that the 
distinctions we consider to be real now, as the distinction between subject 
and object, Will have no reality in the waking state. This analysis is borne
108ibid.
IQ^ibid., p. 77. (emphasis after the comma is mine)
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ouc by the facts since if what we now call the dream state is in fact the 
waking state then it is quite true that the distinction between subject and 
object will be found to be Illusory since this distinction is not present in 
the dream state.
Russell, however, makes it quite clear that no one really believes 
that we are dreaming now. On the level of belief we are in complete accord 
with Lord Russell. But Russell cannot employ arguments from the level of 
belief to establish anything on the level of knowledge.
To sum up. On the level of belief the position of the dissertation 
is in accord with that of Russell's. We most certainly believe in the exis­
tence of an external world and in other minds. But on the level of knowledge 
it cannot be said that Russell's arguments have proven that we can know either 
the existence of the external world or that of other minds.
^®Cf. above, f. 106.
APPENDIX III
RALPH BARTON PERRY, PRESENT PHILOSOPHICAL TENDENCIES
In Ralph Barton Perry's very lucid and illuminating chapter on 
idealism in his book, Present Philosophical Tendencies, he puts forth a 
criticism of Berkeley in particular and idealism In general. His criticism 
may be divided into two general categories: (i) the idealist does demon­
strate that we cannot know anything but our ideas, but he draws from this 
an illegitimate inference, namely, that all that there is are our ideas 
(ii) to say that all we can know is our ideas is actually to say something 
quite trivial. Since it is true of everything that it is an item of con­
sciousness to say this is not to make a philosophic claim of any importance.
We are not saying anything more than we know what we know. Since the second 
'we know' says nothing more than the first, we are putting forth an entirely 
empty claim. We may as well simply say, ’We know'. And every knowledge claim, 
including this one, must say at least that much. Therefore, to say that we 
know only our own ideas is to say nothing at all.-^
Let us reply to each criticism individually. For the first criticism 
we may refer the reader to the appendices on Moore and Russell for the general 
criticism is the same. Professor Perry's idea is that something may exist
lllperry argues that, ..."there is nothing whatsoever to prevent a 
thing's belonging both to nature and to mind; in tfiich case it is Impossible 
to argue that because a thing belongs to mind it therefore owes its existence 
to the fact." Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 125 (emphasis his).
112This is an attempt to state Perry's famous 'ego-centric predicament'. 
In Perry's own words: "This, then, is the 'ego-centric predicament.'" ...It
should be evident that it proves nothing at all...It does, it is true, con­
tain the proposition that every mentioned thing is an Idea. But this is
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whlch Is beyond our capacity to experience. However valid this first 
criticism may be of traditional idealism, it does not come into contact 
with the position taken in the dissertation. The position of the disserta­
tion with regard to the possible existence of that which lies outside of 
our ideas is three-fold. First, the dissertation is interested only in
knowable existence. Existence which cannot be known under the criteria given
113in the dissertation falls outside of the question of the dissertation. Se­
cond, the dissertation is interested only in possible experience. Existence 
which falls outside the realm of possible experience falls outside of the 
scope of the dissertation.'*'^ Third, we must distinguish between the level 
of knowledge and the level of b e l i e f . W h i l e  we may, and for all practical
purposes, we must believe in a world which exists independently of our experi-
116ence, we cannot claim to know that such a world exists. All that we can
know to exist is experience. That something in addition to our experience may
exist is an article of belief. It can never, even in Perry's own terms, be
117an article of knowledge.
Let us turn to Perry's second criticism. Perry's second criticism is
118that it is quite redundant to say that all that we know is our knowledge.
virtually a redundant proposition to the effect that...every idea, object of 
knowledge, or experience, is an idea, object of knowledge, or experience. And 
a redundant proposition is no proposition at all. Eut what the idealist requir­
es is a proposition to the effect that everything is an idea, or that only 
ideas exist." Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 130-131 (emphasis his).
^Vide, Preface to Dissertation, Appendix on G. E. Moore, esp. £_. 63. 
n  aVide, Appendix on G. E. Moore, pp. 152-153; _f. 58, 61, 62.
^•^Vide. Preface; Appendix on Lord Russell, pp. 167-170; pp. 172-173. 
116ibid.
U 7Cf. Above, i. 95.
For the second criticism, see above, p. 174.
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But there is one consequence which follows upon the truth of this proposition 
which would appear to make this claim other than empty. To know that we can 
only know our own experience of things is to know that we can never know 
anything which exists Independently of our knowing it. While this statement 
of idealism may not establish the truth of idealism, at the very least it
establishes that we can never know the truth of realism. Should the claim
of Idealism be true, it follows that we cannot know of the things when we 
know them that they exist in just this sense were we not to know them. And
this is not to know something trivial. It is to know that the truth of
realism can never be known.
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